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"The harder we look at the dividend picture, the more it seems like a puzzle 
with pieces that just don’t fit together" (Black, 1976). The purpose of this study is to 
examine the dividend phenomenon.
The first essay o f the dissertation investigates the origins, modifications and 
adaptations of corporate dividend payments to shareholders. Contemporary theoretical 
modeling to date has neglected to acknowledge the potential influence of dividend 
payment tradition in the formulation of dividend policy.
The second essay examines the evolution of the theoretical attempts to explain 
dividend policy and empirical tests of these theories. The dividend paradigms are 
divided into models formulated in states with full information, models developed in 
states of informational asymmetries and models using behavioral rationales as the basis 
for their development. The second essay concludes with an analysis to determine if  
method of analysis, frequency of sampling observation or sample period influence the 
often contradictory results of the analyses.
The dissertation’s third essay explores the executive compensation, dividend 
policy and capital structure determination process. This essay extends existing research 
on the policies in two ways. Firm level data is used here; many of the earlier works 
use industry data. The study also seeks to determine if the policy choice interactions 
implied by earlier work can be demonstrated using a system of equations.
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
"The harder we look at the dividend picture, the more it seems like a puzzle 
with pieces that just don’t fit together" (Black, 1976). Although corporate dividend 
policy has been analyzed by financial economists for over a century and intensely 
studied for the last four decades, the theoretical models developed thus far are incapable 
of adequately explaining the continued existence of the phenomenon. The payment of 
dividends is not in the economic best interests of the shareholder, even in the absence 
of personal and corporate taxes. Despite this apparent economic absurdity, generous 
dividends continue to be paid by corporations and the dividend decision remains a major 
component of the corporate financial agenda. The purpose of this study is threefold; 
(1) to examine the historical evolution of dividend policy and determine if the 
evolutionary process can help explain the persistence of this practice, (2) to review 
comprehensively the theoretical modeling of dividend policy by financial economists 
and the empirical tests of the theories and (3) to examine the executive compensation, 
dividend policy and capital structure determination process and analyze the nature and 
significance of the associations between these three policy variables.
The first essay of the dissertation investigates the historical evolution of 
corporate dividend payments to shareholders. The literature lacks an extant 
examination of the origins, modifications and adaptations of these distributions over 
their three centuries of existence. Contemporary theoretical modeling to date has
1
neglected to acknowledge the potential influence of dividend payment tradition in the 
formulation of dividend policy.
Joint stock trading companies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries made 
the first dividend payments. These distributions to shareholders were complete 
disbursements of profits and invested capital and terminated the venture’s existence. 
The payments were soon limited to profits when shareholders and managers realized 
that maintaining the company as a going concern was more economically efficient. 
Dividend payments later became and continue today as token offerings of profits and 
earnings retained in earlier periods that are determined solely at the corporate 
manager’s discretion.
The dissertation’s second essay systematically examines the evolution of the 
theoretical attempts to explain dividend policy and empirical attempts to support these 
theories. The modern era of theoretical dividend modeling began with the Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) (M&M) irrelevance declaration. The majority of models developed 
following the seminal work of M&M rely on market imperfections as their basis for 
explaining dividend existence.
The dividend paradigms can be divided into models formulated in states with full 
information, models developed in states of informational asymmetries and models using 
behavioral rationales as the basis for their development. In the full information setting, 
theorists add the market imperfection of taxes to the perfect market world of M&M. 
The signaling, agency costs and free cash flow hypotheses are all based on the 
assumption that informational asymmetries arising from the separation of corporate
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managers and owners precipitate the need for dividend payments to shareholders. 
Behavioralists model dividends as a function of behavioral and psychological influences.
The second essay concludes with an examination of the empirical tests of 
corporate dividend policy to determine if method of analysis, frequency of sampling 
observation, sample period or journal of publication influence the often contradictory 
results of the analyses. These components are commonly cited by researchers as the 
cause of the often conflicting findings in tests of theoretical models. Categorical data 
analysis methodology is employed to describe the structural relation between the 
explanatory variables and the empirical results. The entire sample of empirical studies 
and the empirical tests of the information content of dividend hypothesis are analyzed 
to determine if choice of the method of analysis, data type and sample period influence 
the results of the studies.
The dissertation’s third essay explores executive compensation, dividend and 
capital structure policy decisions. The informational asymmetries and agency costs 
resulting from the separation of corporate management and owners can be reduced by 
the simultaneous optimization of compensation, dividend and capital structure policy 
choices (Jensen, Solberg and Zorn, 1992, Mehran, 1992 and Smith and Watts, 1992). 
Compensation contracts can be designed to foster managerial activities that benefit the 
corporation’s owners and managerial activities can be better monitored and excess cash 
flows reduced by significant dividend and debt interest payments.
This essay extends existing research on the compensation, dividend and debt 
policy determination process in two ways. This analysis uses firm level data; many of
the earlier works use industry level data. The study also seeks to determine if the 
policy choice interrelation implied by previous work can be demonstrated using a 
system of equations.
Chapter 2 traces the historical evolution of corporate dividend policy and the 
evolution of dividend policy theories is reviewed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 examines the 
determinants and interrelations of executive compensation, dividend policy and capital 
structure policy choices. Chapter 5 has concluding remarks and suggested direction for 
future research of the dividend puzzle.
CHAPTER 2
THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF CORPORATE DIVIDEND POLICY
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Corporate dividend payments to shareholders began over three hundred years 
ago and have continued as an acceptable if not required activity of corporate managers 
despite their apparent contradictory economic nature. The original payments to joint 
stock company shareholders in Holland and Great Britain were liquidating distributions 
of capital and profit that terminated the joint stock enterprise’s existence. Later 
payments were limited to the net profits of the undertakings that permitted more 
efficient use of investment capital and gave the companies perpetual existence. More 
recently, the payments have become symbolic liquidations solely determined by 
managers; dividends are paid to shareholders from a combination of profits from the 
current period and earnings retained in previous profitable periods. Although largely 
symbolic, the continued importance of a consistent and significant dividend payment to 
maintain shareholder contentment remains a managerial priority. The purpose of this 
chapter is to trace the historical evolution of corporate dividend policy.
Section 2.2 examines the early history of joint stock companies in Holland and 
Great Britain and the origins of dividend payments and policies. Section 2.3 explores 
the development of joint stock companies in Great Britain following the Bubble Act of 
1720 and the dawn of corporate activity in the United States. Section 2.4 looks at the 
rise of railroad corporations and the origins of preferred stock issues. Section 2.5
5
examines the rise of the industrial corporation in the United States following the Civil 
War. Section 2.6 analyses the meteoric rise of equities in the third decade of the 
twentieth century and the subsequent crash while Section 2.7 investigates corporate 
dividend policy over the past 50 years. The chapter closes with a brief summary.
2.2 EARLY JOINT STOCK COMPANIES: ORIGINS TO 1720
2.2.1 The Origin of the Modern Corporation
The embryonic origin o f the corporation—groups united for a common purpose— 
can be traced to Greek and Roman times (Williston, 1888a). Precursors of the modern 
corporation were found in Italy where merchants of the fourteenth century formed loose 
federations for limited purposes (Scott, 1912). Cooperatives of merchants and traders 
appeared in Denmark at approximately the same time (Kindleberger, 1984). These 
coalitions became more specialized during the next two centuries (Scott, 1912).
In the first fifty years o f the sixteenth century, successful sailing captains began 
selling "ventures on parts" in their voyages to investors. Parts were bought and sold 
in the open market; by the end of the sixteenth century, these parts were replaced by 
fixed denomination shares (Masselman, 1963). The most common denomination of the 
shares was 1/32 of the ship’s property but interests o f 1/8, 1/16, 1/48, and 1/56 were 
not uncommon. Investors regularly purchased shares from more than one captain to 
diversify their risk of loss from the misfortunes common to sailing ventures of the 
period (Barbour, 1929).
Joint stock companies evolved from these merchant associations due to the high 
capital requirements of foreign trade (Kindleberger, 1984). Investors (shareholders)
provided capital for these corporations while sailing captains (managers) used their 
special skills to employ the assets profitably and pay dividends to the shareholders 
(Warren, 1923). The first joint stock company organized in Great Britain was the 
Eastland Trading Company, originally chartered in the fifteenth century and granted 
monopoly trading rights to the Baltic countries. This enterprise was followed in the 
sixteenth century by the Muscovy Company and the Levant Company, chartered for 
trading with Russia and with Turkey respectively (Scott, 1912). The charters granted 
to joint stock companies were not perpetual—rather the licenses were granted for 
definite and limited periods to allow the government to alter the provisions of the 
charter and collect additional fees and taxes (Kindleberger, 1984). Without exception, 
these trading companies produced significant profits for their owners (Scott, 1912).
2.2.2 Joint Stock Companies in Holland
The Dutch East India Company was formed in Holland in 1602 and granted a 
monopoly for trading with India (Van Loon, 1913). This enterprise was the first 
permanently organized joint stock company (Kindleberger, 1984). Shares of the 
venture began trading in Amsterdam almost immediately after the original stock 
subscription was completed.
More than half of the original capital for the venture was raised from the 
merchants of Amsterdam. In the early years of the company, the organization paid 75 
percent dividends; the high dividend level was largely the result of reckless abuse of 
the new trading territories. During its first fifteen years, the company’s dividends 
averaged 25 percent (Scott, 1912).
The market for exchange of shares was held out-of-doors in Holland until a 
building was erected for this purpose in Amsterdam in 1613. Demand for the shares 
was stimulated by the expectation of high profits from the company’s endeavors and the 
desire to participate in those profits by individuals excluded from the original share 
subscription. The demand for the shares by individuals and non-member merchants 
quickly increased the price of the shares by 15 percent (Ehrenberg, 1963).
Circulation of news of the venture from correspondents across the globe and 
rumors of its successes and failures increased speculation in the shares. Professional 
traders also used eavesdroppers and spies to glean private information. Rumors were 
often started depending solely on a trader’s current position (Schama, 1987). Orders 
for the sale of a large number of shares entered by professional traders led to an flood 
of sale orders by frightened amateur investors to sell their shares and a drop in share 
price. The professional would profit by repurchasing the shares at a lower price (Allen 
and Gale, 1992). Trading was primarily in futures and liberal settlement dates 
increased share volume and volatility (Ehrenberg, 1963). The line between casual 
wagering and organized stock trading was often blurred. Speculators traded in hope 
of earning profits from the short term price fluctuations rather than from the profits 
arising from successful completion of the voyages (Schama, 1987).
The company monopolized the spice trade in Holland. In 1632, seven ships 
returned from India laden with spices. The cargo was sold at five times the venture’s 
cost. In 1661, goods were sold at twice their cost to the company. In 1672, the 
company’s worst year during the 17th century, cargos worth in excess of 40,000,000
guilders were brought to the republic. The average gain to the company per pound of 
spice was 1200 percent (Van Loon, 1913).
Merchant ships of the period were often accompanied on their expeditions by 
armed men-of-war. Although the practice originated during the middle ages, the 
foremost use of the convention was with the organized trade of the Dutch East India 
Company. The lack of competition among the ships of the venture and the common 
ownership of the vessels precluded the fear of the loss of monopoly rents common to 
single ship endeavors of the period (Barbour, 1929).
The Dutch East India Company was not managed by a single individual; rather, 
the company was divided into four chambers, each representing a fixed number of 
shares that had been purchased by investors from a distinct geographical area. 
Inhabitants of other provinces could hold stock individually but had no influence on 
managerial policy. Each chamber sent ships in proportion to their ownership of the 
company; the ships and all potential profits from those ships remained the sole property 
of that chamber. The company had a general board of directors with 46 members but 
immediate power was centered in a 17 member Board of Governors.
Minority stockholders holding less than five shares had no voice in the 
company’s operations—these investors were allowed only to accept their dividends from 
the directors and express their profound gratitude for such excellent management. No 
shareholder meetings were held, no annual nor quarterly reports were issued, nor were 
Board of Governor meeting minutes kept. The high level of dividends quieted any 
potential investor anxieties. Financial juggling by managers kept dividend payments
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high throughout the seventeenth century. A share purchased at the time of original 
subscription produced dividends exceeding 35 times the initial purchase price during the 
company’s first eighty years of business. During the 180 years of the company’s 
existence, dividend payments averaged 21 percent annually.
The Dutch West India Company was founded in 1621 but, unlike the Dutch East 
India Company, it was not granted a strict trading monopoly. Shareholders had a more 
direct influence in the company’s operations. The 74-member board o f directors was 
chosen from all owners possessing at least two shares o f stock. A committee o f 19 
directors was given direct managerial control. The company’s trade areas included the 
west coast of Africa, the east coast of America, and all islands between and south of 
the two coasts. The Dutch West India Company was unsuccessful from its inception 
due to competition and other exogenous factors (Van Loon, 1913).
2.2.3 Joint Stock Companies in Great Britain
The most important joint stock venture in Great Britain was the British East 
India Company, formed in 1599 as a spinoff of the Levant Company. The British East 
India Company was granted a charter and monopoly trading rights by Act of Parliament 
in 1600 (Baskin, 1988). The first agreement between a loosely organized group of 
merchants was for one voyage; proceeds from the sale of cargo and company assets 
were divided among the shareholders at the end of the voyage proportionate to their 
ownership (Kindleberger, 1984). The assets o f the venture were liquidated at the 
conclusion of each voyage to prevent fraudulent practices and to insure that proper 
division of proceeds to shareholders was accomplished (Baskin, 1988).
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The limited number of original shares were primarily sold among acquaintances. 
Shareholders had unlimited liability and were subject to calls for additional funds if  
needed. Management and ownership were completely independent with managers 
chosen according to their ability and knowledge of the venture rather than their 
proportion of ownership in the company (Baskin, 1988). A governor, deputy governor, 
and 24 committees made up the management structure (Scott, 1912). The ownership 
of shares was transferrable through sale of the shares but it was understood that any 
change of ownership would be limited to individuals known by the other stockholders 
(Baskin, 1988). Between 1609 and 1613, distributions of profit and principal from 
voyages totaled between 120 and 240 percent (Scott, 1912); a significant portion was 
paid in articles acquired during the expeditions. These divisions of principal and profits 
closely resembled liquidating dividends (Preinreich, 1978).
The first joint stock shares of the British East India Company were issued in 
1613 with the cost of the shares to be paid over a four-year period. For record keeping 
convenience, each share had an equal and definite value (Williston, 1888b). Four 
voyages were scheduled with separate capital raised for each expedition through the 
installment payments required by the purchase of stock. Divisions from the company 
averaged 31 percent of share purchase price per year from its inception through 1617 
(Scott, 1912) and totaled over 150 percent for the first five years after the initial joint 
stock sale (Baskin, 1988).
By 1617, the company had 934 shareholders and 36 ships; seven additional 
voyages were scheduled. Not all voyages were profitable due to the high risk and
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uncertainty associated with sea voyages (Kindleberger, 1984); depressed economic 
conditions in Great Britain and an outbreak o f plague in London contributed to the ioss 
of profitability (Scott, 1912). The shares sold more than 30 percent below the original 
offering price from 1617-1634 due to the company’s poor performance (Ehrenberg, 
1963).
The minimum investment allowed in the company had increased to £100 by 
1657 (Scott, 1912). Voting rights required an investment o f at least £500 with smaller 
investors being allowed to pool their holdings to reach voting status. An investment 
of £1000 was required for committee membership (Williston, 1888b). An independent 
appraisal o f company assets was scheduled in 1664 with subsequent appraisals to occur 
at three-year intervals. Following each appraisal, shareholders were allowed to 
exchange their proportion of ownership for cash and their shares were sold to a new 
investor. New stockholders were also required to pay an admission fee to the company 
in addition to the share purchase price.
Liquidation o f assets at the end o f each voyage proved to be inefficient since a 
portion of the proceeds were invariably paid in the form of commodities acquired on 
the voyage. The success o f the company and the subsequent confidence of the 
shareholders in the corporation’s managers led to a belief among shareholders that 
accountability could be accomplished exclusively through the payment of generous 
dividends (Baskin, 1988). This fundamental right of the shareholder to receive 
dividends was recognized from the initial joint stock offerings (Williston, 1888b). A 
20 percent dividend paid exclusively from profits was declared in 1661 and paid in
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1662. Once begun, the practice of paying dividends solely from profits continued; a 
dividend of 20 percent was paid again in 1663 and 1664. The 1664 appraisal conducted 
after dividend payment showed a 30 percent undistributed capital gain. The 40 percent 
dividend declared in 1665 included the undistributed capital gain of 30 percent and an 
additional 10 percent dividend from profits (Scott, 1912).
The trading price of the shares varied independently of the level of dividends 
during this period. Despite the large dividends paid between 1665 and 1667, the shares 
routinely sold below par. Between 1668 and 1670, when no dividend was paid, the 
stock price traded above par . The turnover of shares was small during the period 
despite the well distributed ownership; the largest holding in the company at the time 
was less than one percent of the total outstanding stock. This pattern was indicative of 
a general shareholder confidence in the firm’s managers.
Dividends from 1671 through 1677 totaled 130 percent. In 1677, the stock price 
reached £245; a dividend of 40 percent was paid in 1678. In addition, a distribution 
of one-half percent was made in damaged calico. Between 1675 and 1681, dividends 
averaged greater than 20 percent each year with total dividends for the period totalling 
more than 150 percent (Scott, 1912); the stock at the same time traded between £300 
and £500 (Ehrenberg, 1963). Although impressive, these returns were not exorbitant 
when compared with other joint stock company dividends of the period (Scott, 1912). 
The 1678 appraisal value of the company exceeded £1,750,000 with more than 
£1,000,000 in undistributed profits. Beginning in 1681, the corporate directors 
instituted an annual gift to the King from corporate profits.
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Table 2.1 shows the trading price, cash dividends and stock dividends o f the 
British East India Company between 1662 and 1720. The highest dividend paid in any 
single year was 50 percent that was paid in 1680, 1682, 1689 and 1691. The British 
East India Company failed to pay dividends for eight consecutive years beginning in 
1692. The price of the stock showed considerable volatility during the period, trading 
from £60 to £900 per share (Scott, 1912).
TABLE 2.1
TRADING PRICE RANGE, CASH DIVIDENDS AND STOCK DIVIDENDS OF 
THE BRITISH EAST INDIA COMPANY1
1662-1720













1 From Scott, William Robert, 1912, The Constitution and Finance o f English, 
Scottish, and Irish Joint Stock Companies to 1720, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
The British East India Company also employed men-of-war to protect their 
vessels. Private marine insurers began to provide insurance against the loss of ships 
involved in the expeditions. Insurance providers were more successful and reputable
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in Holland and many British ships were insured by Dutch companies despite the higher 
premiums charged by these firms. Premiums were highly volatile, varying from 3 to 
4 percent in peacetime to over 15 percent in time of war (Barbour, 1929).
The success of the early trading companies increased the public’s interest and 
acceptance of joint stock ventures during the seventeenth century (Baskin, 1988). 
Although stock and share dealing was largely unorganized before 1680, by the middle 
of the next decade a highly developed securities market had evolved (Morgan and 
Thomas, 1969). London coffee shops served as the first venues of security trading. 
Corporate activity climaxed between 1690 and 1720 (Baskin, 1988). Before 1691, only 
three joint stock companies existed and all of these were trading companies—the East 
India Company, the Royal African Company and the Hudson’s Bay Company 
(Williston, 1888a). Increases in trade and the subsequent improvement in the general 
economic conditions precipitated the formation and issuance of stock by 100 new 
companies between 1691 and 1695 (Kindleberger, 1984). These issues included 
mining, banking, clothing and utility companies (Ehrenberg, 1963). The lack of cash 
dividend payments by the East India Company during the period did not discourage 
potential investors from purchasing the shares of the joint stock companies (Scott,
1912). Speculation in joint stock issues increased to frenzied levels and share prices, 
new issues and volatility rose to unprecedented levels (Baskin, 1988). The East India 
Company resumed cash dividends in 1700 and the stock price increased eight-fold over 
the next two decades (Scott, 1912). The total capitalization of joint stock companies 
reached £21,000,000 by 1717, a fourfold increase in 22 years (Kindleberger, 1978).
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New company formation continued at a frantic pace—in the twelve months beginning 
in September 1719, 195 new companies were formed (Kindleberger, 1984).
Trading and speculating in new and established issues continued to accelerate. 
This rampant growth was further fueled by allowing investors to purchase shares for 
only 5-10 percent of their market price; shareholders were subject to future calls for 
the balance owed on the shares. The low down payment was justified by the belief that 
a new company’s need for funds was a gradual process and that regular infusions of 
capital from the shareholder payments would increase the safety of the firm’s creditors 
(Scott, 1912).
The South Sea Company was granted a charter in 1711 for the purpose of 
consolidating the national debt of Great Britain and replacing the debt with corporate 
stock. Secondary issues provided funds for the company to pay exorbitant dividends 
to original issue shareholders. Other fraudulent practices including income and 
dividend manipulations were also common. The South Sea Company’s stock price 
increased ten-fold before its inevitable collapse (Kindleberger, 1978). The debacle of 
the South Sea Company and the subsequent passage of the Bubble Act in 1720 greatly 
limited the promotion and development of the joint stock companies in Great Britain 
over the next four decades (Baskin, 1988). The Act made unincorporated joint stock 
companies illegal and placed severe stipulations on new company formation (Clark, 
1929a). Corporations could not be established without an explicit charter from 
Parliament and the sale of shares was prohibited (Davis, 1917).
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2.2.4 Joint Stock Companies in the Colonies and Early Dividend Regulations
The earliest corporations in the American Colonies were public corporations— 
cities and towns. Before the end of the seventeenth century, private corporations began 
to appear. These corporations were modeled after English corporations using English 
law and with corporate charters granted by the Crown. Private corporations were 
distinguished from public corporations by their private support and control. The most 
common type of private corporations of the period were those organized for religious 
worship. No joint stock business corporations existed in the American colonies before 
1720 (Davis, 1917).
The establishment of permanently capitalized joint stock companies produced the 
first dividend payment regulations. Corporate charters of the late seventeenth century 
routinely limited dividend payments to profits only. This practice became more 
commonplace in the eighteenth century (Williston, 1888a).
In 1697, Parliament enacted a statute making the recipients of a dividend paid 
from capital of the Bank of England liable to bank creditors (Kindleberger, 1984). By 
1700, two statutory standards existed—the profit rule and the capital impairment rule. 
The profit rule’s objective was preservation of a minimum asset level to insure 
repayment of the company’s creditor claims. The capital impairment rule developed 
to ensure a corporation’s continued existence. Early law developed solely from 




Corporate dividends began as divisions of venture capital and profits based on 
original investor contribution. The widespread success of joint stock endeavors led to 
the distribution of dividends solely from voyage profits. Company capital remained 
intact and the enterprise continued as a going concern. Corporate managers rapidly 
realized the importance of generous dividends for investor satisfaction. The use of 
profits only to pay dividends and prohibition against capital impairment by excess 
dividend payments were restrictions imposed on corporate dividend policy within fifty 
years of the first profit only dividend payments.
2.3 JOINT STOCK COMPANIES AFTER THE BUBBLE ACT AND THE FIRST 
U. S. CORPORATIONS: 1720 TO 1800
2.3.1 Joint Stock Companies in Holland and Great Britain
The replacement of the able managers of the seventeenth century Dutch East
India Company with managers chosen solely on the basis of their family background
and social acquaintances severely affected the company’s profitability (Van Loon,
1913). During the eighteenth century, the Board of Governors was forced to secretly
borrow funds from financial institutions outside of Holland to maintain the level of
dividend payments (Kindleberger, 1984). After 1770, credit was maintained with great
difficulty; by 1780, the company was practically bankrupt. The company continued to
pay dividends providing a "splendid income" to shareholders up to its collapse in 1795
(Van Loon, 1913).
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In Great Britain, the passage of the Bubble Act of 1720 by Parliament severely 
limited the organization of new joint stock companies (Baskin, 1988). The first 
companies granted charters after the Bubble Act were canal companies. These 
companies doubled the length of canals in Great Britain between 1730 and 1790 
(Kindleberger, 1984). More than 100 of these companies were organized before 1800; 
81 began operation between 1791 and 1794 alone (Hunt, 1936). Although speculation 
in these shares occurred, the level of speculation was mild compared with the railway 
mania that would transpire fifty years later (Kindleberger, 1984).
2.3.2 Joint Stock Companies in the United States
Business corporations in the colonies before the American Revolution were few 
in number and of little importance; their structure and organization were not typical of 
modern firms. The New London Society United for Trade and Commerce, established 
in 1732, was the first U. S. business corporation. The second was the Union Wharf 
Company of New Haven organized in 1760. No evidence exists of the payment of 
dividends by these corporations before 1800; all earnings were used for expansion and 
maintenance of existing assets.
The Philadelphia Contributionship for the Insuring of Houses from Loss by Fire, 
the first corporation with modern corporate characteristics, was chartered in 
Philadelphia in 1768 (Davis, 1917). This company was the only business corporation 
with a charter predating the Declaration of Independence (Williston, 1888b). A number 
of whaling, mining and manufacturing corporations were chartered during the 25 years 
following the American Revolution and many unincorporated companies were founded.
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The first true banking corporation, the Bank of North America, was chartered 
in 1781 in Philadelphia with local citizens purchasing the majority of the shares 
(Williston, 1888b). The company was highly profitable from its beginning and paid a
4.5 percent dividend after six months of operation. Dividends of 14.5 percent and 13.5 
percent were paid in 1784 and 1785, respectively. Shareholder income from dividends 
averaged 9.4 percent for the next century. The Bank of New York, another early joint 
stock company, paid a 3 percent semiannual dividend from 1784-1791. By 1793, over 
twenty banks were in operation. The shares of these stocks usually sold above par due 
to their generous and consistent dividend payments. Bank stocks averaged 8.6 percent 
dividends, usually paid semi-annually, between 1782 and 1800 (Davis, 1917). Table
2.2 shows the dividends paid by banking corporations on common stocks each year 
between 1785 and 1800.
New issue sales and share trading became commonplace. The most common 
method of security sale was by public auction. An influx of European funds for 
investment in U. S. companies and speculation led to four semi-annual upswings in 
stock prices between 1789-1791. Newspaper quotes of stock prices began to appear in 
1786 and became a regular feature of newspapers as early as 1789 (Davis, 1917).
Between 1783 and 1800, 74 charters were granted to corporations to enhance 
inland navigation. The results of these firms were disproportionate to the efforts. 
Although the canals offered increased convenience, the companies were unable to pay 
cash dividends to their investors. Toll bridge and water supply companies of the period 
also failed to pay significant dividends to their shareholders.
TABLE 2.2
U. S. BANK STOCK DIVIDENDS BY YEAR1 
1785-1800
Bank 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800
North America 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.0 13.5 12.5 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 11.0 10.0
New York 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.0 10.5 8.5 9.0 13.5 9.0 9.0 13.5 9.0 9.0 13.5
Massachusetts 2.5 5.0 6.5 7.5 8.5 22.75 19.0 27.33 8.0 8.0 10.5 8.5 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0
Maryland - -- - -- -- -- 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0
United States -- - -- - - -- - 8.0 7.5 8.0 8.0 8.0 9.0 8.0 8.0 10.0
Providence - -- - - -- -- -- 7.5 7.0 7.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 10.5 10.0
South Carolina - -- -- -- -- - - 9.0 9.0 15.0 15.0 7.52 tf3 # U tt
Hartford - - - -- -- -- -- - 3.5 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.0
Union (Boston) - -- -- -- -- -- - - 8.0 8.0 8.5 10.0 10.0 9.0 9.0 9.0
New Haven - -- - -- -- -- -- - - -- -- 0.0 8.0 8.25 6.0 6.0
Pennsylvania ~ -- -- -- -- - - - -- -- - 8.0 8.0 10.00 9.5 9.5
Rhode Island — -- — — — — -- — — — — 5.5 8.0 8.0 10.0 10.0
1 From Davis, Joseph S., 1917, Essays in the Earlier History o f American Corporations, Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
2 For Six Months
3 Not Available
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The 33 insurance companies chartered from 1768-1800 were for the most part 
financially prosperous. Although dividends were paid by these companies to their 
shareholders, the variance in the amount and the reliability of the dividend payments 
was much more pronounced than in the dividends received from banking corporations.
Between 1789 and 1800, eight manufacturing firms were chartered. The success 
of these companies was at best equal to the success of unincorporated manufacturing 
firms of the period. Shareholders were not rewarded with dividends; all profits were 
reinvested in the companies to finance growth and expansion (Davis, 1917). By the 
close of the eighteen century, 335 American corporations existed, over 90 percent of 
these were incorporated after 1789 (Kehl, 1941).
Practically no general statutes governing corporations existed before 1800. 
Corporations and investors relied on English precedents to determine the legality of 
corpoiate operations (Davis, 1917). No specific provisions in the charter protected the 
interests of the company’s creditors—these creditors were safeguarded only by existing 
common law principles (Warren, 1923).
Of paramount importance to American dividend law was the Bank of England 
charter of 1694. Large sections of the charter were copied verbatim by Alexander 
Hamilton when writing the Bank of the United States charter. The only significant 
change in the charter was the assignment of liability for incurred indebtedness due to 
excess dividend payment. In the original charter, shareholders were liable for the 
debts; in the U. S. charter, the board of directors were held accountable for the 
indebtedness. The same policy of board of director liability was followed in subsequent
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bank charters in the United States (Kehl, 1941). Although corporate statutes varied 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the board of director liability held across the United 
States (Briggs, 1933). Shareholder liability was unlimited (Clark, 1929a).
The 1781 charter of the Bank of North America granted the board o f directors 
the power to regularly pay the proper amount of dividends out of corporate profits. 
The 1784 charter of the Bank of New York contained a similar clause. The 1790 Bank 
of the United States charter was the first to specify payment of semi-annual dividends 
from profits (Davis, 1917).
2.3.3 Summary
The recognition of the importance of a consistent dividend stream led to less 
than legitimate financial practices by the managers of joint stock companies when 
corporate profits proved to be insufficient to continue dividend payments at established 
levels. The passage of the Bubble Act in 1720, largely the result of these fraudulent 
activities, limited the further development of joint stock companies in Great Britain 
during the last eighty years of the eighteenth century.
In the United States, the number of both incorporated and unincorporated joint 
stock companies grew rapidly following the American Revolution. The first banking 
corporations in the United States began to pay substantial dividends soon after their 
inception. Other joint stock companies in the United States were less successful in their 
efforts to pay shareholders generous dividends; some of these corporations used current 
earnings to fund expansions and other investment opportunities while other ventures
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were less than profitable. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, dividends had 
become symbolic liquidations rather than distributions of net profits.
2.4 THE RISE OF THE RAILROADS AND PREFERRED STOCK: 1800-1865
2.4.1 Corporate Activity in Great Britain
The dawn of the nineteenth century in Great Britain found a renewed investor 
interest in corporate securities (Kindleberger, 1984). This revival was largely the result 
of investor perception of railroad and canal corporations as civic improvement 
companies rather than parsimonious profit seekers. The perceived increase in 
legitimacy decreased the public’s fear of fraudulent activity (Baskin, 1988). Annual 
dividend payments of 7-12 percent by publicly traded banking firms also boosted 
investor confidence (Hunt, 1936). A price list of publicly traded securities began to be 
a regular feature in the newspapers of the era and the number of issue quotes published 
grew rapidly (Hunt, 1936). Shares of 30 different corporations were available for 
purchase by investors in 1815 (Conant, 1904).
A boom in English insurance company stocks occurred during the third decade 
of the nineteenth century; the rapid growth and abundant success of these companies 
intensified speculation in joint stock companies (Hunt, 1936). At the same time, the 
market was inundated with new issues; 624 new companies issued stock between 1823 
and 1825 (Kindleberger, 1984). Parliament received 250 joint stock company 
applications for incorporation in April 1824 alone (Hunt, 1936). The financial collapse 
of 1827 led to the failure of 75 percent of the firms organized between 1823 and 1825; 
most of the others had failed by 1843 (Baskin, 1988). Joint stock banks generally
25
emerged from the period unscathed with the majority of the 40 banks organized 
between 1826 and 1833 remaining profitable and paying dividends of between 7 and 12 
percent in 1833. Insurance companies were also generally successful; all but one o f the 
companies organized during the boom were paying dividends to shareholders in 1843 
(Hunt, 1936).
Great Britain’s first railroad stock began trading in 1825. For the next decade, 
an average of five new railroad companies issued shares each year. In 1836, 29 
railroad corporations sold stock for the first time and the initial sale of shares of 17 
additional transportation companies occurred in 1837 (Kindleberger, 1984).
Before 1840, most railroad stocks were marketed and traded in local markets; 
the majority of shareholders were not London financiers but local investors with 
knowledge of the venture’s benefits and profit potential (Baskin, 1988). Several of 
these issues were paying dividends in excess of 10 percent by 1840 and almost all of 
the companies paid dividends of at least 6 percent. By 1844, these issues had 
developed a reputation among investors for their security and profitability (Hunt, 1936). 
Railroad issues experienced an almost manic boom over the next ten years; the trading 
activity and price increases were unprecedented in British financial history. A flood 
of new issues were offered to investors; these shares required small initial payments for 
purchase. The market collapsed in 1847 when calls for additional capital led to the sale 
of shares by investors unable to meet those calls. Of the large number of companies 
organized between 1844 and 1868, only 42 percent were still operating at the end of 
the period (Hunt, 1936).
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Corporate finance of railroad companies in the middle o f the nineteenth century 
was fraught with dishonesty. Dividends were commonly declared before profits were 
determined and were often paid out of accumulated capital or from the proceeds of 
subsequent issues (Kindleberger, 1984). The aggregate nominal dividend return on 
railroad stocks in 1854 was 3.39 percent (Baskin, 1988).
The repeal of the Bubble Act in 1824 removed most of the existing restrictions 
on joint stock company organization but kept the requirement of Parliamentary approval 
for incorporation. This stipulation was not lifted until an act allowing general 
incorporation was passed in 1856. The act also included a provisions granting 
shareholders limited liability (Kindleberger, 1984). The share price of corporation 
stocks rose steadily in the decade following the enactment of the limited liability statute, 
especially the price o f shares o f those companies incorporated after the act’s passage. 
Shares requiring full payment at purchase became the rule rather than the exception of 
securities of this period (Jeffreys, 1954). The limited liability clause provided the 
impetus for the formation of over 2500 new companies between 1856 and 1862 (Hunt, 
1936); the securities market continued to grow rapidly for the next twenty years 
(Shannon, 1954). Unfortunately, the limited liability provision had no effect on the 
investor’s personal risk when purchasing shares offered by joint stock companies; the 
average life of initial issue corporations of the period was less than four years 
(MacGregor, 1929).
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2.4.2 Corporate Activity in the United States
Between 1800 and 1823, 557 manufacturing corporations were incorporated in 
the United States with over half of the new corporations based in New York or 
Massachusetts. Cotton manufacturing corporation dividends during the period averaged 
5.5%; the textile mill dividends averaged almost twice that rate. Textile makers paid 
dividends of between 10 and 20 percent during the War of 1812 (Clark, 1929a).
Manufacturing corporation profits in the United States increased significantly 
following the War of 1812. The industrial revolution increased production, wealth and 
precipitated a change in business methods of American corporations (Faulkner, 1924). 
The allure of increased profits enticed outside investors to contribute capital to these 
ventures (Davis, 1917); equity sales became the mills’ most important source of capital 
in the first half of the nineteenth century (Davis, 1971). Up to this time, many of the 
textile mills had been closely held. Share par values ranged from 25 to 1000 dollars 
per share (Clark, 1929a). Despite these advances, only a few U. S. financial firms 
were capitalized in excess of $500,000; the majority of manufacturing and other 
industry corporations had less than $50,000 capital (Davis, 1917).
U.S. corporate issues began to be offered for sale in Great Britain during the 
early nineteenth century. Shares of existing corporations as well as new issues were 
sold through investment bankers with offices in the United States and Great Britain 
(Carosso, 1970). Sales commissions averaged 1-2 percent originally but increased 
competition in the middle of the century between investment bankers halved commission 
rates (Hidy, 1941).
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The temporary shutdown of many of the mills for two years following the War 
of 1812 was followed by payment of between 6 and 8 percent dividends for the next 
ten years. The losses and lack of dividends during the Panic o f 1829 were offset by 
dividends averaging 13.33 percent for the three years following the recession. Textile 
dividends averaged 7.6 percent between 1825 and 1830 and 14.5 percent between 1831 
and 1860.
The beginning of the Civil War brought another increase in profitability and a 
further increase in Northeast textile mill dividends. Dividends increased from 8 percent 
in 1860 to between 10 and 20 percent the following year. One textile mill paid a 66 
percent dividend to its shareholders in 1861. Textile corporation paid dividends of 25 
to 50 percent in 1865, the most profitable year in the industry’s history (Clark, 1929b).
Early offerings of U. S. railroad company shares were primarily retailed to local 
investors with knowledge of the profit potential. Most of the capital raised for railroad 
construction in areas with high population density and a large number of potential 
investors was through the sale of equities. This practice was especially common in 
New England. In contrast, western U. S. railroads were primarily financed with 
mortgage bonds due to fewer potential investors (Baskin, 1988).
Beginning around 1800, special charters began to provide remedy against capital 
impairment caused by board of director dividend declaration and payment. Although 
the profit rule and the capital impairment rule became common in U. S. corporate 
charters before 1825, dividend policy continued to be governed by special clauses in 
each corporate charter. The first general dividend statute, enacted in New York in
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1825, made it unlawful to pay dividends except out of corporate profits. The 
corporation’s board of directors was liable for damages if the law was violated. The 
statute was widely copied by other states. A third general rule, the insolvency rule, 
was first adopted in Massachusetts in 1830. This rule prohibited the payment of a 
dividend when the firm was insolvent or the declaration or payment of a dividend that 
would make the firm insolvent. As with the profit rule, the corporation’s board of 
directors were held accountable for this action. This rule was readily adopted by other 
states (Kehl, 1941).
2.4.3 The Origins of Preferred Stock
Transportation companies in 1836 were the first U. S. corporations to employ 
more than one class of stock (Evans, 1929). Railroad companies needed additional 
infusions of capital but poor financial conditions precluded raising additional funds from 
new investors to complete construction projects and current investors were not likely 
to increase their investments in the companies due to a lack of dividends or capital 
gains on their earlier investments (Baskin, 1988). The idea for preferred stocks can be 
traced to Europe where shares with dividend priority or preference already existed 
(Evans, 1929). Transportation, clothing, brewing and manufacturing corporations in 
Great Britain and Germany commonly used multiple classes of stock at this time 
(Evans, 1931).
States were petitioned by transportation companies for aid for both existing 
project completion and new projects. In 1836, Maryland legislators introduced a bill 
providing public funds for projects in return for a guaranteed dividend from the stock
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issue. The bill passed with the semi-annual dividend payments starting three years after 
stock issuance. This initial offering was soon followed by preferred stock issue by 
other corporations in Maryland and in other states. Some of the issues were designed 
to convert to common shares on a future date while others remained non-participating 
preferred stocks. One issue also allowed the state to have control over the 
corporation’s board of director appointments (Evans, 1929).
The second stage in the development of preferred stock began in the next decade 
with the sale of shares to private investors. The promise of regular dividends was 
exchanged for new funds. Since original equity issue investors had received no 
dividends from their investments, two classes of shares evolved; a class of stock with 
guaranteed dividends and another with no guarantee of dividends. Preferred stock 
became an accepted vehicle for emergency fund raising by transportation corporations; 
several new railroad preferred issues began trading between 1843 and 1850. Around 
1850, nine different preferred issues were available for purchase by investors. These 
early guaranteed dividend issues were sold only in time of financial need for expansion 
or reconstruction of existing lines rather than in initial offerings.
The dividend rate and period of payment varied considerably among issues 
during this period but dividend rates of 10 to 12 percent of original issue price were not 
unusual. The high rates of returns were required to secure investor interest and give 
original issue purchasers the opportunity to earn a fair return on their total investment 
by increasing their stake in the firm. The board of directors or shareholders determined 
the duration of the dividend payment and the level of the payment. As a rule, the
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shares were preferred only until a dividend was paid on all shares; then the stock was 
converted to common shares. The dividends were cumulative, non-participating and 
carried the same voting rights as common shares (Evans, 1929).
Until 1850, preferred stock was used as a temporary mechanism for increasing 
capital and employed almost exclusively by the railroad industry. Issuance of preferred 
stock before 1850 was invariably associated with financial distress. Bond interest was 
often paid with the proceeds from preferred stock issues. As the number of preferred 
issues grew, the security developed a distinct place in corporate structure with more 
clearly defined rights and privileges. The uses of issue proceeds and characteristics of 
the issues also began to diverge. The participation feature became customary in 
preferred stock issues (Evans, 1931); however, the issues were for the most part non­
participating in the event of asset distribution (Stevens, 1937).
In 1855, ten railroad preferred issues were trading; in twenty years the number 
had increased to 44 issues. Companies began to issue more than one class of preferred 
stock. At the same time, several of the corporations began to limit the rights of 
preferred shareholders (Evans, 1931). The last fifty years of the nineteenth century saw 
railroad stock in the United States develop into the predominant public market in 
corporate securities (Baskin, 1988).
The Pennsylvania Railroad Corporation used preferred stock to fund the merger 
activity that made it the world’s largest corporation in 1871. The company 
strengthened the investor’s perception of preferred stock—a security without the negative 
connotation often associated with fixed income securities and less risky than equity
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issues. The attractive dividend rate and dependability of equity dividends o f preferred 
stock also helped increase the public’s opinion of common stock as a legitimate 
investment vehicle (Baskin, 1988).
During the late nineteenth century, the Pennsylvania Railroad Corporation 
retained a portion of its earnings. This policy, although not uncommon in the United 
States, prompted investors in Great Britain to send representatives to meet with 
corporate management and express their opinion that all corporate earnings should be 
distributed to shareholders (Baskin, 1988).
Although the power to issue preferred shares was given expressly by statute, 
exceptions were not uncommon. The legal system of the time viewed preferred issues 
as a form of mortgage on company assets (Evans, 1929). Around 1852, a change in 
the legal process of preferred share issuance occurred due to the increase in the number 
of issues. General acts rather than specific acts allowing preferred stock issue became 
customary (Evans, 1931).
2.4.4 Summary
Paying consistent dividends remained of paramount importance to managers 
during the first half o f the nineteenth century. Less than scrupulous corporate managers 
continued to resort to fraudulent activities to maintain the payment stream. Limited 
shareholder liability became a standard during the first half of the century and general 
statutes governing dividend payments began to be enacted. Preferred stock matured 
from its original use as a simple alternative capital raising instrument to a security with 
its own unique set of characteristics.
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2.5 THE RISE OF THE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION: 1865-1920
2.5.1 Corporate Activity in Great Britain
The number of joint stock companies in Great Britain increased rapidly during 
the last two decades of the nineteenth century from 1302 corporations in 1880 to 6182 
in 1898 (Conant, 1904). In 1914, 76.4 percent of corporate earnings in Great Britain 
was paid to shareholders in the form of dividends (Baskin, 1988); preferred stock 
dividend requirements consumed 21 percent of the earnings while the remaining 55 
percent was used to pay common stock dividends. The higher personal tax rate in 
Great Britain necessitated higher dividend payments by British corporations than their 
American counterparts (Montgomery, 1927).
2.5.2 Corporate Activity in the United States
Before 1865, equity was the most important source of capital for U. S. 
manufacturing corporations. The need for investment capital was greatest when the 
firm was least able to find funds—during initial organization. This pattern was 
especially true of the textile industry. Legal restrictions against stock issues at less than 
par and the average proprietor’s aversion to dilution of ownership and managerial 
control restricted capital raising success. Most manufacturing firms before 1880 
remained closely held—75 percent of the shares of the eleven largest textile mills of the 
period were held by less than 750 investors (Davis, 1917).
Following the Civil War, the majority of Northern manufacturing companies 
paid regular dividends. The Lowell Company, the premier textile manufacturer in New 
England, averaged paying 18 percent dividends during the decade following the war.
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Despite their closely held nature, these companies continued to pay significant 
dividends. Dividend payments for all textile manufacturers averaged almost 8 percent 
per year until the beginning o f the twentieth century despite the temporary suspension 
of dividends by many companies following the panic of 1874. Manufacturing 
production increased twice as fast as the population during this decade (Clark, 1929b).
The dawn of the twentieth century brought a further change in American 
business. The percentage o f manufactured goods being exported had tripled the 35 
years following the Civil War to over 30 percent of all manufactured products (Conant, 
1904). Before the Civil War, individuals seeking investment opportunities bought real 
estate. Equity share investment opportunities were limited primarily to railroad stocks. 
The only industrial stocks available to investors were coal and textile firms (Navin and 
Sears, 1955). Before 1890, the Pullman Palace Car Company was the only 
manufacturing firm traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Its close 
association with the prosperous railroad industry caused investors to consider the 
company more of a railroad firm than an industrial firm (Baskin, 1988).
Investor confidence in industrial firms increased dramatically at the end of the 
nineteenth century due to the payment of high dividends by nearly all issues almost 
immediately after their inception (Faulkner, 1924). At the same time, railroad bond 
interest rates declined from 7 to 3.5 percent (Conant, 1904). Dividends were frequently 
paid out of capital by these newly organized firms and the use of capital for dividend 
payment by firms in financial distress was common (Faulkner, 1924). These
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extravagant dividend payments led to financial distress and bankruptcy by many o f the 
firms (Baskin, 1988).
The majority of the other manufacturing firms of the period were small 
partnerships or closely held corporations. Many companies remained family owned, 
even the larger manufacturers like Singer and McCormick. However, ownership in the 
New England textile corporations began to be more widely disseminated. The trading 
of these shares was primarily consummated on the Boston Exchange. The shares were 
regarded as investment grade securities and often were used as loan collateral.
Marshall Field and Company, Macy’s and other large department stores o f the 
period were all partnerships. Sears, Roebuck and Company, Wool worth, Montgomery 
Ward and The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company were all in their infancy during 
this period; of these, only Montgomery Ward was incorporated.
Most of the extractive companies of this era were small partnerships. 
Homestake Mining and Standard Oil were peculiarities as were a few large, publicly 
traded copper and iron mining firms. Coal mining firms were viewed by investors 
essentially as railroad stocks due to their close ties with the railroad industry (Navin and 
Sears, 1955). Standard Oil paid dividends ranging from 5.25 percent to 30 percent 
during the last twenty years of the nineteenth century (Faulkner, 1924).
The processing industries, especially sugar and oil refining companies, were the 
first industrial firms to attract public interest. The trust form of organization used by 
many of the firms in these industries were the forerunner of modern corporate mergers. 
Trust formation began when the majority of oil companies deposited their securities
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with a group of trustees with the expressed goal of decreasing overproduction. A few 
of the individual corporations remained independent. The managers of the individual 
member firms of the trust coordinated their commercial strategy to meet joint 
objectives.
Other industries forming trusts during the period included the cotton, whiskey, 
and sugar refining industry. Very little earnings and operational information was 
available to investors. Although the shares of the Standard Oil trust were closely held, 
shares of the other trusts were actively traded. Trusts commonly sold preferred stock 
secured by fixed assets and backed by earning capacity and common shares embodying 
the risk, uncertainty and anticipated growth of the enterprise. The average volume of 
these shares dwarfed other issues—during the last half of 1889, an average of 150,000 
trust shares exchanged hands each week; only 2,000 shares of Pullman Car Company 
were traded on average per week (Navin and Sears, 1955).
In 1890, fewer than ten industrial stocks were traded and quoted on the NYSE. 
This number had increased to more than 30 issues by the crash of 1893 and to over 200 
by 1897. Industrial securities of the period were concentrated in the manufacturing, 
distributive, extractive and processing industries. The Dow Jones Industrial Average 
began to be reported in the middle of this decade followed by the publication of 
Moody’s Industrial Security in 1900.
Financial information other than the company’s capitalization and dividend 
record was frequently unavailable to investors in the early twentieth century. Utility, 
financial and railroad corporations generally provided more detailed data than other
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companies o f the period. Before World W ar I, demands for increased disclosure o f 
information by the shareholders were generally ignored by managers (Hawkins, 1963).
The NYSE, Investment Bankers Association of America, public accounting firms 
and the U. S. government began to require increased disclosure from publicly held 
corporations. The NYSE lacked stringent regulations for securities during the 
nineteenth century (Michie, 1986). As time passed, the exchange sought to increase 
regulation. The 1869 requirement for annual report publication by listed corporations 
was largely ignored when first instituted by most managers; quarterly reports were not 
required until 1926 (Hawkins, 1963).
Returns from industrial corporation shares began to surpass railroad company 
stock returns after the Civil War. The extreme volatility of the market immediately 
following the war decreased during the last fifteen years of the century (Smith, 1928). 
Between 1872 and 1899, the income from industrial and utility common stock was 
greater than the income provided by railroad bonds (Snowden, 1990). Overall, 
industrial stocks fared better than railroad stocks in the depression o f the last decade 
of the nineteenth century. The three largest industrials of the time paid dividends 
throughout the depression; only General Electric failed to pay dividends and the 
suspension of dividends was the result of cash retention by corporate management 
rather than the consequence o f a lack of earnings (Navin and Sears, 1955). The return 
on investment in industrial, utility and railroad common stocks exceeded the return 
from railroad bonds from 1900-1920 (Smith, 1959).
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Corporate dividends before 1920 did not reflect the cyclical economic influences 
shown by stock prices (Snowden, 1987). Dividend payments and stock prices trended 
in opposite directions during the first 20 years of the twentieth century in contrast to 
the positive relationship shown before 1900 (Van Strum, 1927). After 1900, consistent 
strong earnings by corporate America led to a gradual increase in dividends but the 
increased earnings precipitated by World War I were not reflected by increased 
dividends (White, 1990). However, the aggregate dividend payment by American 
corporations during the first two decades of the twentieth century increased more 
rapidly than nominal stock prices (Snowden, 1990).
Dividends did not begin to be smoothed by corporate management until after 
1920 (Van Strum, 1927). The increased variability of dividends during the period is 
a potential explanation for the extreme volatility of stock prices during the period 
(Baskin, 1988). Increase volatility during this period was also partially the result of 
attempts by professional traders to manipulate share prices (Allen and Gale, 1992).
The mean return from common stock dividends between 1871 and 1925 was 
5.17 percent. Average share dividends exceeded eight percent in 1918 while returns 
fell to less than four percent in 1886, 1890, 1898, and 1906-1907. Table 2.3 shows 
the average dividend income per share by year from 1871 through 1919.
2.5.3 The Maturation and Specialization of Preferred Stock
Although not actively traded, preferred stock was important in the emergence 
of industrial corporations (Navin and Sears, 1955). At the end of the nineteenth 
century, preferred stock began to be viewed as an investment distinct from common
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1 From Wilson, Jack W. and Charles P. Jones, 1987, A Comparison of Annual 
Common Stock Returns: 1871-1925 with 1926-85, The Journal o f
Business, 60, 239-258.
stock. The fixed dividend rate was likened by most investors to bond interest payments 
(Stevens, 1936a). The issue of preferred stock allowed repatriation of sunk costs 
without loss of control and was an inexpensive and safe method for raising funds 
(Navin and Sears, 1955). Preferred shares were customarily viewed as an investment
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in the firm’s tangible assets; common stock represented the company’s growth potential 
(Dewing, 1926). Before 1904, preferred stock had a preference only to dividend 
payment; in return for this preference, dividends were limited in amount. Later issues 
were cumulative and also had prior claim to assets in the event of bankruptcy (Dewing, 
1953). Participation in profits by preferred shares began to appear in corporate 
charters, especially in railroad and utility preferred issues (Stevens, 1936b).
The investing public was already familiar with preferred issues from the 
railroads’ long use of the security. Industrial and utility corporations began to use 
preferred stock to raise capital on more liberal terms in the last decade of the nineteenth 
century and the first two decades of the twentieth century (Dewing, 1926). Between 
1890 and 1893, at least 23 investment grade preferred issues began trading; these issues 
were predominately offered in exchange for existing securities and were sold at par 
without regard to dividend rate. The majority of the industrial preferred issues traded 
on the NYSE had 7 to 8 percent cumulative dividend rates (Navin and Sears, 1955).
A second type of preferred stock was offered by railroad, utility, industrial and 
financial corporations in reorganization. If the company was unable to extend current 
liabilities, current debt was often refunded with non-cumulative preferred stock. 
Although yields and other features were unattractive to debtholders, the alternative of 
default on the debt by the corporation left the creditor with little choice (Dewing, 
1953).
Preferred stock dividends averaged over 8 percent before 1897 and averaged 6.7 
percent between 1897 and 1920. Industrial corporation preferred stock had the highest
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yield since these firms were more disinclined to use debt financing. Utility 
corporations issued cumulative preferred stock primarily after the depression o f 1903; 
yields averaged six to seven percent (Dewing, 1926). Most shares carried voting rights 
but investors viewed the right as superfluous as long as dividends were paid (Stevens, 
1938). The voting rights were only exercisable under special charter provisions on 
many of the issues (Bradley, 1948).
The issues distributed by companies in reorganization before 1905 were non- 
cumulative and were habitually issued with lower dividend rates (Berle, 1923). The 
board of directors uniquely determined if  dividends were to be paid on the shares 
(Stevens, 1936c). Of the 51 preferred stocks traded on the exchange, 32 of the issues 
were issued during corporation reorganizations. Despite the precarious economic 
conditions surrounding the origination o f the majority o f these issues, dividends were 
paid on these shares 83 percent of the time (Spal, 1942).
2.5.4 The Origins of No-Par Stock Issues
Shares o f stock were originally issued with a minimum fixed value called par 
that was defined as the valuation of the participation in the rights of ownership. The 
purpose for requiring the payment of a minimum fixed amount was to protect the 
creditors of the coqioration (Berle and Means, 1932). The payment of a cash 
equivalent to par was required initially. Later, property, services and intangibles of 
equal value became acceptable substitutes. The legal dilution of par value began when 
management began to be allowed to value the non-cash equivalents used for payment 
of par (Dewing, 1926).
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Owners of issued shares could not collect par value from the corporation even 
though the amount was paid in full; the shares’ current trading price on the exchange 
was the maximum price per share available to the shareholder (Dewing, 1926). Par 
also allowed the investor to approximately value the corporation even with the crude 
accounting methods o f the period (Baskin, 1988). Railroad and industrial shares were 
commonly issued with a par value of $100; early railroad shares had a par value o f $50 
(Montgomery, 1927). Copper mining shares were often issued with a $25 par value; 
other mining stocks were issued with pars as low as $1.
Shares designed to participate in earnings only but not representing ownership 
in corporate assets began to be issued without a par value in the first decade o f the 
twentieth century. Capital stock taxes were levied on the shares assuming a par value 
of $100. Subsequent offerings were issued with low par values—$1 or $5—bearing little 
relation to the historical contribution (Dewing, 1953).
The New York Bar Association began lobbying for legal issuance of no par 
stock before the beginning o f the twentieth century. Par value was criticized for 
causing confusion among investors and for unfairly pegging the value o f the shares to 
their par value. The trading price of par value shares tended to gravitate toward par. 
Others criticized par value due to the difficulty of assessment of a true value o f the 
coiporation. The decline of trading price below par value enables new shareholders to 
purchase the shares at a discount compared to original investors paying par for the 
stock. Proponents argued that the retention of par value would maintain the distinction
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of capital and profits to be used for dividend payment and would provide a "true" value 
for investors to use in their analysis of an issue (Dewing, 1926).
The issuance of no par stock was first legalized in New York in 1912 (Berle and 
Means, 1932). More than 20 states followed this precedent and allowed the issue of 
no par stock by 1923; by 1927 almost all states allowed the issuance of no par shares 
(Dewing, 1926). By 1919, 27 NYSE corporations had issued no par stock; the number 
had increased to 189 companies by 1924 (Montgomery, 1927).
2 .5.5 Summary
In the years following the Civil War in the United States, the general lack of 
publicly available financial information required investors to value industrial securities 
solely using their dividend history. The rise of industry trusts increased investor 
interest in the securities markets and trading activity increased. Smoothing of corporate 
dividend streams began to be practiced by managers and specialized uses of preferred 
stock and no-par common stock increased.
2.6 THE ROARING TWENTIES AND THE GREAT CRASH: 1920-1929
2.6.1 The Boom and the Bust
Until 1920, common stock was not viewed as an investment grade security; only 
railroad bonds and industrial preferred stock were purchased by conservative private 
and institutional investors. At this time, security analysts began advocating the 
purchase of common stocks as an inflation hedge. The increased risk and short-term
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volatility of stock were balanced by the benefits of superior returns over the long-term 
(Snowden, 1990).
The shareholder rolls of American corporations increased dramatically in the 
first three decades of the twentieth century (Carosso, 1970). Corporate shareholders 
increased from 500,000 in 1900 to two million in 1920 to over ten million by 1930 
(Baskin, 1988). The most rapid period of increase was from 1917-1923. Less affluent 
investors—those not in the top income bracket—became shareholders in record numbers 
during this time. The percentage of share ownership by those individuals with the top 
25,000 incomes in the United States declined from 57 percent in 1916 to 37 percent in 
1921. These increases were the result of customer ownership campaigns, employee 
stock ownership plans, decreased share attractiveness to the wealthy due to high 
dividend tax burdens, a decrease in the World War I surtax following the end of the 
conflict (Means, 1930), funds available for investment from Liberty Bond maturation 
and a decrease in the commission rate on smaller share purchases (Carosso, 1970).
Dividends paid by corporations increased from $2.10 in 1871 to $6.62 in 1929 
(White, 1990). In 1920, share prices were low and dividend yields were relatively 
high. The market began a long rise in mid 1921 with only minor corrections in 1924 
and 1926 (Galbraith, 1954). Total yearly share volume increased 500 percent from 
1921-1928 (Klingaman, 1989). The bull market beginning after World War I was 
largely the result of the public’s expectations of continued dividend increases greater 
than the actual increases (Galbraith, 1954). Corporate earnings averaged 9 percent per 
year from 1922-1927 while dividends averaged 6.8 percent (White, 1990). Dividends
46
of industrial firms averaged seven percent during the period (Fisher, 1930). In 1927, 
$1.5 billion was paid in dividends (Wilbur, 1932).
As American businesses prospered in the 1920’s, stock values increased. Within 
a five-year period, stock prices rose threefold (Erickson, 1972). Share volume also 
increased 250 percent from 1927-1929 while bond offerings decreased 38 percent 
during the same period (Carosso, 1970). Railroad stocks fell in relation to utility and 
industrial shares, especially utility shares (White, 1990). In 1927, the bull market 
began in earnest; by 1928, buy orders overwhelmed the capacities of the brokerage 
houses (Galbraith, 1954). Trading hours on the NYSE were shortened in hope of 
decreasing the trading volume (Carosso, 1970). As share prices continued to increase, 
corporate managers began to slow dividend increases in an attempt to retard investor 
speculation and enthusiasm. Other managers warned the public o f the overvaluation of 
company shares and the unrealistic nature of their expectations (White, 1990). Analysts 
warned o f the impending crash; professional financiers and traders began to quietly 
withdraw their funds from the market (Erickson, 1972). Other investors heeded few 
o f these cautions and share prices continued to increase rapidly outpacing dividend 
increases (White, 1990).
March 1928 marked the beginning o f a "speculative mania" (Galbraith, 1954). 
Novice and seasoned investors alike purchased stocks with their savings believing that 
stock prices would increase indefinitely (Erickson, 1972). On March 5, General 
Motors (GM) stock increased in price $5 and had risen $10 by the end of the week. 
Record Corporation of America (RCA) increased $13 the same week. Despite the
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common favoritism shown to these issues by speculators, the stocks were dissimilar. 
GM had recently promised to increase dividends and investors expected the recent 
increases in earnings to continue. RCA on the other hand had not yet paid a dividend 
nor would the firm pay dividends for many years to come (White, 1990). Speculative 
stocks of infant industries—radio, airplane and movie corporations—paying little or no 
dividends enjoyed the greatest increase in price (Carosso, 1970). The stable dividend 
paying railroad stocks languished during the boom. The average dividend per share 
increased to $5.97 in 1928 (White, 1990).
Total dividends increased to $2.6 billion in 1929 (Wilbur, 1932). Dividend 
increases averaged slightly less than eight percent per year for the decade with the 
average dividend paid to common shareholders doubling in less than ten years (Brittain, 
1966). Quarterly dividends continued to rise in late 1929, increasing 12.8 percent in 
the third quarter and 11.6 percent in the fourth quarter. Although slowed, dividend 
increases and stock prices gave no indication of the imminent recession (White, 1990). 
The stock market decline beginning in 1929 cannot be logically explained by dividend 
decreases (Shiller, 1981). The 240 leading issues of the NYSE lost 2.8 billion dollars 
in market value during September 1929 (Klingaman, 1989).
Bear raids were not the cause of the drastic fall in prices but other forms of 
stock price manipulation were common. Trading pools—investor groups that purchased 
blocks of stocks, circulated rumors that led to price increases, and sold their blocks at 
a profit— were not uncommon (Allen and Gale, 1992).
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Dividend payments exceeded net income from 1922-1933; the shortfall in 
income was paid from accumulated surplus (Sage, 1937). The average dividend yield 
on all NYSE stocks from 1921 to 1930 ranged from a low of 3.5 percent to a high of 
nine percent. Blue chip issue yields from 1897-1930 ranged from a low of 2 percent 
immediately preceding the crash to a high of 7.5 percent (Sloan, 1931). Table 2.4 
shows the average dividend yield on a share of common stock by year from 1920-1929.
TABLE 2.4
DIVIDEND INCOME ON COMMON STOCKS BY YEAR1
1920-1929












1 Dividend income 1920-1925 from Wilson, Jack W. and Charles P. Jones, 
1987, A Comparison of Annual Common Stock Returns: 1871-1925 with 
1926-85, The Journal o f Business, 60, 239-258. 1926-1929 from Stocks, 
Bonds, Bills and Inflation 1992 Yearbook™ (annually updates work by 
Roger G. Ibbotson and Rex A. Sinquefield), Chicago, Illinois: Ibbotson 
Associates, Inc.
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The percentage of earnings paid out as dividends increased for most industry 
sectors from 1920 to 1929 (Brittain, 1966). The increase in dividends between 1920 
and 1929 was significantly higher than the increase in earnings by most industry 
sectors. The ratio o f net dividends to net profits increased to 70 percent during this 
decade. Table 2.5 shows the payout ratio for 1920 and 1929 by industry sector.
TABLE 2.5













Stone, Glass 29 66
Metals and Products 42 57
Wholesale Trade 68 74
Retail Trade 90 92
Finance 284 95
Public Utilities 77 71
Services 74 75
All Corporations 64 71
All Manufacturers 55 63
1 From Brittain, John A., 1966, Corporate Dividend Policy, Washington: The
Brookings Institution.
2 #: Negative profits for the year.
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In 1929, the number of new stock issues exceeded the number of bond issues 
for the first time. The number of new equity issues doubled from 1927 to 1928 and 
approximately doubled again the following year (Carosso, 1970). Table 2.6 shows the 
number of new equity issues by year from 1919 through 1929.
TABLE 2.6 
NEW EQUITY ISSUES BY YEAR1
1919-1929













1 From Carosso, Vincent P ., 1970, Investment Banking in America, A History, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
In 1925, 13 percent of preferred issues had a dividend rate of 6 percent, 68 
percent paid 7 percent, and 13 percent paid 8 percent (Dewing, 1926). The yield on 
preferred stocks had fallen to 4.7 percent by 1929 (Graham, Dodd, and Cottle, 1962).
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2.6.2 Summary
A major change in the distribution of wealth and share ownership occurred in 
the United States during the early twentieth century. Stocks continued to be valued 
primarily by dividend payment history; other financial information was still generally 
unavailable. The increases in corporate dividend payments during the decade were 
reflected in rising stock prices. The first express use of dividends as a signaling 
mechanism in the months preceding the 1929 crash failed—investors acknowledged the 
dividend increase signal by bidding up the share price but ignored the negative 
connotations associated with the slowing of dividend increases. The growth in dividend 
payments during this decade outpaced the growth in earnings and many firms were 
forced to use retained earnings to fund the higher payments.
2.7 MODERN DIVIDEND HISTORY: 1930 TO THE PRESENT
2.7.1 Post-Crash Corporate Activities
In 1931, the management of General Motors announced that all earnings should 
be paid as dividends in poor economic times and if a corporation is sound, the use of 
accumulated surplus to maintain the dividend is justified (Wilbur, 1932). Shareholders 
began to lobby Congress to decrease corporate retained earnings and increase dividend 
payments. The Revenue Act of 1934 threatened to heavily tax undistributed corporate 
earnings; the Revenue Act of 1936 began the taxation of retained earnings. In 
response, many corporations increased dividends or declared special dividends (Sage, 
1937) despite having profit levels 22 percent below their 1926-1929 average (Jaeger, 
1972). Managers were thankful to have an excuse for increasing dividends; the large
52
number of business failures early in the decade had seriously shaken shareholder faith 
in corporate management and many of the managers believed that increasing dividends 
was a low cost method o f restoring investor faith (Graham and Dodd, 1934).
Large corporations in the United States distributed more than 80 percent of their 
earnings as dividends in 1937. This increase in dividends totaled greater than 1.1 
billion dollars in 1936 and 1937, one-third greater than expected (Lent, 1948). Despite 
the increases, the net dividend/net profit after tax ratio fell to 35 percent during 1929- 
1947. Although corporate profits were 90 percent greater in 1946 and 1947 than in 
1929, aggregate dividend payout was only three percent greater (Brittain, 1966).
During World War II, corporate cash dividends were paid using Liberty Bonds 
(Preinreich, 1978). Dividend increases averaged six percent per year in the fifteen 
years following the end of the second World War; corporate net profits after tax 
increases averaged two percent per year during the same period (Brittain, 1966).
The ratio of net dividends to net profit after tax, the dividend payout ratio, 
increased to its highest level during the twenty years following World War II (Brittain, 
1966). Table 2.7 shows the dividend payout ratio for 1947, 1960 and the 1920-1960 
period by industry sector.
The ratio of dividends paid to net earnings in the electric utility industry showed 
exceptional stability from 1947 to 1959. Individual firm ratios were much more volatile 
during the period (Dhrymes and Kurz, 1964).
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TABLE 2.7
DIVIDEND PAYOUT RATIO BY INDUSTRY1
1947, 1960 and 1920-1960
Industry 1947 1960 1920-1960
Mining 38 95 78.0
Construction 15 ff2 37.4
Food 42 53 59.4
Textiles 24 41 52.1
Lumber 22 74 52.5
Paper 24 62 47.6
Printing 33 40 46.7
Petroleum 38 55 53.5
Rubber 29 58 43.4
Leather 33 73 67.5
Stone, Glass 36 58 47.6
Metals and Products 36 64 52.0
Wholesale Trade 20 33 35.1
Retail Trade 25 68 49.6
Finance 58 59 67.2
Public Utilities 66 92 83.0
Services 36 102 65.5
All Corporations 36 62 58.2
All Manufacturers 34 58 52.3
1 From Brittain, John A., 1966, Corporate Dividend Policy, Washington: The
Brookings Institution.
2 it\ Negative profits for the year.
2.7.2 Contemporary Dividend Policy
In the years following the second World War, corporate dividend policy in the 
United States and Great Britain has remained relatively unchanged and dividend payout 
levels relatively constant. In the 15 years following World War II, dividends increased
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an average of 6 percent each year and the aggregate dividend payout ratio increased to 
levels comparable to the payout levels following the first World War (Brittain, 1966). 
A state of "inertia" has developed in the payment of corporate dividends (Dhrymes and 
Kurz, 1967). Dividends as a percent of net income have increased in Great Britain 
during this period (Thomas, 1978). The dividend rate was relatively unaffected by the 
high levels of inflation that characterized the American economy during and 
immediately following the War in Viet Nam showing only a slight increase during these 
years. The consistent level of dividend payment is evidence of the continued smoothing 
of dividends by corporate management (Ibbotson and Sinquefield, 1982). Table 2.8 
displays the average dividend per share for common stock from 1930 to 1991.
2.7,3 Summary
Over the past fifty years, a state of inertia has developed in corporate dividend 
policy. Dividend rates were relatively unaffected by the high levels o f inflation 
characteristic of the American economy during and immediately following the War in 
Vietnam. The consistent level of dividend payments is evidence of the continued 
smoothing of dividends by corporate managers.
2.8 SUMMARY
Dividend payments to shareholders began as a simple convention of 
convenience. Joint stock shareholders found the payment of dividends solely from 
company profits while maintaining the enterprise as a going concern to be more 
efficient than divisions of all profits and company capital. Later corporate managers
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TABLE 2.8
DIVIDEND INCOME ON COMMON STOCKS BY YEAR1
1930-1991
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1930-1991
































1 From Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation 1992 Yearbook™ (annually updates 
work by Roger G. Ibbotson and Rex A. Sinquefield), Chicago, Illinois: 
Ibbotson Associates, Inc.
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began to retain earnings to fund investment opportunities and dividends became 
symbolic liquidations of the enterprise paid from profits and retained earnings rather 
than distributions of all current profits.
The importance of significant dividend payments to maintain shareholder 
satisfaction was recognized early by corporate managers. Less than ethical activities 
were often used to continue dividend payments and the payments were often paid solely 
from retained earnings during unprofitable periods o f company operations. The lack 
of financial information available to investors in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries magnified the importance of a history o f consistent dividend payments; 
shareholders used this information as their primary input when valuing firms.
CHAPTER 3
THE EVOLUTION OF DIVIDEND POLICY THEORIES
3.1 INTRODUCTION AND INITIAL RESEARCH
Corporate dividend policy has captured the interest of economists for the last 
century and has been the subject of intensive theoretical modeling and empirical 
examination by financial economists over the last four decades. A number of 
conflicting theoretical models, all lacking strong empirical support, define the current 
state of financial economists’ attempts to explain the dividend phenomenon. The 
purpose of this chapter is to examine systematically the academic attempts to explain 
corporate dividend policy.
Initial forays into explaining corporate dividend policy are divided as to their 
prediction of the dividend payment’s effect on share price. Three schools of thought 
emerge: one faction sees dividends as attractive and a positive influence on stock price, 
a second bloc believes stock prices are negatively correlated with dividend payout levels 
and a third group of empiricists maintain that firm dividend policy is irrelevant in stock 
price valuation.
Common stock theory proponents maintain that the safety and total return from 
dividends and capital gains of common stock will exceed bond return over the long 
term. Common stocks are able to sustain purchasing power more effectively than bonds 
because as commodity prices increase, purchasing power decreases and the bond 
income and par value returned upon maturity become less valuable (Fisher, 1912). The
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theory requires only fundamental assumptions; limited investor liability, complete 
markets and the ability of investors to diversify their portfolios. A number of 
elementary empirical analyses support the theory (see Norton, 1912, Smith, 1923, Van 
Strum, 1925, and Harold, 1934).
Preinreich (1932) sees dividend policy as merely a residual decision. Dividends 
are paid to shareholders if and only if revenues remain after all positive investment 
opportunities have been funded. Another method determines dividend payout by 
examining and estimating corporate contingencies and financial needs rather than more 
rudimentary approaches based simply on current funds availability or historical payout 
patterns (Sage, 1937).
Following the proclamation by Graham and Dodd (1934) that the corporation’s 
main objective is to pay the owners of the firms (the shareholders) dividends, a 
preference for issues that pay regular cash dividends became the prevailing investment 
strategy in the financial community. A dollar paid as a cash dividend was shown to 
increase a share’s price four times as much as a dollar retained. Dividend multiples 
became the preferred method for share valuation by both amateurs and professional 
money managers.
Harkavy (1953) shows empirical support for Graham and Dodd’s proclamation 
by showing a positive correlation between stock price and dividend payout. The 
relation is modeled theoretically by Walter (1956). Over the long term, share price is 
the present value of expected dividends. Investors are willing to pay increased price 
premiums for issues with consistent dividend growth. Because current cash dividends
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are less risky than future capital gains or higher expected dividend payments, dividend 
policy is relevant in firm valuation (Gordon, 1959, 1962). Lintner (1962) and Gordon 
(1963) show a decrease in the investor’s required rate of return as dividends increase 
because the cash received from dividends is more certain than future capital gains. 
Stock prices are led by dividends in the long run and contemporaneous causality is 
found between dividends and security price (Sung and Urrutia, 1992). Conversely, 
Friend and Puckett (1964) posit that biased results from omitted variables, different 
methods of analysis and measurement errors likely undermine the early study results 
showing a strong preference by investors for dividends.
The seminal paper of Miller and Modigliani (1961) is the beginning of 
contemporary theoretical attempts to explain the role of dividend policy. Their model 
assumes perfect capital markets, rational investors, full and costless information, 
competitive markets, no transaction costs and no taxes. Firm investment policy is 
exogenous in the model. Using the arbitrage proof o f Modigliani and Miller (1958), 
Miller and Modigliani (M&M) conclude that the dividend decision does not affect 
shareholder wealth nor the cost of capital-dividend policy is irrelevant. If investors 
can buy and sell securities to manufacture their desired dividend payout rate, the 
expected return required for investors to hold shares is not affected by the combination 
of new issues and gross dividend payments. Since dividend policy doesn’t affect the 
discounting rate of expected future cash flows, the firm’s market value is independent 
of changes in dividend policy. Accordingly, corporations have no incentive to follow 
a systematic policy. Financing decision indifference results in a shareholder
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indifference to corporate dividend policy. Dividend policy is material only if a change 
in dividend policy relays information that investors do not have. Fama (1978) extends 
the model to a general equilibrium.
Empirical evidence is inconclusive as to the irrelevancy of dividend policy. The 
empirical results of Dhrymes and Kurz (1967), Brigham and Gordon (1968), 
McDonald, Jacquillat and Nussenbaum (1975), Bar-Yosef and Kolodny (1976), McCabe 
(1979), Anderson (1983), Peterson and Benesh (1983) and Jensen, Solberg and Zorn 
(1992) all fail to support the M&M irrelevancy proposition. These studies show the 
investment and dividend decisions to be interrelated. According to Peterson and Benesh 
(1983), market imperfections are the cause of the interdependencies.
Conversely, Higgins (1972), Fama (1974), Smirlock and Marshall (1983) and 
Frankfurter and Gong (1993) find empirical support for the proposition. The empirical 
results from this group of papers are too inadequate to reject the M&M irrelevance 
proposition. Fama (1974) posits that existing market imperfections are not significant 
enough to invalidate the independence of the two policies. Table 3.1 presents these 
works by their principal attributes.
The M&M model is generally accepted as valid if its assumptions are not 
violated. Modification of these assumptions and the introduction of capital market 
imperfections can cause dividend policy to become relevant. Dividend policy relevancy 
is solely due to market imperfections, inefficiencies, or irrationalities (Brealy and 
Myers, 1991).
TABLE 3.1









Reject M&M "behaviorally oriented conclusions". Investment and 
dividend decisions are interrelated.
Brigham and Gordon (1968) 1958-1962
Annual
MRA Stock value is dependent on dividend policy. Required rates of returns 
increase with increases in leverage and retention rates.
Higgins (1972) 1961-1965
Annual
XSRA Questions Dhrymes and Kurz (1967). Dividend payout is the result of 






Results supports M&M—the evidence is inadequate to reject investment 








Results are not consistent with the M&M the dividend irrelevance 
proposition and do not and support Dhrymes and Kurz (1967).
Bar-Yosef and Kolodny (1976) 1963-1971
Annual
XSRA Security price and firm payout policy are positively related. Dividend 
policy is significant in explaining a security’s return. Findings conflict 
with the M&M dividend irrelevance proposition.
TABLE 3.1 (continued)









Earlier research results in error due to model misspecifications and 
variable omissions. Investment and dividend decisions are interrelated. 
Findings fail to support M&M.
Anderson (1983) 1963-1977
Quarterly
TSRA Corporate investment policies and opportunities likely influence the cash 
flows available for payment of dividends.




Financing decisions significantly impact investment decisions. Market 
imperfections lead to interactive policy determination.
Smirlock and Marshall (1983) 1958-1977
Annual
GC Test Results support M&M. The dividend decision does not motivate the 
investment decision.






Insider ownership, debt policy, and dividend policy are interdependent. 
Dividend levels are paid after internal financing of investment 
opportunities. Insider holdings and dividends are inversely related.




Dividend and investment policy are independent. Current dividends are 
only affected by past dividends. No industry effects are present. Previous 
empirical examination accuracy suffered from model misspecification.
1 See Appendix A for method of analysis abbreviations.
64
Theoretical and empirical research attempting to explain corporate dividend 
policy can be broadly segregated into models formulated in states with full information, 
models in states with informational asymmetries and models using behavioral rationales 
as the basis for their development. Section 3.2 reviews theoretical models and 
empirical research in full information equilibriums adding the market imperfection of 
taxes. Section 3.3 examines investigation and modeling in states with asymmetric 
information; specifically the signaling, agency costs and free cash flow hypotheses. 
Behavioral models are discussed in Section 3.4. The chapter closes with a brief 
conclusion.
3.2 THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS UNDER FULL INFORMATION
A large body of theoretical models and empirical research analyzes the effect 
of the market imperfection of taxes on corporate dividend policy. An early examination 
of the effect shows that depreciation allowances and individual tax rates substantially 
influenced dividend payout rates in the U.S. between 1920 and 1960 (Brittain, 1964). 
The significance of the effect of the tax code on the determination and implementation 
of corporate dividend policy is not questioned by the majority of writers. The models 
developed thus far are therefore not separated into paradigms supporting the contention 
that taxes do not affect corporate dividend decisions and those modeling the effect of 
taxes on corporate policy; rather, the paradigms can be better classified as tax-adjusted 
or tax-avoidance dividend models.
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3.2.1 Theoretical Models
Tax-adjusted models surmise that investors require and secure higher expected 
returns on shares of dividend paying stocks. The imposition of a tax liability on 
dividends causes the dividend payment to be grossed up to increase the shareholder’s 
pre-tax return. Under capital asset pricing theory, investors offer a lower price for the 
shares due to the future tax liability of the dividend payment.
One consequence of the tax-adjusted model is the division of investors into 
dividend tax clienteles. The clientele argument was first proposed in the seminal work 
of M&M (1961). In later research, Modigliani (1982) finds that the clientele effect is 
responsible for only nominal alterations in portfolio composition rather than the major 
differences predicted by Miller (1977). Masulis and Trueman (1988) model cash 
dividend payments as products of deferred dividend costs. Their model predicts that 
investors with differing tax liabilities will not be uniform in their ideal firm 
investment/dividend policy. As the tax liability on dividends increases (decreases), the 
dividend payment decreases (increases) while earnings reinvestment increases 
(decreases). Differences can be minimized by segregation of investors into clienteles.
The model developed by Farrar and Selwyn (1967) assumes investors maximize 
after-tax income. In a partial equilibrium framework, investors are presented with two 
choices. Individuals choose the amount of personal and corporate leverage and also 
choose whether to receive corporate distributions as dividends or capital gains. If the 
tax liability of capital gains distributions is less than the liability incurred by dividend 
distribution, rational investors will prefer capital gains; the preferred payment is the one
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with the least tax liability. The model contends that no dividends should be paid; 
rather, share repurchase should be used to distribute corporate earnings.
The Farrar and Selwyn (1967) model is extended into a general equilibrium 
framework by Brennan (1970). In this setting, investors maximize their expected utility 
of wealth. Although the model is more robust, the predictions are similar to those of 
the Farrar and Selwyn model; an equilibrium with dividend paying firms is not 
consistent with a zero required return per unit of dividend yield.
Auerbach (1979a) develops a discrete time, infinite horizon model in that 
shareholders maximize their wealth. If a capital gains/dividends tax differential exists, 
wealth maximization no longer implies firm market value maximization. Subsequently, 
Auerbach (1979b) posits that dividends are distributed due to the consistent, long-term 
undervaluation of corporate capital. The undervaluation is the result of a dynamic 
process encompassing multiple periods of total reinvestment of all firm profits followed 
by firm returns less than the returns expected by investors. If firms are unable to make 
distributions to investors except in the form of dividends, shareholders must include the 
expected tax liabilities of future dividend payments to accurately determine market 
prices. These liabilities decrease the share price investors are willing to pay so as to 
increase the expected return from their investment. Stocks with dividend yields higher 
than the risk-free rate likely provide positive abnormal returns from the increased risk 
of these cash flows (see Bradford (1981) and Fung (1981) for further extensions).
Tax-adjusted models are criticized as incompatible with rational behavior by 
investors. Miller (1986) advances the strategy of tax sheltering of income by high tax
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bracket individuals as a behavior more consistent with rational shareholder behavior. 
Individuals can, of course, not purchase dividend paying shares to avoid the tax liability 
of these payments. Alternatively, using a strategy first advanced by Miller and Scholes 
(1978), shareholders can purchase dividend paying stocks and receive the distributions, 
then simultaneously borrow funds to invest in tax-free securities. The interest charges 
on the loan are used to offset the tax liability of the dividend income while the income 
from the bonds is free of tax liability and consequently does not increase the investor’s 
taxable income. The firm’s value is independent of its dividend policy due to investor 
indifference between capital gains and dividends.
The use of dividend specific personal tax shelters (for example, the existing 
dividend income exemption) to avoid tax liabilities is advanced by DeAngelo and 
Masulis (1980). They contend that the Miller and Scholes (1978) tax shelter strategy 
is not sufficient to induce positive dividend payment at equilibrium. Fung and 
Theobald (1984) model tax shelters that are not based on interest charges and apply the 
theoretical results to the French, German, British, and U.S. tax systems. Dividend tax 
credits are incapable of inducing a positive dividend equilibrium; non-interest related 
tax shelters are required. The dividend payout level depends on the efficiency of the 
market for tax shelters and country specific tax law influences.
3.2.2 Empirical Investigation of the Tax Effect on Dividends
An examination of the pricing of the tax on dividends has been actively pursued 
since the results of these studies should conclusively support either the tax-adjusted 
model or the tax-avoidance model. The inevitable tax liabilities cause dividends to be
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grossed up by discounting share prices in the tax-adjusted model. Several studies 
analyze this issue by adding an additional variable representing the price of the dividend 
component to the capital asset pricing model. If the coefficient on the dividend factor 
is positive, the results support the tax-adjusted model—returns on dividend-paying shares 
are increased and the tax rate on dividends is greater than zero; if zero, dividend paying 
shares are valued using the same pricing mechanism as non-dividend paying shares and 
the results support the tax-avoidance model.
The results of these studies are diverse. Black and Scholes (1974), Miller and 
Scholes (1982) and Hess (1982, 1983b) report insignificant or negative dividend 
coefficients. Christie (1990) finds a negative coefficient on a dummy variable 
representing the zero dividend firm. These zero dividend firms earn abnormal negative 
returns. The diverse results raise the question of the appropriate method o f analysis 
(Hess, 1983a). Potential method of analysis inadequacies contributing to the non­
homogeneity of the results include the linear model’s suitability (Blume, 1980 and 
Elton, Gruber and Rentzler, 1983), the choice of the market portfolio proxy (Roll, 
1977) and the influence of the information effect (Litzenberger and Ramaswamy, 1982 
and Miller and Scholes, 1984). Table 3.2 summarizes the studies pricing the dividend 
component using the capital asset pricing model.
Other authors investigate share price changes during the period surrounding the 
ex-dividend date to determine if the tax on dividends is priced. Campbell and Beranek 
(1955) first document the tendency for the share price to decline less on the ex-date
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TABLE 3.2
EMPIRICAL STUDIES PRICING THE TAX ON DIVIDENDS BY ADDING 




Black and Scholes (1974) 1936-1966
Monthly
MRA Pre-tax stock returns are independent of dividend policy. The share price 
is not influenced by choice of dividend policy.




MRA Risk adjusted returns increase with increased dividend yields 
implying a non-desirability of dividends. A high return is necessary to 
induce purchase o f high dividend stocks.




The dividend yield term is statistically significant—the tax rate on dividends 
is positive and returns on dividend paying stocks are increased. The 
lack of power of the Black and Scholes (1974) study is due to inefficient 
estimation procedures.




XSRA Results support Elton and Gruber (1970) and Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy (1979).
Gordon and Bradford (1980) 1926-1978
Monthly
MRA Valuation of dividend and capital gains does not differ systematically. 
Results are consistent with price maximization but not increased tax 





Dividend yield effects disseminate over time and are not just present on 
ex-dividend date. The study identifies potential sources of bias in use 
of the price drop to infer tax rates.
TABLE 3.2 (continued)
EMPIRICAL STUDIES PRICING THE TAX ON DIVIDENDS BY ADDING 






XSRA Dividends are preferred to capital gains despite the increased tax 
liability. Average returns are approximately equal. This is explained 
by the possible failure by the market to anticipate the increase of dividends 





The abnormal return/dividend yield relation is consistent with 
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) findings but not with Miller and 
Scholes (1982). Different methods prevent comparisons but evidence 
suggests non-linear relations.




XSRA Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) model reformulated. Results support 
1979 findings. Stock returns and expected dividend yields are positively 
correlated; the relation is non-linear.
Miller and Scholes (1982) 1940-1978
Monthly
XSRA Short term dividend yields cannot be used to determine the tax liability 
differences of dividend and capital gains stocks. Tax effect and 







MRA The studies finds a negative coefficient for the dividend pricing variable. 
Empirical results fail to support the existence of clienteles. Dividend 
yields likely proxy for expected return changes over time.
o
TABLE 3.2 (continued)
EMPIRICAL STUDIES PRICING THE TAX ON DIVIDENDS BY ADDING 






MRA Tax-based clienteles exist and are relatively constant over time. Clienteles 
are strongly motivated by dividend/price ratios; largely unaffected by 
firm specific risk and other firm traits.




MRA Dividend yields and excess returns are positively related. The 
phenomenon is likely related to tax effects but other factors can influence 
the relation.
Ang and Peterson (1985) 1973-1983
Annual
XSRA The role of dividends as a proxy for risk is examined using ex-ante data 
that increases tax and information effect confounding. A positive 
expected return/yield relation is demonstrated but the relation displays 
a large variance. Returns and beta are positively related; returns and 
size are negatively related.
Christie (1990) 1946-1985
Monthly
MRA Zero dividend firms earn negative abnormal returns. The results conflict 
with Blume (1980). The findings cannot exclusively be attributed to the 
tax effect but could possibly be influenced by a dividend expectations 
effect.
1 See Appendix A for method of analysis abbreviations.
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than the amount of the dividend payment. The dividend/price decline differential is not 
pronounced. Later work (Durand and May, 1960) supports this finding but the 
discrepancies between the dividend payment amount and the price decline in this study 
of American Telephone and Telegraph common stock are also negligible. Marginal 
shareholders must be indifferent between holding the ex-dividend shares and the after 
tax dividend or owning the share before the dividend is paid (Elton and Gruber, 1970). 
This equality allows for indirect estimation of the shareholders’ tax rates.
Table 3.3 summarizes empirical work relating the price change to dividend ratio 
around ex-dividend days. A positive tax rate is implied if the price change/dividend 
ratio is bounded by 0 and 1. Campbell and Beranek (1955), Elton and Gruber (1970) 
and Kaplanis (1986) find evidence that supports the tax clientele hypothesis. Other 
authors (Brooks and Edwards, 1980 and Kalay, 1982) question the method’s ability to 
infer tax brackets due to the influence of short term trading activity and other 
confounding factors. Gagnon and Suret (1991) show that the return variance in most 
empirical study samples precludes tax rate inference and the consequent clientele 
estimation. Although the full impact of short term traders on ex-dividend day returns 
is not known, the impact of these investors has decreased as abnormal returns and 
transaction costs have decreased following the initiation of a negotiated commission 
structure (Finnerty, 1981, Eades, Hess and Kim, 1984 and Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 
1986). Karpoff and Walkling (1988) are unable to demonstrate any correlation between 
transaction costs and ex-dividend day returns. The importance o f transaction costs to 
the short term trader is discussed by Kalay (1982, 1984) and Elton, Gruber and
73
Rentzler (1984). Kalay (1982, 1984) asserts that transaction costs are not a major 
determinant of trading strategy and do not significantly affect short term trading activity 
because floor trader and specialist commission rates are not significant. Traders will 
exploit the arbitrage opportunities of the share price changes on ex-dividend day if the 
abnormal returns are large. On the other hand, Elton, Gruber and Rentzler (1984) 
refute Kalay’s findings because of the underestimation of transaction costs. These 
authors believe that the transaction costs significantly affect trading profits to the extent 
that abnormal profit capture is not possible and short term trading activity effects are 
negated.
A third approach explores the effect a change in the capital gains/dividend tax 
differential has on the share price of dividend and non-dividend paying firms. 
According to the tax-adjusted model, a change in the tax rate should cause a change in 
the demand curve for dividends and a change in the pricing. Alternatively, no change 
in the pricing of dividends should occur under the tax-avoidance model.
Table 3.4 summarizes empirical analyses of this topic. In a study of stock 
returns before the introduction of federal income taxes in the United States, Barclay 
(1987) finds support for the tax-adjusted model since no tax clientele effect is present. 
Investor dividend preference is little affected by changes in the tax code (Crockett and 
Friend, 1988). Grammatikos (1989) reports that abnormal returns in high yield stocks 
have increased following the 1984 Tax Reform Act. Robin (1991) and Wu and Hsu 
(1992) find support for the tax clientele hypothesis in the period preceding and 
following the 1986 Tax Reform Act (1986 TRA). Conversely, Michaely (1991) and
TABLE 3.3
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF CHANGES IN PRICE DURING THE PERIOD 
SURROUNDING EX-DIVIDEND DAYS
Method of
Author(s) Data Analysis1 Major Result(s)
Studies Using Price Change to Dividend Ratio








SupportM&M (1961) clientele effect; results suggest changes in dividend 
policy cause changes in shareholder wealth. Dividend yield and ex- 
dividend price drop are positively correlated. This study demonstrates 
a preference of highly (low) taxed investors for capital gains (dividends).
The study analyzes two classes of utility corporation stock differing only 
in dividend policy. Investors prefer cash dividends to stock dividends 
despite lower after tax returns.
Finnerty (1981) 1978
Daily
EG Shareholders of electric utility companies prefer dividends to capital gains. 
Two types o f investors are present in the market—taxable investors able 




Modified EG Refines Elton and Gruber (1970) due to potential biases in original study. 
Results support the hypothesis that a higher dividend tax allows short 
term traders to make arbitrage profits.
TABLE 3.3 (continued)





Studies Using Price Change to Dividend Ratio (continued)
Kaplanis (1986) 1979-1984
Daily
Option price changes Supports clientele hypothesis; results inconsistent with short term trading 
hypothesis. Expected and actual differences are not significant.
Poterba (1986) 1965-1984
Daily
PriceA/PriceB ratio Re-examines Long (1978) data. Stock dividend shares have higher retums- 
-a finding consistent with capital gain preference. The price decrease 
following cash dividend payment is less than the amount of the dividend.
Skinner and Gilster (1990) 1980-1985
Daily
EG Other factors likely confound the findings of earlier studies (i.e. Elton 
and Gruber, 1970). The dividend clientele effect is likely an industry 
effect rather than a tax effect.
Sterk and Vandenberg (1990) 1984-1986
Daily
PriceA/PriceB ratio In a study using Citizens Utilities stock (also used by Long (1978) and 
Poterba (1986), the authors find a dividend/capital gains tax differential 
premium exists but its effects are eclipsed by the shareholder’s preference 
for cash dividends. Tax laws affect share value.
- j
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Studies Using Abnormal Positive Returns
Eades, Hess and Kim (1984) 1962-1980
Daily
Modified EG Capital gains/dividend tax differential incompletely explains ex-dividend 
day excess returns. Ex-dividend day returns decrease after negotiated 
commissions are allowed. Return distribution results support the tax- 
adjusted hypothesis.




ES Test tax arbitrage using trading volume around the ex-dividend date. 




ClassA/ClassB ratio Cash dividend paying shares sell at a premium to stock dividend paying 
shares. Premiums are explained by changes in the relative value and 
trading costs. No evidence is shown for a cash dividend preference.




Ex-dividend day returns are significantly affected by short term traders. 
This effect is primarily in high-yield stocks and has grown following 
negotiated commission introduction. Trading activities vary positively 
(negatively) with yield (costs).
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Studies Using Abnormal Positive Returns (continued)
Bajaj and Vijh (1990) 1962-1987
Daily
ES The price reaction to a change in dividend policy is more pronounced 
in high yield stocks. The findings support the dividend clientele 
hypothesis. The small firm reaction is partially attributable to higher 
relative costs. Information and yield effects are confounded.
Karpoff and Walkling (1990) 1973-1985
Daily
ES Ex-dividend day returns are positively related to bid-ask spreads. The 
relation is stronger in high yield stocks. Short term trading activity 
significantly affects abnormal returns.
Venkatesh (1991) 1988
Intraday
Modified EG The ex-dividend day price decrease and trading volume increase is related 
to transaction costs. Trading activity decreases abnormal returns.
Stickel (1991) 1972-1980
Daily
ES The study examines non-convertible preferred stocks. Increased 
liquidity is associated with decreased abnormal returns and increased 
increased volume. Transaction costs preclude short term trading profits.
Dubofsky (1992) 1962-1987
Daily
Modified EG Market microstructure (specifically NYSE and AMEX trading rules) 
precipitate ex-dividend day abnormal returns.




Hearth and Rimbey (1992) find few changes in market activity following the 1986 TRA 
and little support for the tax clientele theory.
Following a sequence of tax reform acts in Canada, Khoury and Smith (1977), 
Morgan (1980), Amoako-Adu (1983) and Booth and Johnson (1984) find support for 
the tax-adjusted model using Canadian stock market data from the period preceding and 
following the changes in the tax law. Notwithstanding these findings, Lakonishok and 
Vermaelen (1983) report results more supportive of the short term trading hypothesis. 
The tax-adjusted model is also supported in studies using British data (Feldstein, 1970, 
Poterba and Summers, 1984 and Ang, Blackwell and Megginson, 1991).
Another approach uses direct examination of investor portfolios to test the tax 
clientele hypothesis. The tax-adjusted model predicts that certain subgroups of taxable 
investors will hold dividend paying stocks while the tax-avoidance model posits that 
only tax exempt investors and shareholders who are able to shelter the dividend income 
will hold dividend paying shares.
Blume, Crockett and Friend (1974) find an inverse relation between portfolio 
dividend yield and the investor’s tax bracket. Although high income investors hold 
lower dividend paying stocks in their portfolios, the yield differences between the high 
income investor portfolios and the low income investor portfolios were less than the tax 
bracket differential. In a later investigation of individual brokerage accounts, Pettit 
(1977) finds that the large dividend/capital gains tax differential induces high tax 
bracket individuals to hold low yield issues. Portfolio dividend yields also increase as 
age and liquidity needs increase. A subsequent re-examination of the Pettit (1977) investor
TABLE 3.4




U.S. Tax Law Changes
Barclay (1987) 1900-1910
Daily
EG Examines stock price movements on ex-dividend day before federal income 
taxes. Results supportthetax-adjustedhypothesis. Notaxclienteleeffect 
is found. Dividend/capital gain taxation differentials affect individual 
portfolio choices. The value of the firm is affected by its dividend policy.




Dividend payments cause significant tax liabilities. Investors are not 
indifferent between dividends and capital gains. Results are consistent 
with an after-tax preference for dividends. Tax law changes have little 





An increase in abnormal return on ex-dividend day follows the 1984 Tax 
Reform Act. The increase is found only in high yield stocks. Shortterm 
trading is inhibited by tax law changes.
Robin (1991) 1984-1988
Daily
ES Supports the tax clientele hypothesis. A statistically significant decrease 
in ex-dividend day returns follows the 1986 TRA. Short term trading 
activity has also diminished.
TABLE 3.4 (continued)




U.S. Tax Law Changes (continued)
Michaely (1991) 1986-1989
Daily
Modified EG Analyzes the ex-dividend day premiums before and after the 1986 TRA. 
The 1986 TRA has little effect on ex-day returns. Short term traders 
are mainly responsible for ex-day effects.




XSRA Personal tax rates affect corporate capital structure decisions. The study 
finds indirect support for dividend clientele existence.
Hearth and Rimbey (1992) 1984-1988
Daily
EG, NP Tests Results do not support the tax clientele hypothesis. Few significant 
changes in ex-day returns following the 1986 TRA.
Wu and Hsu (1992) 1984-1990
Daily
ES Ex-dividend day premiums increase significantly after the 1986 TRA. 
Short term trading volume decreases due to the increase in corporate 
tax liability. Lower yield stock price changes are consistent with the 
tax clientele hypothesis. Ex-dividend day premiums on high yield issues 
are related to arbitrage trading.
Canadian Tax Law Changes




Changes in taxation of capital gains induce changes in dividend policy. 
Canadian corporate dividendpolicy is dissimilar to U. S. corporate policy. 
Aggregate dividends depend on the capital gain/dividend tax differential.
oo©
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Canadian Tax Law Changes (continued)
MRA, 
OLS, GLS
Dividend and capitals gains are almost perfect substitutes following the 
tax law changes in 1972 and were imperfect substitutes preceding the 
passage of the act. The change in substitutability is the result of the 
introduction of a tax on capital gains, an increase in the dividend tax 
credit or a combination of these factors.
Lakonishok and Vermaelen 
(1983)





Booth and Johnston (1984) 1970-1980
Daily
EG
Results are not compatible with Elton and Gruber (1970). Marginal 
shareholder dividend/capital gain valuation is not reflected in ex-dividend 
day price behavior. The short term trading hypothesis is supported. 
Ex-day price declines are smaller in Canada.
Significant differences between the effects of tax reform on high yield 
and low yield stocks is demonstrated. Shareholders use personal tax 
liabilities to price stocks.
Shareholders prefer capital gains to dividends. The short term trading 
hypothesis is not supported by empirical findings. Weakly supports the 
dividend tax clientele hypothesis.
TABLE 3.4 (continued)




British Tax Law Changes
Feldstein (1970) 1953-1964
Quarterly
XSRA, OLS, GLS, IV, 
ALS
Changes in the tax rate affect dividend policy. 40-60 percent of the effect 
of the change ensues in the first year.
Poterba and Summers (1984) 1955-1981
Daily
Monthly
XSRA, GLS Results support the tax-adjusted model. Taxes are partially responsible 
for the positive dividend yield/stock return relation. The results support 
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979,1982) and conflict with Miller and 
Scholes (1982) and Gordon and Bradford (1980).




Means Test Taxes rates affect dividend payout levels and share valuation by investors. 
Stock dividend shares sell at a premium when compared to cash dividend 
shares if the tax liability of capital gains is lower. Cash dividends are 
preferred if tax liabilities are equal.
1 See Appendix A for method of analysis abbreviations.
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portfolios by Lewellen, Stanley, Lease and Schlarbaum (1978) finds little evidence of 
the tax clientele effect—rather, dividend paying shares are found in the portfolios of 
investors with differing tax liabilities.
A further group of studies attempts to determine if shareholders pay taxes on 
dividends. The tax-adjusted model predicts that tax payments will be made because 
pre-tax returns are grossed up due to potential investor awareness of the tax liability; 
the tax-avoidance model predicts that no taxes will be paid because non tax exempt 
investors will shelter the income. Feenberg (1981) finds that only 2 'A percent of 
dividends are paid to individuals eligible to take the interest deduction proposed by 
Miller and Scholes (1978). Also, Peterson, Peterson and Ang (1985) report that 
shareholders pay considerable taxes on dividends and that they do not shelter their 
income. Other research shows that an increase (decrease) in the tax liability of 
dividends versus capital gains leads to a decrease (increase) in aggregate dividends in 
the United States (Lent, 1948 and Brittain, 1966), Canada (Khoury and Smith, 1977) 
and Great Britain (Feldstein, 1970).
3.2.3 Summary
Transaction costs, tax differentials, and heterogeneous shareholder expectations 
should induce a capital gain preference if firms are following an optimal investment 
strategy (Lintner, 1962). Stiglitz (1981) and Modigliani (1982) assert that corporations 
acting in the shareholder’s best interest should pay zero dividends if capital gains tax 
liability is less than dividend tax liability. However, corporations continue to pay 
dividends despite their apparent liabilities. This is not completely unexpected. General
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equilibria of standard finance models demand that prices adjust upward to induce firms 
to make taxable distributions (DeAngelo, 1991).
The underlying tax structure significantly affects corporate dividend policy. 
Empirical analysis of these effects better support the tax-adjusted model than the 
alternative tax-avoidance model. Under the tax-adjusted model, high dividend yield 
stocks with high tax liabilities are priced to increase the pre-tax expected returns. The 
theory that rational shareholders require a higher return from dividend paying shares 
is logically consistent.
Positive support for the dividend clientele hypothesis is shown by the differences 
in ex-dividend day return performance of high yield and low yield stocks (Haugen and 
Senbet, 1986). However, the proportion of non-dividend paying stocks is much smaller 
than expected if the majority of investors are subject to the tax liabilities associated with 
dividends.
3.3 THEORETICAL EXPLANATION BASED ON INFORMATIONAL
ASYMMETRIES
The market imperfection of asymmetric information is the basis for three distinct 
efforts to explain corporate dividend policy. The mitigation of the informational 
asymmetries between managers and owners via unexpected changes in dividend policy 
is the cornerstone of dividend signaling models. Agency cost theory uses dividend 
policy to better align the interests of shareholders and corporate managers. The free 
cash flow hypothesis combines attributes of both the signaling and agency costs
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paradigms; the payment of dividends can decrease the level of funds available for 
perquisite consumption by corporate managers.
3.3.1 Signaling and the Information Content of Dividend Hypothesis
In their seminal work, M&M argue that the share price is independent of 
dividend policy—the value of a share reflects both the future cash flow stream and 
future growth opportunities. M&M acknowledge that dividend changes influence stock 
prices and attribute this phenomenon to the "information content of dividends". A 
stock price change resulting from a change in dividend payout due to the informational 
content of dividends represents differences in the private information known by 
corporate managers and the information available to the public. Only unexpected 
changes in dividend levels and the release of new information should affect stock prices 
under perfect market assumptions.
Corporate managers hold private information concerning the firm’s future value. 
Managers are motivated to release this information to investors but must do so 
indirectly to prevent competing firms from profiting from the release. The signal of 
this information must be credible—i.e. costly to prevent false signaling by other firms 
in the marketplace. If managers have information that is not known by the public and 
an incentive to release this information indirectly, they can relay this information to 
shareholders through unexpected changes in dividend policy (Myers and Majluf, 1984).
This price reaction to announcement of changes in dividend policy is rational 
(Myers, 1987). The dividend information message of unobservable true earnings 
foreshadows expected future earnings. The market price of the shares should increase
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(decrease) from the raised (lowered) expectations. Communication of managerial 
expectations using dividends is less ambiguous than earnings announcements since 
dividend policy is solely at the discretion of management. A reluctance on the part of 
managers to reduce dividends is a necessary condition for dividend use as a credible 
signal (Kalay, 1980).
The results of early empirical attempts to support the information content of 
dividends hypothesis are ambiguous. Separate studies by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and 
Roll (1969), Petitt (1972,1976), Griffin (1976) and Laub (1976) show positive 
(negative) excess returns accruing following unexpected dividend increases (decreases). 
Works by Ang (1975) and Gonedes (1978) fail to support the premise while Watts 
(1973) finds that transaction costs preclude excess return capture by market participants. 
Charest (1978) reports that earnings announcement and dividend announcement effects 
are confounded. Inconsistencies in the results can be traced to differences in data, 
sample period, methods of analysis and model misspecification. Table 3.5 is a 
summary of these works.
3.3.1.a Theoretical Signaling Models
Akerlof’s (1970) model of the used car industry as a pooling equilibrium in the 
absence of signaling activities illuminates the costs o f informational asymmetries. The 
generalization of Akerlof s model by Spence (1974) became the prototype for all 
financial models of signaling. The model defines a unique and specific signaling 
equilibrium in that market participants seeking employment in a world of uncertainty 
and asymmetric information rely on signals of their quality rather than reputation
TABLE 3.5










Changes in dividends are assumed to signal changes in long run managerial 
expectations. Increased prices are associated with concurrent stock splits 
and dividend increases; decreases if dividends decrease. Markets adjust 





Dividends relay significant new information of managerial estimates of 
earning power. Moderate dividend increases are associated with favorable 
market movements; large and small increases don’t affect returns; all 
decreases in dividends reduce returns. Prices react rapidly. Dividend 





The positive effects have no economic value since transaction costs erase 
abnormal returns. Only inconsequential differences in the six month 
performance of firms are seen following dividend increases or dividend 
decreases. The results can be confused by noise and confounding effects.
Ezell (1974) 1966-1970
Annual
MRA Formation of expectations of dividend and earnings levels impacts the 
informational content of dividends.
Ang (1975) 1966-1971
Quarterly
Cross spectral analysis Results fail to support the informational content of dividends. Short run 
earnings and dividends are highly correlated implying that dividendpolicy 
is not entirely a residual decision.
00-J
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Earnings, dividends, and earnings forecasts jointly significantly affect 
security returns. Analysts’ forecasts and dividend changes (especially 
decreases) carry unique information.
Laub (1976) 1946-1965
Annual
MRA Refutes Watts (1973) due to incorrect analysis of the empirical results. 
The results support the release of future earning prospects information 
via dividends. Watts (1976a) rebuts these findings.
Petitt (1976) 1946-1965
Monthly
MRA Review of Watts (1973) method of analysis. Dividend changes relay 
relevant information. Watts (1976b) argues that Petitt’s model is 
misspecified and results are confounded by external effects.
Charest (1978) 1962-1969
Daily
ES Stock prices increase (decline) following dividend increase (reduction) 
announcements. Significant abnormal returns accrue in the months 
following the announcement of a change in dividend policy. The study 
does not segregate dividend and earnings announcement effects; dividend 
announcements do not necessarily transmit information.
Gonedes (1978) 1946-1972
Annual
XSRA The results do not support the dividend information hypothesis. 
Unexpected dividend changes provide little additional information to the 
market—shareholders already have all pertinent information.




acquisition to find positions. Although formulated in the job market, Spence believes 
that findings can be extended to a limited number of other settings (admissions 
procedures, promotions, and credit application). A necessary condition for signaling 
to be successful is an inverse relation between a signal’s costs and true productivity- 
relative costs are higher for inferior workers to signal. The signaling mechanisms must 
be controlled, must be able to be modified by the signaler, and must be costly. Since 
managers cannot determine a worker’s quality through observation, a high quality 
worker signals his value through additional education resulting in higher pay. A similar 
model is formulated for the insurance market (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). The 
general sufficient conditions for a signaling equilibrium to exist are formalized by Riley 
(1979).
Numerous theoretical financial models of signaling have been formulated to 
explain how managerial activities attempt to reduce the information asymmetries 
between corporate shareholders and managers. These include share repurchases 
(Stewart, 1976, Vermaelen, 1981 and Barclay and Smith, 1988), ownership equity 
proportion (Leland and Pyle, 1977), capital structure (Ross, 1977), convertible bond 
conversion (Harris and Raviv, 1985), insider trading (Damodaran and Liu, 1993) and 
models with dual signals o f the insider trading activity occurring around other corporate 
signaling activities (John and Mishra, 1990 and John and Lang, 1991). Signaling 
models of corporate dividend policy are formalized by Bhattacharya (1979,1980), 
Talmor (1981), Hakansson (1982), John and Williams (1985), Miller and Rock (1985), 
Bar-Yosef and Huffman (1986), Makhija and Thompson (1986), Ambarish, John and
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Williams (1987), Ofer and Thakor (1987), Kumar (1988), Kale and Noe (1990) and 
Rodriguez (1992).
The majority of financial theorists believe that signaling via corporate dividend 
policy has a lower cost than alternatives that would accomplish the same result. If less 
costly alternatives are available, prudent corporate managers would choose these 
alternatives rather than dividend policy to signal their inside information (Ambarish, 
John and Williams (1987) and Ofer and Thakor (1987)). The use of dividends as 
signals implies that alternative methods of signaling are not perfect substitutes (Asquith 
and Mullins (1986)).
The dividend signaling model developed by Bhattacharya (1979) is descended 
from Ross (1977). In this model of an all equity firm, a higher dividend payment per 
share implies a higher firm value. Unexpected increases in dividends are favorable 
signals relaying unique information of managements’ expectations of future cash flows. 
The costs associated with dividend payments—the opportunity costs of the use of 
internal funds or the transaction costs associated with external financing—make the 
signal costly for firms lacking positive information to imitate. Unlike Spence (1974), 
the costs of signaling occur in the future while the firm benefits from the strategy 
during the current period. The increase in share value associated with the signal offsets 
the shareholders’ tax liability from dividend income. In this environment, closely held 
firms are likely to pay higher dividends to communicate their value to outside 
shareholders because information availability is constrained in closely held firms. If
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the least profitable firms pay zero dividends, the dividend and earnings relation will be 
linear. The model’s predictions are supported by Brittain (1966).
Bhattacharya (1980) extends the model to a two-period intertemporal setting 
while Talmor (1981) augments the model using a multivariate signaling paradigm with 
multiple valuation parameters and signaling mechanisms. In Talmor’s model, managers 
make several financing decisions simultaneously. The firm’s management considers all 
financial decisions as a single operation even if the individual activities are not 
explicitly recognized by the shareholders as signaling vehicles. Makhija and Thompson 
(1986) define the least profitable firm differently than Bhattacharya (1979) in their 
extension of the model. If all firms have non-zero earnings, the dividend/earnings 
relation will be nonlinear. To ensure equilibrium existence, the dividend policy of the 
most profitable firms must be constrained and additional limiting conditions likely have 
to be imposed.
A signaling equilibrium will exist only if firm quality dispersion is limited in the 
extension of the Bhattacharya (1979) model developed by Rodriguez (1992). If a cash 
flow range is specified for each firm, an upper bound on firm quality distribution 
exists; an equilibrium is not feasible beyond the bound. If the lowest quality firms have 
zero cash flows, dividends will increase linearly with firm quality in equilibrium. If 
some firms pay excess dividends due to the wide distribution in firm quality, an 
equilibrium is not likely. Dividend signaling levels in equilibrium are an increasing 
function of the firms’ differences in quality (consistent with Ofer and Thakor, 1987).
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An equilibrium with homogeneous shareholder beliefs and efficient markets 
precludes the use of dividend policy to signal (Hakansson, 1982). Increased market 
efficiency via private information dissemination through corporate dividend policy will 
occur provided one of three sufficient conditions are met—shareholders have 
heterogeneous probability assessments, markets are incomplete, or investors have 
different consumption allocations over time. The three are not mutually exclusive. In 
this model, the information content of a change in dividend policy is a significant but 
the signaling function alone cannot explain dividend persistence. Unexpected changes 
in dividends convey private information of expected future payoff patterns. The release 
of information through dividend policy changes proxies for additional financial markets. 
The model only discusses gains in shareholder welfare from dividend payments; it does 
not explain how investors induce managers to pay dividends or the preference for cash 
dividends.
John and Williams (1985) develop a signaling model with multiple equilibria 
using the assumption that firms with unique private information will receive varied 
marginal benefits following changes in dividend policy. The model is developed in an 
adverse environment where only dividends are taxed. Managers’ expectations of future 
returns are signaled. An increase in dividends increases share price-consistent with the 
goal of shareholder value maximization (this goal differs from Bhattacharya, 1979). 
Information dissemination cause a premium to be offered by investors for dividend 
paying shares that offsets the costs of the signaling-increased shareholder tax liabilities 
and constrained firm liquidity. In equilibrium, firms with more favorable information
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pay higher dividends and are consequently more highly valued by investors. Firms 
with lower cash flow levels pay dividends no greater than firms with higher expected 
cash flows. Dividend clienteles exist in this model. Although modeled in a world with 
unfavorable market conditions, an equilibrium exists with dissipative dividends. The 
firm’s efficient equilibrium is determined by internalizing the investment decision.
Miller and Rock (1985) model a net dividend concept—the unexpected net 
dividend is determined by subtracting external financing from the total dividend paid—to 
signal expected current earnings information that implies future earnings levels. The 
model combines dividends and external financing that are stylized as different sides of 
the same coin. The signal of current earnings differs from the models of Bhattacharya 
(1979) and John and Williams (1985). The cost of the signal in the model is a non- 
optimal investment policy—the payment of dividends uses cash that could otherwise be 
used for investment opportunities. Earning, dividend and financing announcements are 
closely related and dividends and earnings announcements are perfect substitutes if the 
model’s assumptions are met. Unexpected increases in dividends provide increases in 
shareholder wealth.
The assumption of a managerial incentive reward/penalty policy underlies the 
signaling model developed by Bar-Yosef and Huffman (1986). In this equilibrium, 
dividends increase as managerial expectations of cash flow increase but the marginal 
effect of cash flows on dividends decreases as cash flows increase. Consistent with 
Leland and Pyle (1977), higher levels of uncertainty are present in firms with lower
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dividend payout ratios. Unlike Bhattacharya (1979) interest rate effects on dividend 
payment levels are indeterminant.
Ambarish, John and Williams (1987) generalize the models o f Myers and Majluf 
(1984), John and Williams (1985) and Miller and Rock (1985). In this model, 
dividends are less efficient than other methods (investment policy, share repurchase and 
equity issues) of releasing private information to the market. The private information 
known to managers is communicated through combinations of changes in dividend and 
investment policies or changes in dividend policy and new equity issue or share 
repurchase announcements. If all private information can be conveyed via an 
alternative signaling venue, relaying information through changes in dividend policy is 
redundant. Dividends exists in this equilibrium only if the cost of using multiple 
signaling mechanisms is less than using individual vehicles. The tax liability of 
dividend payment is the cost of signaling. The use of two corporate policy decisions 
minimizes the costs associated with signaling.
In Ofer and Thakor (1987), both dividends and stock repurchases are used as 
signals. The difference in costs of the two approaches precludes their substitutability. 
In addition to the financing costs associated with dividend payments, share repurchases 
have the additional cost of increasing managerial risk due to the proportional increase 
in managerial ownership following a repurchase. It follows that share repurchases 
disseminate more information due to their higher cost. Dividends are used to signal 
small market underpricings o f the firm while repurchase is reserved for periods when
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the stock is significantly underpriced due to the cost differential between the two 
methods.
The ability to use a multivariate signal does not preclude the use of a single 
signal. In the model developed by Hausch and Seward (1993), cash distributions are 
assumed to signal changes in managerial expectations of firm potential. Two types of 
distribution policies exist, a deterministic policy with known, declared amounts of cash 
payments (dividends) and a stochastic policy characterized by a firm’s precommitment 
to pay an unspecified amount of cash (share repurchases). Each alternative has distinct 
signaling properties and the distribution’s size and the announcement effect’s magnitude 
are uncorrelated. If firms have identical production possibilities but dissimilar cash 
levels, firms with decreasing absolute risk aversion are more likely to hold higher levels 
of cash and have a lower relative cost of stochastic disbursement. High quality firms 
can distinguish themselves from low quality firms by their choice of distribution policy.
A corporation’s prospects can only be partially revealed using dividend policy 
because the payment stream is routinely smoothed by managers; changes in dividend 
policy are only a rough signal of future expected earnings. Kumar (1988) models a 
rational expectations signaling equilibrium in that dividends convey only broad 
information of changes in a firm’s prospects. The model implies that although dividend 
increases (decreases) signal important positive (negative) information about the firm’s 
prospects, dividends are a poor predictor of corporate earnings due to the smoothing 
process applied by managers.
96
In a two-period model developed by Kale and Noe (1990), dividend increases 
signal increased future cash flow stability and decreased riskiness o f the cash flows. 
In the model, dividends are positively correlated with share price returns and are 
inversely related to expected cash flow variance and underwriting costs.
3 .3 .l .b  Empirical Tests of the Informational Content of Dividends Hypothesis
Empirical tests of the information content of dividend hypothesis are largely 
supportive of the theory. A large number of studies using diverse sample periods find 
that unexpected changes in dividend policy relay information and the information 
released by a change in dividend policy is not trivial. The magnitude o f the price 
change associated with unexpected decreases in dividend payouts is greater than the 
change following unexpected increases and is positively related to the excess returns and 
trading volume associated with the change. Earnings and dividend announcements are 
not perfect substitutes; each convey unique information. Changes in regular dividends 
provide more information than special dividends. A size effect (more pronounced 
reactions following dividend changes by smaller firms) due to the decreased level of 
small firm information available to the market is shown. Results can be confounded 
by ex-dividend/announcement effects, wealth transfers and decreases in profitable 
investment opportunities. A summary of the empirical studies supporting the 
information content of dividend hypothesis is found in Table 3.6.
Several studies show results that contrast with the previous findings and that are 
inconsistent with the information content of dividend hypothesis/signaling models. The 
impact of an unexpected and substantial change in dividend policy is more diverse and
TABLE 3.6




Aharony and Swary (1980) 1963-1976
Daily
ES Separates earnings and dividend announcement effects. Each conveys 
unique information and are associated with significant abnormal returns. 
Negative announcement effects are stronger. Results strongly support 
the information content hypothesis.
Kalay (1980) 1956-1975
Annual
Dividend change analysis The Ross (1977) model is applied to corporate dividend policy and finds 
an indefinite evidence of managerial reluctance to decrease dividends. 
The few cases of forced dividend reduction imply that the information 
content of dividends cannot be rejected analyzing dividend decreases.
Kwan (1981) 1973-1977
Quarterly
ES Extends Watts (1973) with an modified Lintner (1956) and Fama and 
Babiak (1968) model. The information is non-trivial.
Woolridge (1982) 1970-1977
Daily
ES Positive (negative) debt and preferred stock returns result from 
unanticipated increases (decreases) in dividends. Signaling is the main 
influence on security prices but wealth transfer and confounding effects 






Signaling is more effective in lower risk firms. The negative correlation 
between yield and variance implies more information is released by a 












Dividend change announcements convey information; the unexpected 
dividend change/abnormal return relation is significant. If anticipated, 
no additional information is released.
Asquith and Mullins (1983) 1964-1980
Daily
ES Initial dividend announcements result in significantpositiveexcess returns 
and increased investor wealth. Subsequent dividend increase 
announcement effects are greater than initiation or resumption 
announcement effects. Dividend announcements relay unique information.
Brickley (1983) 1969-1979
Daily
ES Regular dividend announcement effects are greater and more permanent 
than those associated with special dividends .Both announcements convey 
positive information. Dividend increases or special dividends precede 
earnings decreases.
Divecha and Morse (1983) 1977-1979
Daily
ES The increase in share price is directly proportional to the magnitude of 
of the dividend increase announcement. The results are consistent with 
the informationhypothesisbut the results are likely confounded by effects 





Managers increase earnings forecasts rather than increase dividends; 
dividend decreases are not associated with decreases in earnings. Dividend 















Earnings and dividend announcement individual effects and interactions 
result in abnormal returns. Earnings and dividend announcements are 
not perfect substitutes.




ES Bond price changes around dividend announcement support the dividend 
informationhypothesis. The information conveyed is the expected future 
profitability of the firm. Decreases in dividends negatively affect bond 
prices; increases have no effect on bond prices.




ES Anticipated dividend omissions and large decreases depress stock prices. 
Initiations of dividends are associated with significant positive returns. 
Reaction to unfavorable announcements is more significant. Results 
strongly support the informational hypothesis.




RCRA Random coefficient results support the information content hypothesis. 
Dividend change announcements alter shareholder expectations. The 
price adjustment is protracted over the month following the announcement.




ES Positive net announcement effects. Excess returns accruing during the 
announcement period partially compensate investors for the increase in 












ES The market’s response to dividend announcement is lagged due to 
announcement effect and ex-dividend effect confounding. No lag occurs 
if the ex-dividend effect is controlled for. The reaction to the dividend 
information effect is overly optimistic.
Asquith and Mullins (1986) 1964-1980
Daily
ES Dividend initiation produces positive excess returns. The magnitude of 
the dividend is positively correlated with the size of abnormal return. 
The returns are larger than the dividend/capital gains tax differential. 
Subsequent increases are also associated with positive excess returns.




ES Managers select eamings/dividendannouncement dates to impact returns. 






XSRA Significant positive returns are associated with dividend initiation. 
Increases in trading volume from future earnings represent more than 
a change in shareholder clientele. The findings support the information 
hypothesis. Trading volume and dividend changes are positively related.
Ofer and Siegel (1987) 1976-1984
Daily
MRA, IV Tests dividend signaling hypothesis using earnings forecast error and 
dividend change correlation. A change in dividend policy relays 
information to the market—analysts revise earnings forecasts following 
a change in dividend policy.
©o
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Healy and Palepu (1988) 1954-1963
1969-1982
Quarterly
XSRA Increased (decreased) earnings are associated with dividend initiation 
(omission). Positive (negative) earnings are documented one year prior 
and post dividend initiation (omission). Changes provide additional 
information on future earnings.
Eddy and Seifert (1988) 1983-1985
Daily
ES Larger dividend increases more significantly affect small firms. A 
significant size/price reaction relation is shown.




ES Excess return is positively (negatively) correlated with security yield if 





Friday earnings and dividend announcements tend to be more negative. 
Smaller firms are affected more. The weekend effect is not related to 
earnings and dividend announcements.
Venkatesh (1989) 1972-1983
Daily
NP Tests Dividend information proxies for earnings announcement information 
following dividend initiation. The findings support the signaling 
hypothesis. Volatility decreases follow dividend initiation implying less 
uncertainty following initiation.




Dividends signal reliability and precede unexpected earnings changes 
and changes in short term firm performance. The consistency of earnings 
changes and dividend changes imply that earnings cause dividend changes.
o
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MRA Using Australian data, interaction between earnings and dividend effects 
announcement effects is shown. The interaction is independent of the 
timing of the announcements.






Although significant abnormal returns are associated with both positive 
and negative changes in dividends, the effects are more pronounced in 
dividend decreases. The effect is magnified if current earnings are not 
known. No earnings predictability or percent change in earnings/dividend 
announcement effect relation is found. Late announcements of dividend 
decreases are anticipated by the market and have little effect. Information 
content is positively correlated with the size of the change.
Ghosh and Woolridge (1991) 1962-1984
Daily
ES The firstdividendomissionis associated with significant negative returns; 
subsequent omission effects are insignificant (consistent with Kalay and 
Lowenstein (1985) and Eades, Hess, and Kim (1985)). Prices react to 
unanticipated announcements only.
Shrader and Milkman (1991) 1987-1988
Daily
ES Dividend increases signal increases in future cash flow expectations or 
alternatively, decreases in growth opportunities. Low growth firms have 
abnormal returns following increases in dividends; high growth firms 
have no excess returns.
*
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Earnings levels increase the predictability of dividend decreases in firms 
with losses. The results support the information content of dividend 
hypothesis. An annual loss is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for a dividend decrease to occur in firms with established records of 
dividend payouts. The change in dividend policy following negative 
earnings is more pronounced.
Eddy and Seifert (1992) 1983-1985
Daily
ES The combined dividend/earnings announcement effect is greater than the 
reaction to one announcement (approximately doubled). Joint 
announcements convey more information. No significant reaction is 
documented when contradictory signals.
Kao, Wu, and Lin (1992) 1965-1990
Quarterly
TOBIT Dividends are customarily smoothed by managers; non-systematic changes 
in dividend policy signal unexpected earnings changes. Unexpected 
changes in dividend policy and changes in future earnings forecasts are 
positively related.
Kim and Viswanath (1992) 1971-1980
Daily
ES The market’s reaction to dividend changes increase costs. Dividend policy 
is matched to permanent earnings levels. Signaling is supported.




An information hypothesis/weekend effect relation is not seen.
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Wong and Swindle (1992) 1970-1986
Daily
NP Tests Dividend initiation does not decrease information acquisition costs. 
Earnings announcement effects are not decreased by dividend initiation 
(contrasts with Venkatesh (1989)). The volatility decrease is due to the 
decrease in volume, not in information asymmetry.
Gu and Clayton (1993) 1982-1986
Quarterly
ANOVA RBD Most firms show a positive relation between increased cash flows and 
signaling. Not all dividend changes are accurate signals. Small and 
medium changes in dividend policy are accurate; large changes are more 
likely to be false signals. The signal conveys the stability of future cash 
flows.
1 See Appendix A for method of analysis abbreviations.
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of greater complexity than signaling models predict. Managerial subjectivity in the 
estimation of earnings likely cause inaccuracies in future earnings prognostications and 
severely limit the usefulness of the private information released through changes in 
corporate dividend payout levels. The decrease in the earnings growth rate of firms 
following the announcement o f the change in policy is also inconsistent with theory 
predictions. Further, the wide variance in excess return distributions associated with 
changes in policy is not compatible with the models’ predictions.
Frankfurter and Gong (1992) provide the only direct test of a signaling model 
by examining the model developed by John and Williams (1985). In their analysis, the 
authors show that liquidity demands and dividend payments are negatively correlated; 
these results are diametrically opposed to the model’s predictions. Shareholder liquidity 
requirements partially determine firm dividend policy. Share prices increase (decrease) 
and trading volumes decrease (increase) following dividend increases (decreases). The 
categorization of the results of these studies is presented in Table 3.7.
3 .3 .l .c  Summary
The only direct test of a signaling model (Frankfurter and Gong, 1992) is unable 
to find empirical support for the theory. Crockett and Friend (1988) conclude that the 
John and Williams (1985) model prediction that zero dividend firms have little 
investment capital and cash flows instead of capital constraints is improbable. 
Managerial imposition of costs on remaining shareholders to benefit sellers of the shares 
is irrational. In the model developed by Miller and Rock (1985), increased dividends 
can release misinformation that benefits selling shareholders; a conclusion in
TABLE 3.7
EMPIRICAL TESTS NOT SUPPORTIVE OF THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF 








No information effects from dividend or earnings announcements are 
found in dividend decreases of greater than 20 percent.






Dividend policy is relevant—the market reacts to unexpected changes in 
policy. Dividend increases are followed by increases in the earnings 
growth rate. Abnormal returns and dividend increase magnitude are 
positively related but only consistent increases raise share price. Dividend 
policy effects are more complex than modeled by signaling models.




The earnings growth rate decreases following dividend initiation 
announcement, contrary to dividend signaling hypothesis prediction. 
Initiations signify the coming of age of firms and lower capital costs due 
to increased capital market accessibility.




ES Tests John and Williams (1985) and fails to support the model; liquidity 
demands and dividend payments are negatively correlated. Shareholder 
liquidityrequirements partially determine firm dividendpolicy. Dividend 
increases (decreases) cause increases (decreases) in share price and 
decreases (increases) in share volume. The positive relation between 
dividend change and price change is significant in small firms only.




contradiction with behavior rationality. In addition, consistent underinvestment by 
management would make the firm a target for takeovers. Brennan and Thakor (1990) 
assert that the choice of cash distribution method cannot depend solely on information 
asymmetries because share price is not an absolute composite of private information due 
to the costs involved with information collection.
On the other hand, the majority of empirical tests o f the information content of 
dividend support the hypothesis-unexpected changes in dividend policy result in excess 
returns. The results are not without possible inadequacies, however, because they are 
partially driven by other events. Methods of analysis are likely less than appropriate. 
The arbitrary assignment of a dividend change as unexpected (defining unexpected by 
the magnitude of the change) and the length of the event window used in excess return 
determination likely bias the results.
Miller (1987) reviews Riley’s (1979) sufficient conditions for a signaling 
equilibrium concentrating on their application in a financial setting. He concludes that 
its adaption to financial modeling is difficult if  not impossible. The costs associated 
with signaling in finance are for the most part opportunity costs—departures from 
optimal investment strategies under full information conditions. The existence of 
benefits from signaling are obvious—what the benefits are specifically and who they 
benefit are not. Financial researchers differ in their opinions of what is being signaled; 
the permanence of past earnings (Lintner, 1956 and Fama and Babiak, 1964), a more 
precise measure of current earnings (Watts, 1973, Gonedes, 1978 and Miller and Rock, 
1985) or future earnings expectations (Marsh and Merton, 1986). Grundy (1991) shows
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that the models developed by John and Williams (1985) and Miller and Rock (1985) fail 
to satisfy Riley’s (1979) conditions if negative investments, prices, or quantities are 
possible.
The ability of changes in dividend policy to serve as signals of private 
managerial information will likely never be fully understood due to misapplication of 
the model. Spence (1973) writes that his signaling model is not likely to be 
representative of many markets because of the different informational structures in those 
markets. The leap from the specific model developed by Spence to the theoretical 
financial signaling models of the last decade is likely to have been inappropriate given 
the original model’s assumptions.
The questions of what dividends signal, how they signal, and why less expensive 
methods are less successful in communicating private information have not been 
conclusively answered. Signals are "self-verifying "—the mechanism is believable only 
if  the message in reasonable and accurate. Messages relayed through changes in 
dividend policy are often ambiguous—insolvent firms are liquidated via dividends 
following changes in dividend policy (Easterbrook, 1984).
Signaling cannot totally explain the continued existence of dividends. The 
assumption that dividend payments in excess of optimal levels are partially explained 
by signaling is simple; proving this assumption is far more difficult since other factors 
determine policy (Miller, 1987). The price reaction is evidence of the capacity for 
signaling. If dividends are changed solely for the purpose of signaling firm specific 
information, then fluctuations in aggregate dividends should be stochastic and
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insignificant in magnitude. If altered for any other reason, then the lack o f information 
makes dividends useful in measuring the firm’s information content in dividend 
announcements (Marsh and Merton, 1987). Managers’ preference of using cash 
dividend policy to signal rather than less expensive alternatives lacks a reasonable 
explanation (Feldstein and Green, 1983 and Thakor, 1989). If managers are not 
attempting to relay information through dividend policy, other dissipative methods of 
cash disbursement are available and should be utilized to ensure shareholder wealth 
maximization (Myers, 1987). Future research efforts will likely be more successful in 
explaining why dividends cannot be used as signals rather than why they can (Miller, 
1987).
3.3.2 Agency Cost Theory
The recognition of potential agency costs associated with the separation of 
management and ownership is not new; differences in managerial and shareholder 
priorities have been recognized for over three centuries. Adam Smith (1937) adjudged 
the management of early joint stock companies to be negligent in many of their 
activities. These problems were especially prevalent in the British East Indies Company 
and attempts to monitor managers were largely unsuccessful due to inefficiencies and 
costs associated with shareholder monitoring (Kindleberger, 1984). Scott (1912) and 
Carlos (1992) question these assertions-while control and organization were less than 
ideal, the continued success and long life of the corporation implies general sound 
managerial practices. Although some fraud no doubt existed, the majority of 
managerial activities coincided with shareholder desires.
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Modem agency theory seeks to explain corporate capital structure as the result 
of attempts to minimize the costs associated with the separation of corporate ownership 
and control. Agency costs are lower in firms with high managerial ownership stakes 
due to the better alignment of shareholder and manager goals (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) and in firms with large block shareholders that are better able to monitor 
managerial activities (Shleifer and Vishney, 1986). Agency problems result from 
informational asymmetries, potential wealth transfers from bondholders to stockholders 
through the acceptance of high risk and high return projects by managers, and failure 
to accept positive net present value projects and perquisite consumption in excess of the 
level consumed by prudent corporate managers (Barnea, Haugen and Senbet, 1981).
Dividend policy influences these relations in two ways. Fama and Jensen 
(1983a, 1983b) espouse that potential shareholder and bondholder conflicts can be 
mitigated by covenants governing claim priority. These orderings can be circumvented 
by large dividend payments to stockholders. The payment o f large dividends to 
shareholders can also result in the rejection of positive net present value projects and 
misuse of low-cost capital (Myers, 1977). Debt covenants to minimize dividend 
payments are necessary to prevent bondholder wealth transfers to shareholders (John 
and Kalay, 1982). Although potentially substantial in their precipitation of agency 
costs, dividend policy is not a major source of bondholder wealth expropriation. In 
firms where dividend payouts are limited by bondholder covenants, dividend payout 
levels are still below the maximum level allowed by the constraints (Kalay, 1982).
I l l
The second way dividend policy affects agency costs is the reduction o f these 
costs through increased monitoring by capital markets. Large dividend payments 
reduce funds available for perquisite consumption and investment opportunities and 
require managers to seek financing in capital markets. The efficient monitoring of 
capital markets reduces less than optimal investment activity and excess perquisite 
consumption and hence reduce the costs associated with ownership and control 
separation (Easterbrook, 1984).
In an empirical examination, Rozeff (1982) finds three common trends in 
corporate dividend policy: (1) lower dividend payment levels are found in high growth 
firms—investment requirements reduce the funds available for dividend payment, (2) 
corporations with higher firm specific risks or leverage ratios pay smaller dividends and 
(3) higher payouts are found in firms with little insider ownership and large number of 
outside shareholders. These results imply that dividend policy mitigates agency costs 
due to the partial monitoring activity provided by dividend payments. Other research 
generally supports the agency costs hypothesis. Table 3.8 outlines these studies.
3.3.3 The Free Cash Flow Theory
Prudent corporate managers working in the shareholders’ best interests should 
invest in all profitable opportunities. However, management and owner separation 
affords corporate managers the temptation to consume or otherwise waste surplus funds. 
The inefficient use of funds in excess of profitable investment opportunities by 
management was first recognized over 60 years ago (Berle and Means, 1932). Jensen’s 
(1986) free cash flow hypothesis updated this assertion combining market information
TABLE 3.8






MRA Cross-sectional dividend payout regularities are the result of the capital 
cost and agency cost tradeoff when dividends are paid. Firm growth 
and expected growth are negatively related to the dividend level and the 
percentage of insider ownership. Growth is positively related to the 
number of shareholders. Firm risk is negatively correlated with dividend 
level.
Dyl and Hoffmeister (1986) 1979
Weekly
MRA Dividends are an important determinant of a firm’s risk. Dividend 
payments are made in order to select a preferred risk environment. Higher 
dividends are found in lower risk firms.




MRA Earnings volatility and degree of leverage are inversely related (consistent) 
with agency theory predictions). New issue transaction costs and dividend 
payout levels are also negatively correlated. Ownership stake, leverage 
and dividends are jointly orchestrated by managers to decrease total costs.




LOGIT The results support agency theory. All financially distressed firms reduce 
dividends, even those without covenants requiring them to do so. Debt 
covenants restrict dividend policy but are not the only factors impacting 
dividend policy. In the absence of covenants, dividends are reduced; 
managers are more averse to omission than to reduction. Reductions 
are the result of inferior performance and strategic maneuvers.
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MRA, OLS Regulated payout ratios are higher than unregulated ratios. The insider 
ownership stake is not an important determinant in unregulated firms. 
Increased (decreased) growth and increased (decreased) systematic risk 
are associated with lower ratios. Regulations inhibit growth, temper 
external monitor need, and increase wealth transfer through dividends 
implying decreased insider importance. Restrictions proxy as monitors.
Dempsey and Laber (1992) 1981-1987
Annual
MRA Extends Rozeff (1982). The original model maintains its substantial 
explanatory power and design stability. The results are statistically 
indistinguishable from the original study.
Sun (1992) 1979-1983
Annual
MRA Efforts to decrease agency costs lead to dividend regularities across firms. 
Ownership structure, informational asymmetries, and leverage risk 
characteristics characterize agency problems. Decreased (increased) 
insider ownership, decreased (increased) growth, and decreased (increased) 
debt risk are associated with increased (decreased) dividend payments. 
Results imply that dividend payments can lead to effective monitoring 
but cannot be used as effective signals. The higher dividend payments 
increase bondholder risk.
1 See Appendix A for method of analysis abbreviations.
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asymmetries with agency theory. The funds remaining after financing all positive net 
present value projects cause conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. 
Dividend and debt interest payments decrease the free cash flow available to managers 
for use in investment in marginal net present value projects and manager perquisite 
consumption. This combination of agency and signaling theory should better explain 
dividend policy than either theory alone but the free cash flow hypothesis better 
explains the corporate takeover frenzy of the 1980’s (Myers, 1987 and 1990).
An alternate information hypothesis, that changes in dividend policy signal 
changes in management’s expected investment policy, is fashioned by Lang and 
Litzenberger (1989). The model’s inferences support the free cash flow and 
overinvestment hypotheses better than the signaling hypothesis.
Table 3.9 lists the empirical tests of the signaling and free cash flow hypotheses. 
Although both of the hypotheses find some support, the research results better support 
the free cash flow hypothesis. Barber and Castanias (1992) view the two paradigms as 
complementary rather than competing.
3.3.4 Summary
Although M&M’s informational content of dividend hypothesis is supported by 
the majority of empirical studies, the only direct test of a signaling model (Frankfurter 
and Gong, 1992) fails to support the model. Empirical research generally supports the 
agency costs hypothesis and the partial mitigation of these costs through dividend 
payments. Neither information relay or agency cost mitigation are sufficient to explain 
the existence and persistence of corporate dividend policy. Jensen’s (1986) free cash
TABLE 3.9








AARA Results are consistent with both signaling and free cash flow 
hypotheses but better support the free cash flow hypothesis.






The paper views the signaling hypothesis and free cash flow 
hypothesis as complements. Both explain the initiation of dividends 
by firms with high cash flows.




XSRA Replicate Lang and Litzenberger (1989) using a larger sample. Low 
Q firm’s dividend change announcements have larger stock price changes. 
Q and dividend yield are negatively related. Dividend yield likely drive 
the study’s results. Results support signaling and clientele hypotheses.




ES Dividend initiations support signaling theory but not the free cash flow 
hypothesis; dividend omissions support both. Both announcements carry 
information. Investor dividend preference influences the magnitude of 
price change associated with omissions.






The free cash flow hypothesis is supported in this analysis of young firms 
initiating dividends. The Miller and Rock (1985) cash flow signaling 
and Rozeff (1982) ownership structure hypotheses cannot be rejected.
1 See Appendix A for method of analysis abbreviations.
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flow hypothesis, a combination of agency and signaling theory, more adequately explain 
corporate dividend policy than either of these theories individually.
3.4 BEHAVIORAL MODELS
No theoretical paradigm developed thus far completely explains the persistence 
of corporate dividend policy; empirical attempts to validate these theories are 
inconclusive or contradictory (Baker and Farrelly, 1988). Investor behavior is 
substantially influenced by societal norms and attitudes (Shiller, 1984). Unfortunately, 
this motivation has been ignored by financial theorists for the most part due to the 
difficulty of introducing investor behavior into traditional financial pricing models 
(Arbel, Carvell and Postnieks, 1988). Including these influences into modeling efforts 
can enrich the development o f a theory to explain the endurance of corporate dividend 
policy (Shiller, 1989).
Ordinary investors are faced not with risk but with uncertainty—a lack of concise 
judgement and sense of objective evidence (Knight, 1964). Social pressures can lead 
to errors in judgement and trading activities by shareholders that cannot be logically 
explained. These errors in judgement are only mistakes, not lapses of rational 
investment activity. Mass investor psychology profoundly influences aggregate market 
activity (Shiller, 1984).
Dividend policy is inconsistent with wealth maximization of the shareholder and 
is better explained by the addition of a socioeconomic behavior paradigm into economic 
models. Dividend payouts can be viewed as the socioeconomic repercussion of 
corporate evolution—the informational asymmetries between managers and shareholders
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causes dividends to be paid to increase the attractiveness of equity issues (Frankfurter 
and Lane, 1991). The systematic relation between industry type and dividend policy 
reported by Michel (1979) implies that managers are influenced by the actions of 
competitive firm executives when determining dividend payout levels. Managers realize 
that shareholders desire dividends and pay or increase dividends as a method of 
mollifying investors (Frankfurter and Lane, 1991). Dividend payments to shareholders 
should help increase the corporation’s stability by serving as a ritualistic reminder of 
the managerial and owner relationship (Ho and Robinson, 1992). Dividends are 
partially a tradition and partially a method to allay investor anxiety (Frankfurter and 
Lane, 1991).
A review of the survey articles seeking to define financial manager determinants 
and beliefs about corporate dividend policy follows. Models explaining dividend 
preference and policy as primarily functions of behavioral and social activities are then 
examined. The section closes with a brief conclusion.
3.4.1 Managerial Surveys
Lintner (1956) surveyed corporate chief executive offices and chief financial 
officers and finds dividend policy is an active decision variable because managers 
believe that stable dividends lessen negative investor reactions. The active 
determination of dividend policy implies that the level of retained earnings and savings 
are dividend decision byproducts. Corporate management believes shareholders should 
receive a equitable portion of earnings. The majority of managers develop long term 
payout ratio targets and use periodic partial adjustments to reach target levels; the
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magnitude of the percentage change is more important than the absolute dollar amount. 
Unexpected changes in earnings are one of the most important dividend determinants. 
Managers are reluctant to renege on changes—dividend decreases are met with 
considerable managerial resistance and dividend increases occur only if managers are 
sure of the coverage of the higher levels by future cash flows. Dividend are smoothed 
in the short run so as to not reflect the variability of earnings. These results fail to 
explain why companies pay dividends.
A change in dividend policy implies a change in managerial expectations of 
future cash flows and depends substantially on current and past earnings. Darling 
(1957), Tumovsky (1967) and Fama and Babiak (1968) find empirical support for 
Lintner’s findings; dividends are a function of current and past profit levels, expected 
future earnings and are negatively correlated with changes in the level of sales. Current 
income remains the critical determinant of corporate dividend policy 25 years following 
Lintner’s original survey (DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner, 1992).
Other factors not considered by Lintner (regulatory constraints, investment 
magnitude, debt and firm size) also affect dividend policy. Variations in dividend 
policy is primarily due to a combination of endogenous and exogenous elements 
(Dhrymes and Kurz, 1964).
Harkins and Walsh (1971) find that shareholder dividend desires and 
management need of retained earnings for investment opportunities conflict. A 
compromise policy partially satisfying both parties is chosen. Managers consider 
current and expected earnings, dividend payment history, dividend level stability, cash
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flows and investment opportunities and shareholder desires in their determination of the 
payout level. One-half of the firms surveyed have target dividend payout levels; 
dividends are gradually adjusted over a period of years to reach the target level. 
Although costly, dividend payments are important.
A survey of 318 NYSE firm chief financial officers (CFO’s) by Baker, Farrelly 
and Edelman (1985) find attitudes similar to those found by Lintner (1956). The CFO’s 
cite the importance of dividend continuity, the belief that share prices are affected by 
dividend policy and the difference in classification of regular and unusual cash flows 
as important determinants of dividend policy. Dividends are changed only if managers 
are sure of the changed cash flows’ permanence. The effects on share price from 
dividend payment and earnings retention are viewed differently by financial managers. 
Regulated firm CFO’s have different attitudes toward dividend policy.
In a survey of corporate managers of dividend achievers (defined as firms with 
ten consecutive years of dividend increases), the amount of dividend payment is less 
important than the consistency of payment. Managerial views of dividend policy are 
essentially unchanged thirty years after Lintner’s study; dividends are paid because 
shareholders expect continued dividend growth and managers believe investors want to 
receive dividends. Managers believe that dividend payments are necessary to maintain 
or increase share price and to attract new investors. Dividend payout policy is 
determined using criteria including sustainability, current firm profitability, future cash 
flow expectations, and industry norms. The majority of firms develop target payout 
ratios and use dividends as an active decision variable. Although changes in dividend
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policy are viewed by financial managers as carrying information, the message is often 
ambiguous and can actually misinform investors. Baker and Farrelly (1988) find that 
less than one-half of financial officers questioned in their study attempted to signal 
through dividend policy.
3.4.2 Theoretical Behavioral Models
Feldstein and Green (1983) model the corporate dividend decision as the last 
step in a process that evaluates inputs from five sources. First, dividend policy is a 
consequence of investor consumption needs. The tax liabilities from dividend payment 
are less than the transaction costs of selling shares to provide income if earnings are 
retained. Second, the market value of retained earnings is less than the market value 
of dividends. Third, dividend payment is consistent with steady state growth and an 
optimal debt/equity ratio. Fourth, dividend payments are a byproduct of the separation 
of corporation owners and managers; dividend payments help to diminish the agency 
costs arising from separation of corporate owners and managers and are used for 
signaling activities. Finally, although asymmetric information and agency costs are 
present in the model, the paradigm is not dependent on these market imperfections. 
Shareholders with diverse tax liabilities and diversification goals in an equilibrium with 
uncertainty result in dividend payments.
Shefrin and Statman (1984) explain dividend preference by using the theory of 
self control (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981) and the descriptive theory o f choice under 
uncertainty (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Information models are used to justify the 
presence of corporate dividends while the tax liability of dividends is used as a
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counterargument. This model is also consistent with dividend clienteles. Dividends 
and capital gains are not always perfect substitutes (even in a world without taxes and 
transaction costs) due to a lack of self control to delay gratification (Thaler and Shefrin,
1981). In financial theory, dividends and capital gains have the same value; this is not 
the case in a world modeled using the theory of self control. Dividend checks are 
appreciated more than capital gains and provide an automatic control device on 
spending levels (Thaler, 1980). Risky alternatives, costs, and payoffs are evaluated 
separately. This theory is also supported by the greater effects shown following 
dividend decreases; losses are more significant than gains. Kahneman and Tversky 
(1982) posit that the sale of shares of stock cause more investor regret and anxiety than 
spending the cash received from dividend payments. A subsequent price rise of shares 
sold for income needs increases the shareholders’ contrition. Clearly in this model, 
capital gains and dividends are not perfect substitutes. Regret aversion can induce a 
preference for dividends through the use of a consumption rule based on the use of 
dividends, not invested capital. Dividend yields are positively correlated with planned 
dissaving rate. If dissaving is positively related to age and negatively related to 
income, portfolio dividend yields will be positively correlated with age and negatively 
correlated with income.
Marsh and Merton (1986) develop a rational expectations model of dividend 
policy as management’s response to permanent earnings. In equilibrium, dividend 
levels are determined using future earnings expectations. Using dividends as signals 
is incompatible with this model.
122
Marsh and Merton (1987) study an aggregate stock market dividend process 
using 55 years of aggregate data and economic earnings. Market prices adequately 
reflect permanent earnings; managers systematically change the dividend payout 
following unexpected changes in permanent earnings by partially adjusting dividend 
levels; this partial adjustment causes dividends to be less volatile than share prices. The 
change in dividends is unrelated to later changes in share price. Lagged dividends 
explain little aggregate dividend variance when previous period stock price changes are 
included in the model. Dividends exhibit a systematic time series behavior—the 
aggregate dividend change is driven by the one period lagged stock price change.
3.4.3 Summary
Managerial and shareholder behavioral and socioeconomic influences profoundly 
affect corporate dividend policy. In surveys of corporate managers, the authors find 
that the attitudes toward dividend payments have remained largely unchanged over the 
past forty years. Managers believe that shareholders expect and are entitled to 
significant and regular dividend payments. The managers also believe that share price 
is substantially affected by dividend policy and that shareholders use dividend payments 
as a major input in firm valuation. However, these surveys are incapable of explaining 
why corporations began to pay and continue to pay dividends.
Behavioral influences affect shareholder attitudes toward dividend payments. 
Dividends and capital gains are not perfect substitutes in the eyes of the shareholders 
due to psychological and behavioral influences affecting the evaluation of the two 
alternatives. Incorporating investor behavioral and psychological influences into
123
theoretical models could greatly enrich the development of a theory to explain corporate 
dividend policy persistence.
3.5 ANALYSIS OF THE EMPIRICAL TESTS OF CORPORATE DIVIDEND 
THEORY
3.5.1 Introduction
The conflicting results of empirical analyses are commonly blamed on modeling,
method of analysis, data or sample period differences. The choice of variables included
in or those omitted from a model (Watts, 1976b, McCabe, 1979, Frankfurter and Gong,
1993) and the definition used in the estimation of important factors (Miller and Scholes,
1982) can significantly influence a study’s results. Roll (1977) asserts that the lack of
an adequate proxy can make a theoretical model untestable. The use of different
methods across studies can limit the comparability of the results (Morgan, 1982).
Attempts to empirically validate theoretical dividend models are thus far
inconclusive or in some cases even contradictory (Baker and Farrelly, 1988).
Numerous rationales have been offered as explanations for these divergent results; the
model and empirical method of analysis employed in the studies (Watts, 1973 and
Morgan, 1982), the frequency of sample observation (Watts, 1976a and Laub, 1976)
and the period of the sample (Watts, 1973) are specified as possible causes of the
inconsistencies. The purpose of this analysis is to examine the empirical studies of
corporate dividend policy and determine if the choice of method of analysis, frequency
of sampling observation or sample period influence the results of these tests of dividend
policy. The journal of publication is also included as an explanatory variable.
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This research is important for several reasons. Results that cannot be duplicated 
over diverse sample periods are likely artifacts of a particular sample period. In 
contrast, findings that persist through time can lead to the development of more 
descriptive models. Finally, results that change over time can be indicative of changes 
in the returns generating mechanism (Amihud and Mendelson, 1987).
3.5.2 Method of Analysis
The categorical data analysis method (CDAM) is used to determine if the 
method of analysis, observation frequency, sample period or journal of publication can 
be used to predict and explain the results of a study. The data analyzed in the analysis 
is drawn from Tables 3.1-3.8. Five attributes from each study are present in the test. 
The first variable, the results of each study, are classified as either supporting or failing 
to support the hypothesis tested by the authors. The second variable of the model is 
the method of analysis employed in each of the dividend studies. These are classified 
either as methods analyzing changes in price or average return (event study or price 
change methods of analyses) or studies using regression analyses (least square analysis, 
logit analysis, etc.) or other methods (see Appendix A for the assignment of methods 
of analysis to classes). The third variable is defined by the studies’ choice of data type. 
Studies are classified into one group if daily data is used and into another for less 
frequent observations. The mid-point of each study’s sample period serves as the fourth 
variable. If a study’s mid-point of the sample period occurs before 1976, the study is 
assigned to one class; if the mid-point is after 1976, it belongs to the other class. The 
choice of 1976 as the dividing point is based on the publication of Jensen and
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Meckling’s (1976) agency cost theory and the beginning of intense examination of the 
costs of asymmetric information. Also, the approximate mid-point o f the "modem" 
financial era (beginning with Modigliani and Miller’s seminal paper of 1958) is 1976. 
In addition, this choice divides the studies used in the analysis into two approximately 
equal groups. The findings of the study are robust; classifying the sample period using 
other criteria did not alter the study’s results. The final independent variable entered 
is the journal o f publication. Classification is fixed by the study’s publication in a "top- 
tier" journal (The Journal o f  Finance, Journal o f  Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 
Journal o f Financial Economics and The Review o f Financial Studies) or not. Each 
study’s result is used as the response (dependent) variable in the analysis while the 
method of analysis, the data type, the sample period and the journal are employed as 
explanatory (independent) variables.
CDAM is a specialized multivariate analysis technique for evaluation of response 
and explanatory variables via weighted least squares (WLS) procedures. The procedure 
is useful in the examination of dichotomous (i.e. studies supporting or failing to support 
a hypothesis), non-ordered polytomous (i.e. differences in method o f analysis) and 
ordered polytomous (i.e. early, middle and late sample periods) discrete variables. 
Although the technique resembles the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), CDAM differs 
from ANOVA by describing the structural relations between the explanatory variables. 
ANOVA models, in contrast, determine the effects of independent variables on a 
dependent variable and partition the overall variability of the model. A detailed 
explanation of CDAM is found in Appendix B. The method of analysis assumes
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mutually independent explanatory variables—the knowledge of one variable does not 
increase the probability of a correct prediction of another explanatory variable’s level.
The implementation of CDAM is facilitated by the assignment of the sample’s 
observations into classes based on some explanatory variable characteristic. The table 
developed from this classification process provides a concise summary of the data. The 
technique then uses a series of dummy variables representing the explanatory variable 
classes and tests the model using WLS estimation techniques. Table 3.10 displays the 
framework used in the assignment of the individual studies to CDAM populations.
3.5.3 Empirical Results
A population profile succinctly summarizes the assignment of individual 
empirical studies to groups based on explanatory variable combinations. The sample 
size of each population is the frequency that each combination of categorical variables 
appears in the overall sample. Table 3.11 summarizes the classification of empirical 
studies analyzing the theoretical explanations of corporate dividend policy into CDAM 
populations.
As shown in Table 3.12, the WLS estimates of study method of analysis, data 
type, sample period and journal coefficients do not differ significantly from zero and 
therefore do not influence the outcome of the analyses. The estimates of each 
explanatory variable are extremely small and the reported p-values range from 0.167 
to 0.962. The intercept term representing the mean of the dependent variable is highly 
significant with a p-value of <0.001.
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TABLE 3.10
THE CATEGORICAL DATA ANALYSIS METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
CLASSIFICATION FRAMEWORK
Method of Sample
Result Analysis Data Type Period Journal
Support Price Change1
Other4
Fail to Support Price Change
Other
































1 Price change methods of analysis include event study and price change methods of analysis.
A listing of method of analysis classifications is found in Appendix A.
2 Top-tier journals include The Journal o f  Finance, Journal o f  Financial and Quantitative
Analysis, Journal o f  Financial Economics and The Review o f  Financial Studies.
3 Other data includes weekly, quarterly and annual observations.
4 Other methods of analysis include regression analyses and other methods (see Appendix A).
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TABLE 3.11
CATEGORICAL VARIABLE ANALYSIS POPULATION PROFILES OF 








1 Price Change Other Pre 1976 Top-tier 5
2 Price Change Other Pre 1976 Other 2
3 Price Change Other Post 1976 Top-tier 2
4 Price Change Other Post 1976 Other 2
5 Price Change Daily Pre 1976 Top-tier 11
6 Price Change Daily Pre 1976 Other 7
7 Price Change Daily Post 1976 Top-tier 17
8 Price Change Daily Post 1976 Other 20
9 Other Other Pre 1976 Top-tier 19
10 Other Other Pre 1976 Other 25
11 Other Other Post 1976 Top-tier 9
12 Other Other Post 1976 Other 15
13 Other Daily Pre 1976 Top-tier 3
14 Other Daily Pre 1976 Other 3
15 Other Daily Post 1976 Top-tier 8
16 Other Daily Post 1976 Other 7
TABLE 3.12
ANALYSIS OF WEIGHTED LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES OBTAINED FROM 









Intercept 0.2088 0.0324 41.43 0.001
Method of Analysis 0.0118 0.0413 0.08 0.775
Data Type -0.0020 0.0411 0.00 0.962
Sample Period 0.0452 0.0327 1.91 0.167
Journal Type -0.0089 0.0324 0.08 0.784
1 The empirical analyses evaluated are obtained from Tables 3.1-3.8.
2 N = 155 in this analysis.
CDAM is then applied to empirical studies testing a specific hypothesis. The 
information content of dividend hypothesis empirical tests is the only subset of 
empirical analyses with enough observations to test the effect that method of analysis, 
data type, sample period and journal selection have on the outcome of the research. 
The data used in this analysis are drawn from Tables 3.5 and 3.6. Table 3.13 shows 
the population profiles of studies testing the information content of dividend hypothesis.
TABLE 3.13
CATEGORICAL VARIABLE ANALYSIS POPULATION PROFILES 
OF EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF THE INFORMATION 
CONTENT OF DIVIDEND HYPOTHESIS
Sample
Method of 
Analysis Data Period Journal Size
1 Price Change Other Pre 1976 Top-tier 2
2 Price Change Other Pre 1976 Other 2
3 Price Change Other Post 1976 Top-tier 2
4 Price Change Other Post 1976 Other 2
5 Price Change Daily Pre 1976 Top-tier 5
6 Price Change Daily Pre 1976 Other 5
7 Price Change Daily Post 1976 Top-tier 8
8 Price Change Daily Post 1976 Other 11
9 Other Other Pre 1976 Top-tier 7
10 Other Other Pre 1976 Other 7
11 Other Other Post 1976 Top-tier 1
12 Other Other Post 1976 Other 5
13 Other Daily Pre 1976 Top-tier 2
14 Other Daily Pre 1976 Other 2
15 Other Daily Post 1976 Top-tier 5
16 Other Daily Post 1976 Other 3
The total number of studies testing the information content of dividend 
hypothesis by CDAM is 69. Consistent with the results found in the overall analysis 
of empirical tests of theoretical dividend models, the method of analysis, data type,
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sample period and journal coefficients are again not significant. The p-values of the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables range from 0.219 for the journal variable to 
0.9535 for the method of analysis choice variable. The intercept term is again highly 
significant with a p-value of <0.001. Table 3.14 shows the results of the CDAM 
analysis of studies testing the information content of dividend hypothesis.
TABLE 3.14
ANALYSIS OF WEIGHTED LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES OBTAINED FROM 
CATEGORICAL VARIABLE ANALYSIS OF EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF 








Intercept 0.2465 0.0475 26.89 0.001
Method of Analysis -0.0031 0.0523 0.00 0.953
Data Type -0.0433 0.0579 0.56 0.456
Sample Period 0.0252 0.0504 0.25 0.617
Journal Type 0.0565 0.0460 1.51 0.219
1 The empirical analyses evaluated are obtained from Tables 3.5 and 3.6.
2 N =  69 in this analysis.
3.5.4 Discussion and Summary
A common rationale used to explain different results from empirical analyses is 
to attribute the inconsistencies to method of analysis, data, or sample differences. In 
contrast to commonly held beliefs, the choice o f method of analysis, data type and 
sample period do not significantly affect the results of a study. Using CDAM, an 
examination of empirical studies testing a wide range of hypotheses of dividend policy
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and of empirical tests of a specific hypothesis (the information content of dividend 
hypothesis) finds that none of these explanatory variables is significant (p-values range 
from 0.167 to 0.962).
The intercept term is highly significant in both the overall analysis and the 
information content of dividend hypothesis analysis. Because the term represents all 
variables not included in the model, factors absent from the model can be responsible 
for the diverse results of the empirical tests.
Additional CDAM is performed using finer divisions of the explanatory 
variables. The method of analysis variable is divided into four groups—event study, 
price change, regression and other methods of analysis. The variable representing data 
type is divided into studies using annual, quarterly, monthly and daily samples and is 
analyzed. The results of these efforts are consistent with previous findings—none of the 
independent variables show any significant explanatory power. Statistical results of 
these tests are shown in Appendix B.
The length of the sample period or the total number of observations used in the 
analysis can influence the results of a study. Studies using data drawn from a smaller 
time horizon can be subject to anomalies that are washed out over longer sample 
periods or with more observations. Model specification, variable definition and proxy 
choice can also impact the findings.
3.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
"The nearly universal policy of paying substantial dividends is the primary 
puzzle in the economics of corporate finance" (Feldstein and Green, 1983). A number
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of conflicting theoretical models all lacking strong empirical support define the current 
state of financial economists’ attempts to explain the dividend phenomenon. Nor can 
corporate dividend policy be ascribed to existing regulatory constraints. The incomplete 
nature of current theories and the sensitivity of data to changes in specifications 
precludes any dogmatism (Brealy and Myers, 1991).
We know that dividend policy is "sticky"—managers decrease dividends only 
when absolutely necessary—in the event of poor earnings with reserves insufficient to 
fund the dividend (Myers, 1984 and DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner, 1992). 
Furthermore, individual market imperfections do little to explain the underlying reasons 
for dividend payments (Black, 1976). The systematic time series behavior of corporate 
dividend policy implies that firm specific theoretical explanations of dividend policy— 
signaling and agency theories—cannot explain the practice (Marsh and Merton, 1987).
The majority of shareholders must pay taxes on dividend income. The majority 
of empirical works support the hypothesis that the returns on dividend paying stocks are 
increased to offset the tax liability of dividend payment. However, the absence of a 
pronounced difference in the portfolios of high tax bracket and low tax bracket 
individuals casts doubts as to the significance of taxes in the determination of corporate 
dividend policy.
Dividends can relay information but the use of dividends for this purpose fails 
to explain why firms pay dividends. Signaling’s impact on the investor’s preference 
for dividends is even less certain due to the ambiguity associated with signals. Further, 
if  dividends are changed only to signal firm specific information, aggregate dividend
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changes should be small and random in nature rather than having a systematic time 
series pattern and a demonstrated positive trend (Marsh and Merton, 1987).
No single economic rationale is capable of explaining the dividend phenomenon. 
A combination of risk averse shareholders invested in capital constrained firms, the 
costs associated with systematic liquidation of holdings, agency costs and information 
transmission can partially explain the preference of shareholders for dividends (Crockett 
and Friend, 1988). The incompleteness of the theoretical model is largely due to a 
misconception of the nature of dividend payments. The continuance of dividends is 
based largely on long-standing corporate traditions (Brealy and Myers, 1991).
The corporate tradition of paying dividends is the sum total of over three 
hundred years of dividend payments. Despite individual differences in policy, 
consistent, identifiable patterns of dividend payment recur through corporations. 
Managers are reluctant to reduce dividend payments, even in periods of financial 
distress. Moreover, dividends are increased only if a corporation’s management is 
confident that the higher levels can be maintained. Executives believe shareholders 
expect significant dividends to be paid and shareholders believe that they deserve these 
dividends. Finally, shareholders prefer dividend payments despite their economic 
liability. Myers (1990) surmises that dividend payments are in reality an unwritten 
contract between shareholders and corporate management.
Current models of corporate dividend policy by and large ignore behavioral and 
socioeconomic influences on managerial and shareholder activities. Dividend 
preference is difficult to explain other than as an irrational desire by investors for
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dividends unless behavior models and social pressures are incorporated into the model 
(Shiller, 1984). The exclusion of these motivations from financial models severely limit 
their application to corporate activities and policy determination. Dividend policy is 
influenced by the same fads and fashions that affect stock prices because the managers 
who determine dividend policy are motivated by behavioral and socioeconomic 
influences (Shiller, 1990). A model incorporating a combination of modem financial 
theories and behavioral and psychological influences best explain corporate dividend 
policy (Shiller, 1986).
CHAPTER 4
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, DIVIDEND POLICY 
AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The seminal papers of Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) and M&M showed 
that a firm’s capital structure and dividend policy are irrelevant in the determination of 
the value of the company. These theses motivated an abundance of theoretical and 
empirical work to determine the existence and definition of the optimal capital structure 
and dividend policy for a firm. An implicit assumption of the majority of these efforts 
is that corporate managers always act in the best interest of the shareholders.
In contrast, financial hypotheses based on agency theory maintain that conflicts 
of interest arising from the separation of a corporation’s management from firm 
ownership can result in managers deviating from the shareholder wealth standard. The 
personal goals of management—security, advancement, prestige, power and personal 
income—often take precedent over corporate goals (Kaysen, 1960 and Gordon, 1961) 
and are the likely result of this separation (Berle and Means, 1932).
Agency theory suggests that informational asymmetries and managerial 
imprudence can be minimized through the joint optimization of corporate executive 
compensation contracting, dividend policy and capital structure (Jensen, Solberg and 
Zorn, 1992, Mehran, 1992 and Smith and Watts, 1992). The proper structuring of 
compensation contracts can better order managerial activities and efforts to the benefit 
of shareholder interests. The payment of significant dividends and the obligations
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resulting from debt issuance can decrease the available free cash flow for excess 
perquisite consumption by corporate managers and increase monitoring activities by 
capital markets (Easterbrook, 1984 and Jensen, 1986).
Executive compensation, dividend policy and capital structure are major 
corporate policy decisions. Theory predicts that these policy decisions can be optimized 
through a concurrent decision making process. A set of firm-specific financial 
measures influence the decision making process for each of these corporate strategies. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the interaction between executive 
compensation, dividend and capital structure policy decisions.
Section 4.2 reviews the existing executive compensation literature. Section 4.3 
examines the predicted effects of explanatory variables on compensation, dividend and 
financing policy variables. Section 4.4 discusses method of analysis, variable 
definitions and model development. Section 4.5 presents the results of the empirical 
examination. Section 4.6 is a brief summary of the chapter.
4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW
The separation of managers and owners can result in a number of potential 
problems. The intent of corporate management often diverges from endeavors that 
would most benefit the owners of the company (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The 
deviations include the rejection of positive net present value projects and other strategies 
that result in the underinvestment of owner capital (Myers, 1977). Jensen (1986) posits 
that these squanderings of investment opportunities are especially pronounced in 
companies with substantial cash flows. Jensen and Smith (1985) summarize the
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applications of agency theory to management, shareholder and debtholder conflicts of 
interest.
A number of potential solutions are offered to mitigate these conflicts of interest. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama (1980) contend that the competitive nature of the 
managerial labor market will discipline imprudent managerial activity. Competitive 
forces and the threat of takeover will also impede improper activities (Manne, 1965 and 
Jensen and Ruback, 1983). Firms with significant dividend payment policies are forced 
to undergo the scrutiny of capital markets when funds for investment activities are 
needed (Rozeff, 1982 and Easterbrook, 1984) while investors holding large blocks of 
shares also monitor executive activity (Shleifer and Vishney, 1986).
Haugen and Senbet (1981), Beck and Zorn (1982), Jensen and Zimmerman 
(1985) and Lewellen, Loderer, and Martin (1987) show that the proper structuring of 
executive compensation plans can further decrease the agency costs arising from the 
separation of owners and managers. Managerial behavior is better aligned with 
shareholder interests by relating compensation and termination decisions to share price 
performance (Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985). The initial adoption of or a change in 
corporate compensation plans is associated with positive abnormal share price returns 
and increases in shareholder wealth (Larcker, 1983, Brickley, Bhagat and Lease, 1985, 
Tehranian and Waegelein, 1985, Warner, 1985 and DeFusco, Johnson and Zorn, 1990). 
Raviv (1985) believes this change in corporation performance is the direct result of the 
implementation of performance based executive compensation plans.
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The theoretical executive compensation models of Holmstrom (1979) and Shavell 
(1979) extend and formalize the theoretical agency models o f Ross (1973), Stiglitz 
(1975) and Mirrlees (1976). In these models, executive production is increased by 
relating compensation to firm performance when executive output is unobservable. 
Although not flawless, the benefits received from the use of an imperfect monitoring 
device (executive incentive plans) outweigh the costs. Rosen (1982) extends the model 
to a macroeconomic setting while Diamond and Verrecchia (1982) include security 
prices in their incentive modeling.
Consistent with long-term contracting, executive experience and compensation 
are related even when the executive’s productivity level effect is ignored (Harris and 
Holmstrom, 1982). Paying salaries to executives in excess of their marginal product 
is economically rational if the wages motivate lower rank workers to increase their 
production in hope of attaining a higher position (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). Sappington
(1991) provides a broad overview of the theoretical incentive contracting literature.
Lambert, Larcker and Verrecchia (1991) model compensation contract valuation 
from the manager’s perspective. They show that the value of the compensation plan 
to the manager can be quite different than the cost perceived by the firm’s owners. 
They further show that incentive contracts cannot always be valued correctly using 
market based valuation techniques and that the addition of new incentives added to 
existing plans can only be accurately valued by analyzing the total executive 
compensation plan.
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Executive compensation has been intensely analyzed by financial economists. 
The efforts can be divided into studies that find firm size to be the primary determinant 
of executive compensation, those that contend that salary level is better related to firm 
share price and profitability, those that show that multiple inputs determine 
compensation levels and those that analyze the effects of the adoption of executive 
incentive plans on various financial measures and operational strategies.
A positive correlation between executive compensation and firm size is shown 
by several empirical studies summarized in Table 4.1. McGuire, Chiu, and Elbing 
(1962) and Ciscel (1974) report that managerial wages in large industrial coiporations 
are a reward for current and past sales. Current sales are found to be the primary input 
in the compensation determination process. The emphasis on maximizing sales volume 
is likely to lead to managerial goals that unduly accentuate strategies formulated to 
increase sales while disregarding long-term profits (Patton, 1966 and Baumol, 1967). 
A study of utility corporations shows that firm size has a significant influence on and 
is the major determinant of executive compensation in regulated industries (Abdel- 
Khalik, 1988).
A second body of literature, outlined in Table 4.2, argues that executive 
compensation levels are more closely correlated with stock price and corporate profits. 
The positive correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance 
provides incentives for managers to work toward goals that benefit corporate owners 
(Masson, 1971, Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985, Agrawal, Makhija and Mandelker, 1991, 
Crystal, 1991 and Lewellen, Loderer, Martin and Blum, 1992). In the two decades
TABLE 4.1








Means Test Executive compensation in large industrial corporations is a reward for 
past and current sales. Current sales are the most important determinant.
Patton (1966) 1953-1965
Annual
XSRA Executive compensation is more closely related to sales than profits. 
This emphasis on total sales could lead to goals with an undue accentuation 
on increasing sales levels at the sacrifice of corporate profits.
Baumol (1967)
Annual




Corr Coeff Firm growth and size rather than profitability are the major determinants 
of executive compensation. Theresults can be confounded by collinearity 
between the explanatory variables.
Abdel-Khalik (1988) 1981-1983
Annual
2SLS Firm size is the major determinant of executive compensation inregulated 
industries. No correlation between either compensation and operating 
efficiency or compensation and managerial effort is found.
Chopin (1993) 1973-1991
Annual
SUR The effect of sales level on executive compensation is widely divergent 
across industries; positively related in some, negatively in others and 
not related in others. Industry and firm characteristics should be included 
in compensation analyses.
1 See Appendix A for method of analysis abbreviations. -1̂
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following World War II, companies with executive wage incentives based on 
performance have higher returns than those with bonuses tied to the level of sales or 
corporate profits (Masson, 1971). Lewellen (1968, 1969) maintains that executive 
compensation is directly related to the firm’s profitability through executive stock 
ownership programs and incentive-based deferred compensation plans. The 
performance relative to competing firms in the firm’s industry rather than the actual 
price performance is used to determine salaries (Antle and Smith, 1986). Early study 
results (McGuire, Chiu, and Elbing, 1962, Patton, 1966 and Baumol, 1967) are in error 
because of their reliance on cross-sectional data and one year profit levels.
A third group of studies reviewed in Table 4.3 contend that the determining 
process of executive salaries is more complex than previously hypothesized and the 
association cannot be explained by a single variable. Stober (1988) questions the logic 
of using firm size to totally explain the differences in corporation executive 
compensation levels. The disparate levels of executive compensation and the 
inconsistent correlation of sales level to executive compensation across industries 
implies that the determinant process of salaries is more complex than the early research 
suggests. According to Stober, multiple input factors influence and determine the level 
of managerial compensation.
Murphy (1985) finds that compensation is positively correlated with both firm 
size and profitability. Smith and Watts (1992) (hereafter S&W), Gaver and Gaver 
(1993) and Kole (1993a) discuss the interaction between investment, financing and
TABLE 4.2
EMPIRICAL STUDIES RELATING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION TO FIRM SHARE








XSRA Results conflict with McGuire, Chiu, and Elbing (1962). Using 
multivariate regression, the authors find that profits strongly influence 
executive compensation levels while sales lack a significant impact. The 
firm’s market value also has a major influence on the compensation level. 
Executive salary and bonus serve as a good proxy for total compensation.
Masson (1971) 1947-1966
Annual
XSRA Early studies (McGuire, Chiu, and Elbing, 1962, Patton, 1966 and 
Baumol, 1967) are in error due to their reliance on cross-sectional data 
and one year profit levels. Executive compensation incentives are 
predominately related to stock price performance. The relation to 
corporate sales levels is neutral.
Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) 1978-1980
Annual
XSRA Managerial behavior is better managed by relating compensation and 
termination decisions to share price performance. Sales growth has a 
minor influence in aligning shareholder and manager interests. Share 
price and managerial turnover are negatively correlated.
Benston (1985) 1970-1975
Annual
DA Conglomerate firm share prices and managerial compensation show little 
correlation. The change in the market price of shares owned by executives 












Overall results weakly support the hypothesis that executive compensation 
is based on relative firm performance evaluation. Wage levels are 
positively correlated with accounting profitability. Average industry profit 





XSRA Manager and shareholder interests are aligned through managerial 
compensation packages in the utility industry. Results contrast with Ciscel 
and Carroll (1982)—the differences are possibly due to differences in 
variable definition. Compensation and stock price changes are positively 
related implying incentive optimize shareholder wealth.




Changes in executive compensation plans are in response to changes in 
the corporation’s competitive environment and/or strategic plan. 
Regulatory constraints influence compensation contracts. Diversification 
into non-regulated fields and production efficiency are unrelated to 
compensation levels. Findings contrast with Abdel-Khalik (1988).




OLS Higher levels of executive compensation lead to better firm performance 
whether firm performance is defined by higher levels of profitability or 
stock return. This correlation implies that agency costs can be reduced 
by properly designing executive compensation packages.
1 See Appendix A for method of analysis abbreviations.
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compensation decisions and argue that these decisions are partially driven by the firm’s 
investment opportunity set.
A fourth body o f literature summarized in Table 4.4 examines the effects that 
changes in executive compensation packages have on financial measures and operational 
strategies of the corporation. Changes or introduction of performance based incentives 
result in changes in stock prices (Raviv, 1985). Both short term and long term 
compensation plan adoption is associated with positive abnormal returns (Brickley, 
Bhagat and Lease, 1985 and Tehranian and Waegelein, 1985). Kumar and Sopariwala 
(1992) document increases in corporate profitability, accounting returns and earnings 
per share following plan introduction. The improved performance is attributed to a 
better alignment of shareholder and manager interests and a decrease in self-serving 
behavior by managers but the results can be confounded by tax benefits or signaling 
effects.
Conversely, DeFusco, Zorn and Johnson (1991) find a decrease in cumulative 
abnormal returns and firm profitability in the five years following incentive plan 
adoption. In addition, shareholder risk also increases; earnings and share price 
volatility rise from changes in manager risk taking behavior after the plan is initiated. 
Managers attempt to ease the equity holder’s uncertainty and fear by decreasing the 
corporation’s level of outstanding debt and increasing dividend payments. Despite the 
increase, dividend levels are lower than levels forecasted. The smaller increase in 
dividends is the result of decisions that benefit corporate managers; most of the stock
TABLE 4.3




Ciscel and Carroll (1980)







Executive compensation increases with increased profits (achieved either 
through increased sales or decreased costs). Firm size also significantly 
impacts compensation levels but the market for corporate executives is 
the primary determinant of salaries. Firm specific characteristics 
substantially influence executive compensation.
Executives in regulated industries have substantially lower earnings than 
their contemporaries in non-regulated industries. Although sales is a 
significant determinant in the compensation levels of all industries 
analyzed, profit levels are used as an input factor only in non-regulated 
industries.
Eaton and Rosen (1983) 1970-1973
Annual
XSRA The executive compensation scheme is affected by the executive’s age, 
firm monitoring capabilities, and noise confounding future firm 
performance. Older executives have increased levels of deferred 
compensation and more stable compensation plans while younger executive 
compensation is more closely aligned with future firm performance 
(through stock options). Executives of firms with high research and 
development commitments have compensation programs less closely tied 
to firm performance.
TABLE 4.3 (continued)






XSRA The percentage change in managerial salary and bonus is positively 
correlated with firm sales and firm size. Long term incentive options 
are negatively related-managers are more likely to be offered incentives 
when the stock price is depressed. The variance is largely unexplained.




OLS The variation in executive compensation plans across firms imply that 
individual firm plans are structured to decrease agency costs. Executive 
compensation and the managerial decision making process are interrelated.




Results are inconsistent with agency theory—incentive payment schemes 
and threat of dismissal have little effect on managerial activity. CEO’s 
are a minor production process input and their activities are easily analyzed 
and monitored by the board of directors. Implicit regulations are the 
most likely reason for contract limitations The executive compensation 
and shareholder wealth correlation is small and has decreased over the 
past fifty years. Bonuses (50 percent of CEO compensation) are not based 





MRA Individual characteristics of corporate managers (for example, the 
percentage of managerial wealth in company stock) can significantly alter 
the cost/value correlation of corporate contracts. These personal attributes 








Gibbons and Murphy (1992) 1971-1989
Annual
OLS Executive career concerns have significant impact on managerial activity 
even in the presence of incentive contracts and should be considered in 
the development of a total incentive plan.
Riahi-Belkaoui (1992) 1986
Annual
OLS.WLS Compensation is positively correlated with both sales and profits and 
is positively related to security analysts’ opinions.
Smith and Watts (1992) 1965-1985
Annual
XSRA Firms with higher growth rates have lower debt ratios and dividend yields 
and higher executive compensation levels. Stock option plans are also 
more common in these firms. As firms increase in size, dividend yields 
and compensation levels increase (consistent with Murphy, 1985).





The results support Smith and Watts (1992). Executive compensation 
is higher in growth firms. Stock option plans are also more common 
in these firms but the difference in the frequency is not significant.




Executive compensation plans are affected by a firm’s financial distress. 
Incentives are altered and compensation programs are restructured so 





Supports Smith and Watts (1992) and Gaver and Gaver (1993). Complex 
associations exist between executive compensation contract determinants.
1 See Appendix A for method of analysis abbreviations.
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option plans are not dividend protected and the payment of dividends reduce the value 
of the option (Lambert, Lanen and Larcker, 1989).
4.3 EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION. DIVIDENDS AND DEBT
4.3.1 Introduction
Existing models of the relation between policy and exogenous variables provide 
the basis for previous empirical analyses of executive compensation, dividend and debt 
policy variables. Theoretical predictions about the relation between compensation, 
dividend policy and capital structure policy variables and the exogenous variables are 
discussed in the sections following.
4.3.2 Executive Compensation
Two alternative hypotheses explain the executive compensation and dividend 
policy relation. Contracting theory (S&W) predicts a negative correlation between 
dividend and compensation levels; firms with more growth opportunities should have 
higher levels of compensation and lower levels of dividends. In contrast, if dividends 
are used to lessen shareholder anxieties about managerial activities that deviate from 
shareholder wealth maximization (Lintner, 1956, Easterbrook, 1984 and Frankfurter 
and Lane, 1991) and if considerable compensation payments are a source of investor 
apprehension, the correlation should be positive. If compensation and dividend levels 
are positively related, the results support contracting theory; a negative finding would 
better support the alternate hypothesis.
TABLE 4.4
EMPIRICAL STUDIES DEMONSTRATING THE EFFECTS OF EXECUTIVE INCENTIVE PLAN 
ADOPTION ON FINANCIAL MEASURES AND OPERATIONAL STRATEGIES
Method of






Brickley, Bhagat and Lease 1979-1982 ES
(1985) Daily ANOVA
Capital investment significantly increases following executive incentive 
plan adoption. Initiationis also associated with positive abnormal returns. 
Changes in contracts cause changes in the managerial decision making 
process.
Long-term compensation plans increase manager and shareholder interest 
alignment. Plan introductionsare associated with increases inshareholder 
wealth but the increases can be the result of tax benefits or signaling.
Tehranian and Waegelein 1970-1980
(1985) Monthly
ES
Lambert, Lanen and Larcker 1946-1978 TSRA
(1989) Annual XSRA
Short term compensation plan announcements result in positive abnormal 
returns. Results are possibly confounded by other factors. Although 
plan adoption provides an incentive to increase earnings, the price 
adjustment is not immediate.
Actual dividend payments are less than expected payments following initial 
adoption of stock option plans. This shortfall is the result of manager 
self-serving behavior because increases in dividends reduce the value 
of executive stock options since most are not dividend protected. The 
reduction in dividend payout is greatest in firms where the decrease will 
produce the largest increase in option value.
I
TABLE 4.4 (continued)
EMPIRICAL STUDIES DEMONSTRATING THE EFFECTS OF EXECUTIVE INCENTIVE PLAN 








ES The variance of stock prices, option prices and accounting returns increase 
following executive stock option plan adoption. Stockholder wealth also 
increases but bondholder wealth decreases. Effects are the result of a 
perceived change in managerial risk-avoidance behavior.




NP Tests Changes in executive incentive plans cause changes in managerial risk 
taking behavior. Although dividend payments increase and the debt ratio 
declines, firm earnings volatility increases, profits decrease and research 
and development expenditures decrease. Cumulative abnormal returns 
decrease in the five years following plan adoption.




Adoption of performance based executive compensation contracts are 
associated with positive abnormal returns. The positive returns are 
consistent with a reduction in agency costs. Plan initiation is followed 
by an increase in the firm’s profitability and is positively correlated with 
the EPS growth rate.
1 See Appendix A for method of analysis abbreviations.
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According to contracting theory, executive salaries and debt levels should be 
negatively correlated; wage levels are positively related to growth opportunities and 
firms with high growth potential have lower levels of debt. Growth options are 
financed with equity rather than debt to avoid potential agency conflicts (Myers, 1977).
Contracting theory predicts a positive relation between compensation and firm 
size because managerial decisions affect a larger stock of resources in large firms and 
hence the decision should be better compensated. Similarly, managerial salaries and 
incentive plans are positively correlated since both are positively related to growth 
opportunities. McGuire, Chiu and Elbing (1962) and Ciscel (1974) find that 
compensation levels and firm size are positively correlated. Other research (Lewellen 
and Huntsman, 1970 and Masson, 1971) shows a positive correlation between executive 
wages and firm profitability.
4.3.3 Dividends
The cash flow identity links dividends and investments. Firms with more 
investment opportunities pay lower dividends. Rozeff (1982), Easterbrook (1984), 
Myers and Majluf (1984) and Jensen (1986) theorize that faster growing firms have 
more investment opportunities resulting in smaller free cash flows and lower dividend 
payments. Because growth firms pay higher compensation to their executives, 
compensation and dividends should be negatively related.
Contracting theory predicts a positive association between debt and dividends. 
In contrast, Jensen, Solberg and Zorn (1992) (hereafter JS&Z) predict that higher 
dividend levels should exist in firms with lower leverage ratios because o f a tradeoff
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between fixed (debt) and variable (dividend) payout obligations. They also maintain 
that corporations with higher levels of collateralized assets pay higher dividends.
A negative association between firm growth and dividends is predicted by 
contracting theory. In contrast, signaling models hypothesize that growth firms will 
pay more dividends than non-growth firms. Growth firms should have higher levels 
of asymmetric information and will attempt to decrease these asymmetries by paying 
higher dividends. Numerous theoretical and empirical analyses find dividend payout 
and firm profitability to be positively related (for example, see Lintner, 1956, 
Bhattacharya, 1979 and Miller and Rock, 1985). Myers and Majluf (1984) predict that 
firms with more investment opportunities will pay lower dividends due to the 
competition for funds.
4.3.4 Debt
Increases in firm profitability should result in a lower demand for debt from the 
increased availability of internal funds (Myers and Majluf, 1984). As growth 
opportunities increase, debt levels decrease because growth projects are financed with 
equity to avoid the costs associated with underinvestment (Myers, 1977 and Long and 
Malitz, 1985). Alternatively, the signaling model of Ross (1977) predicts that growth 
firms with high levels of asymmetric information will increase leverage ratios to 
mitigate the informational asymmetries.
Contracting theory predicts that growth firms will have lower collateralized 
assets ratios. The increased volatility of cash flows in growth firms increases the 
volatility of tax liabilities and provides the impetus to decrease debt levels (Smith and
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Stulz, 1985 and Smith and Watts, 1992). The secured debt hypothesis (Scott, 1977) 
and the tax shield hypothesis (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980) predict that capital 
intensive industries with high collateralized asset values and debt are positively related.
4.4 DATA. POLICY VARIABLES AND METHOD OF ANALYSIS
In general, previous studies have found that compensation policy is a function 
of executive incentive packages, firm size, firm profitability and the firm’s growth 
opportunities. Dividend policy is influenced by firm profitability, the firm’s growth 
potential and a firm’s investment opportunities. A firm’s capital structure policy is 
determined by a firm’s profitability, growth opportunities and collateralized asset ratio.
4.4.1 Data Sources
Executive compensation data analyzed in the study is drawn from Business 
Week’s annual surveys of executive compensation for the years 1984-1991. Although 
other surveys of compensation are available (Forbes, The Compensation Board), the 
data from Business Week provide the largest and most consistent sample. All other 
variables are from the Compustat Annual Industrial and Over-the Counter Files. These 
variables include total inventories, total assets, gross property, plant and equipment, 
property, plant and equipment expenditures, total long-term debt, net sales, common 
stock dividends, research and development expense, the number of corporation 
employees, operating income before depreciation and common shares reserved for 
conversion—stock options. Both compensation data and Compustat variables must be 
available for the observation to be included in the sample. The final sample resulting
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from the pooling of cross sectional and time series data consists of 2149 company year 
observations from 423 companies in 51 industries.
The following sections describe the measures of policy and explanatory variables 
used in the study. Empirical methods utilized in the analysis are then presented. A 
discussion of hypotheses and empirical results is found in subsequent sections.
4.4.2 Policy Variables
Executive salary and bonus serve as a proxy for managerial compensation 
(COMP). Lewellen and Huntsman, 1970 show that this measure is an adequate 
approximation of total compensation. However, since this measures excludes 
compensation received from incentive plans, a potential error is introduced. If 
incentive payments are a major component o f total salary over the sample period, the 
use o f this proxy will decrease the probability of finding a significant relation between 
compensation and other policy variables due to a smaller variation in measured 
compensation levels.
Dividend yield (DIVS) is defined as dividends per share divided by the closing 
price of the stock for that year. Although alternate measures of dividend policy appear 
in some studies (dividends divided by operating income or net income), dividend yield 
is commonly used to avoid differences across firms in accounting for earnings.
A firm’s capital structure is proxied by the firm’s leverage ratio (LEV). The 
leverage ratio is defined as long-term debt divided by total assets. This proxy for 
capital structure is also used by JS&Z and Mehran (1992).
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4.4.3 Explanatory Variables
Because the explanatory variables incorporated in the analysis are measures of 
firm financial variables, the factors are not completely exogenous. The examination 
requires two assumptions; that explanatory variables that are not completely exogenous 
are predetermined and that each firm strategically selects operational levels to minimize 
agency costs and tax liabilities or to achieve other objectives.
The proxy for executive incentive contracts (OPTIONS) is common shares 
reserved for conversion (stock options). Incentive contracts are an integral part of the 
compensation package determination process (Elton and Rosen, 1983, Lewellen, 
Loderer and Martin, 1987 and Lambert, Larcker and Verrecchia, 1991). Contracting 
theory predicts a significant correlation between executive salaries and incentive plans 
(S&W).
The surrogate measure of firm size is total assets (ASSETS). Production and 
organization economies of scale determine firm size. As firm size increases, 
managerial responsibilities increase and hence compensation levels should increase. 
Earlier studies show that compensation levels are a function o f firm size (McGuire, 
Chiu and Elbing, 1962 and Ciscel, 1974).
The proxy for firm profitability (ROA) is operating income before depreciation 
divided by total assets (DeFusco, Zorn and Johnson, 1991 and JS&Z). Firm 
profitability affects compensation levels (Lewellen and Huntsman, 1970, Murphy, 1985 
and others), dividend policy (Lintner, 1956, Rozeff, 1982 and Miller and Rock, 1985) 
and capital structure (Myers and Majluf, 1984).
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The firm’s growth rate (GROWTH) is defined as the rate of increase in 
corporation employment. An alternate measure, research and development expense as 
a percentage of sales, was also used to proxy for growth; results were consistent using 
either measure. Executive compensation levels in growth firms and non-growth firms 
differ substantially (S&W and Gaver and Gaver, 1993). Dividend policy and capital 
structure are also affected by growth potential (Rozeff, 1982 and Myers, 1977).
The proxy for the collateralized value of assets (COLLAT) is inventories and 
property, plant and equipment divided by total assets (Mehran, 1992). Compensation 
levels and capital structure are a function of the collateralized value of assets (S&W, 
Scott, 1977 and Myers and Majluf, 1984).
The level of investment (INVEST) is proxied by the sum of expenditures for 
plant, property and equipment and research and development expense divided by total 
assets. Investment opportunities are more numerous in growth firms (S&W). JS&Z 
use the same measure as their proxy for investment opportunities. Investment 
opportunities affect dividend policy because the two alternative uses for funds compete 
for available cash flows (Myers and Majluf, 1984).
4.4.4 Empirical Methods
All firms are a function of internal operating choices and external factors 
affecting profitability. If operation were constant across firms, this analysis would be 
reduced to an examination of compensation, dividend and debt levels in each firm and 
identification of the systematic tradeoffs between the policies. Differences in size, 
profitability and other firm specific variables dictate a more detailed analysis.
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S&W show that compensation, dividend policy and financial policy are related 
to and are partially driven by a firm’s investment opportunities. Contracting costs best 
explain the policies but information costs and taxes also influence the policy choices. 
This study builds upon and extends the S&W work in two ways. First, firm level data 
rather than industry level data is used here. Second, previous theoretical modeling and 
empirical results imply that compensation, dividend and debt policy choices are not only 
the product of firm specific characteristics but are interrelated. S&W look at the net 
effects of these factors on policy choices but do not analyze the interaction between 
policy choices. These interactions motivate the determination o f whether these choice 
decisions are made simultaneously. Theory predicts that the costs ensuing from 
informational asymmetries and agency costs resulting from the separation of corporate 
management and corporation owners are minimized by the joint optimization of 
compensation, dividend and debt policies.
The first step in the examination of the interrelations between compensation, 
dividend and debt policies is a cross-sectional analysis o f the policy variables and the 
explanatory variables found by previous work to influence policy choice. Correlation 
coefficients are determined for the variables. No directions of causality can be 
determined from the correlation coefficient analysis.
The proper structuring of executive compensation contracts, dividend policy and 
capital structure are all theorized to decrease asymmetric information and agency costs 
arising from manager and owner separation. These policies are not without costs; the 
structuring of compensation packages to ensure proper managerial activities is difficult.
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Dividends will only reduce informational asymmetries if the signal is costly and cannot 
be imitated. Increased levels o f leverage reduce the levels o f free cash flows but at the 
same time increase bondholder and shareholder conflicts.
The three policy choices can occur independently and still be a function of the 
same firm characteristics. Single equation estimation is incapable of showing any 
potential simultaneity but the concurrent choice of policies can be examined using a 
system of equations. The next step in this analysis examines the interaction of 
executive compensation, dividend policy and capital structure variables while controlling 
for both internal operating choices and external economic factors.
An equation system with one equation for each of the policy decisions is 
analyzed using 3SLS estimation. All of the structural equations are estimated as a set 
rather than each equation being estimated individually. The equations are first 
estimated using the two stage least squares technique and these estimates are used to 
estimate the structural equations’ errors and contemporaneous variance-covariance 
matrix. Generalized least squares estimation is then applied to estimate the large 
equation system. 3SLS is a consistent estimator and has the advantage of being more 
efficient than other least squares methods.
The structural equations system to be estimated is:




Incentive contracts, return on assets, firm growth, assets, the ratio o f collateralized 
assets and investment opportunities are the exogenous variables included in the system.
The simultaneous determination of the policy choice variables fails to explain 
why changes are made in the policies. A residual analysis is conducted to determine 
if direction of causality between executive compensation and dividend policy changes 
can be determined. The two equations are estimated independently using OLS 
regression and the residuals are calculated using the estimated coefficients. The 
equations used in the estimation are:
COMP=CO(LEV,OPTIONS,ASSETS,ROA,GROWTH,COLLAT)
DIVS =DI(LEV,ROA,GROWTH,INVEST)
The residuals calculated represent "orthogonalized compensation" and "orthogonalized 
dividend yields". Any correlation between the variables is indicative of linkages not 
related to the explanatory variables. If executives increase dividends as "hush money" 
to conceal their own increases in compensation, the residuals should be positively 
correlated. A negative relation would result from unusually high dividends being 
associated with low compensation (altruistic executives) or unusually low dividends 
being associated with unusually high compensation (self-interested managers). This 
correlation is consistent with the shareholder and manager conflicts of interest that 
agency and contracting theory are based upon.
The equations are estimated two additional times, first with dividend yield 
lagged one period and a second time with compensation lagged one period. Analysis
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of these residuals allows examination of possible sequencing behavior as an indicator 
of any direction o f causality.
4.4.4 Diagnostic Tests
To determine if the error variance is affected by any of the regressors, 
the White (1980) specification test is used to check for heteroskedasticity in the errors. 
The results show that heteroskedasticity is not a significant problem. Variance inflation 
factors are calculated to determine if serious multicollinearity exists between the 
independent variables. These statistics show no significant multicollinearity.
4.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.5.1 Summary Statistics
Summary statistics of each of the policy variables and explanatory variables are 
shown in Table 4.5. The hypothesis that the mean of the profitability and growth 
variables are each equal to zero is rejected at a 1 percent level of significance. 
Executive compensation averaged almost 1.1 million dollars over the sample period 
while the mean dividend yield was 4.98 percent. The leverage ratio (defined as long­
term debt divided by assets) of 18 percent is similar to the ratio found by Mehran
(1992).
For the sample period, the mean number of common shares reserved for option 
conversion was in excess of 11,000 shares. Firms averaged an over 14.6 percent return 
on assets and the average annual growth rate exceeded 3.6 percent for the sample 
period. The mean investment expenditure was 9.2 percent of total assets.
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4.5.2 Variable Correlation Coefficients
Pearson’s correlation coefficients provide an additional descriptive measure of 
the primary degree of linear association. As shown in Table 4.6, the negative 
correlation between executive compensation and dividends and debt is consistent with 
the prediction of contracting theory and fails to support the hypothesis that dividends 
are used contemporaneously to lessen shareholder anxieties. The positive compensation 
and stock option correlation also supports the contracting hypothesis. Compensation 
levels are positively correlated with both firm size and profitability. The growth 
variable is positively correlated with compensation and negatively correlated with 
dividends and leverage as predicted by contracting theory. The collateralized value of 
assets ratio and investment opportunities are also inversely related to compensation.
Dividend and debt levels are positively correlated—consistent with contracting 
theory but inconsistent with the alternate financing argument of JS&Z. Firm size and 
profitability are also positively correlated with dividend payment levels. Dividend 
levels and the growth and investment opportunity variable are negative as predicted by 
contracting theory.
As expected, the sign on the debt and profitability correlation coefficient is 
negative as predicted due to an decreased need for external financing by more profitable 
firms; however, the coefficient is not statistically significant. In addition, growth 
opportunities are financed with equity rather than debt resulting in a negative correlation 
between debt and growth. Asset levels and debt levels are also positively correlated 
supporting the contracting and tax shield hypotheses. Finally, consistent with the
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TABLE 4.5
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF COMPENSATION, FINANCIAL 
AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE VARIABLES1
COMP DIVS LEV2 OPTIONS ASSETS
Mean 1093.053 4.984 18.178 11.180 15128.290
Std. Dev. 962.446 5.545 13.528 48.563 25590.820
T:Mean=0 52.819** 41.735** 62.294** 10.707** 27.405**
Maximum 15424.000 144.928 110.666 1273.359 230643.000
75% (Q3) 1256.000 6.237 27.329 6.760 14841.000
Median 934.000 3.940 16.620 3.313 5861.133
25% (Ql) 678.000 2.295 6.498 0.251 2557.818
Minimum 216.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 210.660
ROA3 GROWTH4 COLLAT5 INVEST6
Mean 14.624 3.658 74.290 9.242
Std. Dev. 8.878 17.718 41.590 6.827
T:Mean=0 75.794** 9.275** 82.806** 62.749**
Maximum 71.123 18.369 191.185 53.851
75% (Q3) 19.773 6.292 108.140 13.200
Median 14.828 1.025 78.646 8.686
25% (Ql) 10.016 -2.667 50.452 4.294
Minimum -8.204 -7.381 0.000 0.000
1 2149 Observations
2 LEV =  Long-Term Debt/Assets x 100
3 ROA =  Operating Income/Assets x 100
4 GROWTH =  Growth Rate of Corporation Employment
5 COLLAT =  (Inventory +  Property, Plant and Equipment)/Assets x 100
6 INVEST =  (Property, Plant and Equipment Expenditures +  Research and
Development)/Assets x 100 
* Significant at the 5 % level
** Significant at the 1 % level
secured debt hypothesis, debt levels are positively correlated with the collateral value 
of assets.
The variables used in this analysis are patently non-normal. An alternate 
measure of correlation, Kendall’s rank-order correlation coefficients, is a non- 
parametric test that does not assume that the data is distributed normally. These
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correlation coefficients are calculated to ensure that the results are not being driven by 
the lack of normality. The Kendall correlations are consistent with the Pearson 
coefficients.
4.5.3 Three Stage Least Squares Estimation
Table 4.7 displays the results o f the 3SLS estimation of the system of equations. 
The results are largely supportive of contracting theory. In the compensation structural 
equation, the estimates of the dividend and capital structure coefficients are negative 
and differ significantly from zero. These results are consistent with contracting theory 
and signaling theory predictions but do not support the hypothesis that dividends are 
used to reduce investor anxieties. The stock option, firm size and profitability 
coefficient estimates are ail positive and significant. The growth coefficient estimate 
is positive as predicted and differs significantly from zero. The collateralized asset 
value estimate is negative and significant.
In the second structural equation, the estimate of the compensation coefficient 
is negative and significant and the leverage ratio estimate is positive and significant as 
predicted by contracting theory. The estimate of the growth coefficient is also negative 
and significant, also supporting contracting theory. The investment variable coefficient 
is negative and significant. The profitability variable coefficient does not differ 
significantly from zero.
The compensation variable coefficient is negative and significant and the 
dividend variable coefficient is positive and significant in the third structural equation. 
The estimates of the coefficients representing firm profitability and growth are both
TABLE 4.6
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS AMONG COMPENSATION, FINANCIAL AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE VARIABLES
(1984-1991)
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 COMP 1.00
2 DIVS -0.069** 1.00
3 LEV -0.100** 0.108** 1.00
4 OPTIONS 0.082** -0.040 -0.028 1.00
5 ASSETS 0.174** 0.096** 0.099** 0.089** 1.00
6 ROA 0.065** 0.053* -0.012 0.033 -0.485** 1.00
7 GROWTH 0.113** -0.128** -0.051* 0.028 -0.032 0.165** 1.00
8 COLLAT -0.144** 0.115** 0.422** -0.080** -0.394** 0.156** 0.033 1.00
9 INVEST -0.088** -0.069** 0.061** -0.007 -0.346** 0.206** 0.556** 0.523** 1.00
* Significant at the 5 % level
** Significant at the 1 % level
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negative and significant. These results support the theory that more profitable firms 
and firms with more growth opportunities have less debt. The collateralized asset ratio 
variable coefficient is positive and significant as expected.
The 3SLS estimates for the compensation, dividends and debt coefficients all 
differ significantly from zero. These findings imply that the three policy variables are 
jointly and simultaneously determined.
4.5.4 Residual Correlation Analysis
In the previous section, executive compensation, dividend and capital structure 
policies are shown to be simultaneously determined. The finding of a concurrent 
determination process fails to explain why changes are made in the policies. The data 
are reexamined to determine if directions of causality can be determined.
Although no serious multicollinearity exists, the correlation coefficients between 
the variables are significant. The altered structural equations I and II from the 3SLS 
analysis are estimated using compensation and dividend variables orthogonalized to the 
explanatory variables of the equations. This type of analysis biases the examination—no 
significant results are expected. This type of analysis also facilitates the determination 
of potential lag relations between the variables.
The orthogonalized executive compensation and dividend yield correlation 
coefficient is -0.0575 (p-value =  0.0104). Compensation and dividend yield are 
negatively correlated after controlling for leverage, firm size, growth and other 
explanatory variables. This negative relationship is consistent with the results from 
3SLS estimation and supports contracting theory. The correlation coefficient
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TABLE 4.7
THREE STAGE LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES1 OF FINANCIAL AND 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE VARIABLES ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 






(H0:ESTIMATE=0) P > | t |
Structural Equation I
Dependent Variable =  COMP
INTERCEPT 891.857 76.190 11.706 0.0001
DIVS -16.727 3.908 -4.280 0.0001
LEV -4.659 1.854 -2.513 0.0085
OPTIONS 0.947 0.429 2.204 0.0276
ASSETS 0.009 0.001 8.139 0.0001
ROA 24.068 3.123 7.708 0.0001
GROWTH 3.875 1.225 3.163 0.0016
COLLAT -3.027 0.703 -4.305 0.0001
Structural Equation II
Dependent Variable =  DIVS
INTERCEPT 4.409 0.362 13.562 0.0001
COMP -0.001 0.000 -3.982 0.0001
LEV 0.072 0.009 7.737 0.0001
ROA 0.018 0.016 1.113 0.2658
GROWTH -0.028 0.007 -4.016 0.0001
INVEST -0.091 0.021 -4.256 0.0001
Structural Equation III
Dependent Variable =  LEV
INTERCEPT 10.737 0.758 14.149 0.0001
COMP -0.001 0.000 -2.900 0.0036
DIVS 0.283 0.047 6.042 0.0001
ROA -0.463 0.033 -13.782 0.0001
GROWTH -0.043 0.015 -2.870 0.0041
COLLAT 0.176 0.007 23.885 0.0001
1 System Weight R-Square = 0.177
2 2149 Observations
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of compensation and lagged dividend yield is -0.0433 (p-value =  0.0835). 
Compensation levels are also negatively correlated with the previous period’s dividend 
yield. The lagged compensation and dividend correlation is negative but does not differ 
significantly from zero.
The negative lagged dividend yield and compensation correlation could be due 
to changes in the dividend payout amount or changes in the stock price. The 
correlation coefficients are again estimated after redefining the dividend variable as total 
dividends paid by the firm and scaling both compensation and dividends by firm assets. 
The executive compensation and dividend correlation is -0.0731 (p-value =  0.0015) and 
the compensation and lagged dividend correlation is -0.0552 (p-value =  0.0205). The 
lagged compensation and dividend correlation is not significant.
4.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The results of this analysis are largely supportive of the contracting theory and 
support the findings of Smith and Watts (1992). The 3SLS estimates of the policy 
choice variables executive compensation, dividend policy and capital structure all differ 
significantly from zero and the signs are consistent with theory predictions. Executive 
compensation levels are negatively correlated with dividend and debt levels. These 
results are not consistent with the prediction that dividends are used to pacify investors 
and decrease anxieties arising from the separation of management and ownership. 
Alternatively, dividends can be used to decrease investor anxieties but executive 
compensation levels are not a source of anxiety. Dividend and debt levels are positive 
and significant, consistent with contracting and signaling theory predictions but
inconsistent with the tradeoff theory of JS&Z. The significance of the policy variables 
in all three structural equations infers that compensation, dividend and debt policies are 
jointly determined.
CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
"Corporate dividend policy remains a topic on which the field has failed to 
arrive at even a local sense of closure" (Marsh and Merton, 1987). Despite ardent 
theoretical and empirical analysis, financial economists are unable to explain the 
tenacity of the phenomenon. The purpose of this dissertation has been to examine the 
historical evolution of corporate dividend policy, to review the theoretical modeling of 
dividend policy by financial economists and the empirical tests of those theories and to 
examine the interaction between executive compensation, dividend policy and capital 
structure.
Dividend payments began as total distributions of all funds after each sailing 
venture of the joint stock trading companies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
All profits and invested capital were distributed to shareholders on a pro rata basis and 
the enterprise was dissolved. These disbursements were soon limited to profit 
distributions when shareholders and managers found it more expedient to maintain the 
corporation as a going concern. Stockholders received their share of the net profits of 
the voyage based on their original investment, the ships were refitted and resupplied 
and dispatched on another expedition. The distributions later evolved into symbolic 
liquidations made up of both profits and retained earnings when managers realized that 
internal funds provided the least expensive source of capital for expansion of the
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company. Dividend levels are the result of a process that considers profit levels, 
investment opportunities, past payment history and other financial information.
Several recurring themes appear consistently throughout the historical evolution 
of dividend policy. The importance of maintaining a stable or increasing dividend 
payment once payments are begun is paramount in the financial policy decisions of the 
corporation. Managers have used substantial dividends to lessen the shareholder 
anxieties arising from the separation of corporate management and owners. Less than 
ethical managers often resorted to fraudulent activities to maintain payment levels. In 
addition, the determination of dividend payments is a major policy choice rather than 
a residual decision. Finally, shareholders equate consistent and substantial dividend 
payments with firm value. Dividend payments have been the primary input for firm 
valuation by investors over the past three centuries.
The Miller and Modigliani (1961) (M&M) irrelevance declaration is the genesis 
of the modern era of theoretical modeling efforts. In perfect markets, dividend policy 
is irrelevant-corporations lack the incentive to follow a systematic policy. Empirical 
attempts are unable to conclusively support or reject the irrelevance theory. The next 
body of research models dividend policy adds the market imperfection of taxes to the 
equilibrium. The significance of the effect of taxes on dividend policy is not 
questioned—models are either based on the tax adjustment hypothesis (dividends are 
grossed up to offset the tax liabilities of payments) of tax avoidance hypothesis 
(dividend income is sheltered from tax liabilities). The majority of empirical work 
better supports the tax adjustment hypothesis but the literature fails to explain the large
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number of dividend paying corporations or the relative rarity of non-dividend paying 
stocks.
Market imperfections arising from the separation of the corporation’s managers 
and owners and the resulting informational asymmetries are the cornerstone for three 
distinct attempts to explain dividend policy. The need to relay information to 
shareholders that is known exclusively by managers is the basis of dividend signaling 
models. The information content of dividends hypothesis (M&M) posits that 
unexpected changes in dividend policy can relay information to shareholders. A 
number of theoretical models using dividends as signals have been developed. The 
informational content o f dividend hypothesis is supported by the majority of empirical 
analyses; the only test of a theoretical signaling model fails to support the model. The 
second theoretical model resulting from informational asymmetries is based on the 
agency costs arising from the separation of owners and managers (Berle and Means, 
1932 and Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The priorities and goals of managers often 
diverge from activities that are in the best interests of shareholders (Kaysen, 1960 and 
Gordon, 1961). Dividends lower these costs by reducing the cash available for 
managerial improprieties and increasing the monitoring of managerial efforts by capital 
markets (Easterbrook, 1984). The free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986), the third 
theoretical model, combines the signaling and agency cost models. Empirical tests 
generally support these theories.
The influence of societal norms (Shiller, 1984) and corporate traditions (Lintner, 
1956 and Frankfurter and Lane, 1991) on dividend policy and the use of dividends to
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decrease investor anxieties resulting from the separation of corporate ownership and 
management (Frankfurter and Lane, 1991) are the underpinnings for behavioral 
modeling efforts. Dividend policy is an active decision variable and dividends are 
changed only when managers are confident of the permanence of the higher levels of 
earnings. Dividend payment tradition is an important input in the dividend decision 
(Lintner, 1956, Baker, Farrelly and Edelman, 1985 and Baker and Farrelly, 1988).
Differences in method of analysis, data type and sample period are commonly 
cited reasons for the conflicting results obtained in empirical analyses of theoretical 
dividend models. An empirical analysis of the tests o f dividend theory shows that none 
of these factors have any significant explanatory power in the results of the analysis. 
Rather than the conflicting results being attributable to a factor commonly cited as the 
element responsible for the discrepancy, the analysis implies that the paradigm is 
incomplete in its modeling of corporate dividend policy.
Research investigating the determinants of executive compensation, dividend 
policy and capital structure policy decisions have primarily relied on single equation 
models to determine the significance of individual firm characteristics on these policy 
choices. This analysis uses a system of equations and finds that compensation, dividend 
and debt policy decision are made concurrently. The associations between the policy 
variables and the variables representing firm specific characteristics are for the most 
part consistent with contracting theory and signaling theory predictions.
The payment of dividends to shareholders has been a corporate tradition for over 
three centuries; dividend payment policy remains a significant financial policy decision.
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Despite the importance of this tradition, financial economists have largely neglected this 
influence in the development of the theoretical dividend policy paradigm. Although 
difficult to model, the incorporation of this corporate tradition into theoretical modeling 
efforts could open new avenues for the unraveling of the dividend puzzle.
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APPENDIX A 
METHOD OF ANALYSIS ABBREVIATIONS
A. Abnormal Return Methods o f Analysis
AARA Average Adjusted Returns Analysis
ES Event Study Method of Analysis (Fama and Babiak,
1968, Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll, 1969, 
Fama, 1976, Aharony and Swary, 1980, 
Brown and Warner, 1980, Masulis, 1980 
and Brown and Warner, 1985)




Option Price Changes 
PriceA/PriceB Ratio
Price ratio between two classes o f common stock 
Elton and Gruber (1970) Method 
Modified Elton and Gruber (1970) Method 
Changes in Option Prices 
Price ratio between two issues
C. Regression Analysis Methods of Analysis
ALS Augmented Least Squares
IV Instrumental Variables
LOGIT Logit Analysis
MRA Multiple Regression Analysis
OLS Ordinary Least Squares Analysis
RCRA Random Coefficient Regression Analysis (Swamy,
1970, 1971 and 1974)
RRA Recursive Regression Analysis
SUR Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (Zellner, 1962)
TSRA Time Series Regression Analysis
2SLS Two Stage Least Square Analysis
3SLS Three Stage Least Squares Analysis
TOBIT Tobit Analysis




METHOD OF ANALYSIS ABBREVIATIONS
D. Other Methods o f analysis
ANOVA RBD Analysis of Variance Randomized Block Design
BJM Box Jenkins Method
Corr Coeff Correlation Coefficient Method
CSA Cross Spectral Analysis
DA Aggregate Data Analysis
GC Test Granger Causality Test (Granger, 1969)
Means Test Means Test
NP Tests Non-Parametric Tests (Wilcoxin Signed Rank Test,
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients) 
VAR Vector Auto-Regression (Sims, 1980)
APPENDIX B
CATEGORICAL VARIABLE ANALYSIS METHOD OF ANALYSIS
CDAM is a multivariate method of analysis that was originally developed around 
the turn of the century (Fienberg, 1978). The technique utilizes a multidimensional 
contingency table to cross classify data into categories. Each category count represents 
the frequency of a unique combination of categorical variables in the sample. The 
population variable-level combination probability is estimated using iterative WLS using 
the observed frequency (Fingleton, 1984). Iterative WLS improves WLS estimates by 
first estimating the weights, fitting the regression function and calculating the residuals 
using WLS. The residuals from the first estimation are then used to re-estimate the 
weights and the regression is refitted. The process continues until no significant 
changes occur in the weights.
The explanatory variables used in the analysis are assumed to represent true 
categorical variables and not a blend of variables and not combinations of explanatory 
variables. Each of the variables used in the analysis are independent categorical 
variables. In addition, explanatory variables are assumed to be fixed and play a 
defining role in the study and can be continuous or discrete. The method also assumes 
that explanatory variables are mutually independent—the knowledge of one o f the 
independent categorical variables does not ensure correct prediction of another 
explanatory variable. CDAM further assumes that the table frequencies follow a
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product multinomial distribution (Fingleton, 1984). The product multinomial 
distribution requires that each observation in the sample be classified based on its 
unique combination of explanatory variables.
CDAM and ANOVA are similar methods of analysis. Both CDAM and 
ANOVA estimate the interaction between variables. The methods differ in that 
ANOVA models estimate the effects of the independent variables on the dependent 
variable and partition the overall variability of the model. In contrast, CDAM estimates 
the structural relation between the variables by estimating the parameters and testing 
hypotheses about linear combinations of these parameters. The null hypothesis is 
formulated so as to test the fit of the model. The test statistics calculated are 
generalized Wald (1943) statistics that approximate an asymptotic x2 distribution.
The multidimensional contingency table displays cross classified counts based 
on each of several sets of categories and facilitates CDAM (Fienberg, 1980). The table 
rows represent samples determined by unique combinations of independent variables 
while the table columns are determined by dependent variable response. The count in 
the (ij)th cell is the quantity of individuals in the ith population that have the y'th 
response. The sample proportion, p(y =  n /̂ny estimates the probability of the jth 
response (tt^). The proportion vector p is converted into a function vector F =  F(p). 
If the true probabilities for the entire table is represented by the vector tt, the functions 
of the probabilities F(7r) follow the linear model
Ea(F> = F(tt) = XjS
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where EA indicates the asymptotic expectation, X is the fixed constant design matrix 
and /3 is the parameter vector that is estimated.
The WLS estimation method is utilized to estimate the structural relation 
between the variables. The weights are determined from the inverse covariance matrix 
of the F(p) functions of F and b (/3 estimate) and the weighted residual sum of squares 
is minimized. If S is defined as the estimated covariance matrix of F, the fit of the 
model is determined using the test statistic
F'S_1F - b 'C X 'S'^b
which is asymptotically distributed x2- The goodness o f fit of the model is tested with 
the null hypothesis
H0 = C/3 =  0
where C is a matrix of arbitrary constants. The test statistic for this hypothesis
b'C ,[C(X'S"1X)'1C']"1Cb 
follows an asymptotically x 2 distribution if  H0 is true. Although the maximum 
likelihood estimation method of CDAM has a smaller variance, WLS regression CDAM 
is less complex and the difference in variance is not significant (Grizzle, Starmer and 
Koch, 1969).
APPENDIX C
CATEGORICAL VARIABLE ANALYSIS METHOD OF ANALYSIS RESULTS
The following tables show the results of CDAM analysis of the empirical 
analyses of corporate dividend policy. In Table C l, methods of analysis are partitioned 
into four groups; abnormal return, price change, regression analysis and other methods. 
Table C2 shows the results from dividing data type into studies using annual, quarterly, 
monthly and daily data. The results from the analysis of the study’s midpoint as the 
only explanatory variable are shown in Table C3 while Table C4 shows the results from 
analysis with the publication outlet as the only variable. None of the variables are 
significant in the analyses.
TABLE Cl
ANALYSIS OF WEIGHTED LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES 
OBTAINED FROM CATEGORICAL VARIABLE ANALYSIS OF 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF CORPORATE DIVIDEND POLICY1








Intercept 0.2036 0.0372 29.97 0.0001
Price Change -0.0640 0.0527 1.48 0.2244
Regression Analysis 0.0964 0.0814 1.40 0.2365
Other 0.0536 0.0524 1.04 0.3068
1 The empirical analyses evaluated are obtained from Tables 3.1-3.8.




ANALYSIS OF WEIGHTED LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES 
OBTAINED FROM CATEGORICAL VARIABLE ANALYSIS OF 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF CORPORATE DIVIDEND POLICY1








Intercept 0.2160 0.0396 29.80 0.0001
Quarterly 0.0567 0.0676 0.70 0.4013
Monthly -0.0285 0.0502 0.32 0.5702
Daily 0.0449 0.0759 0.35 0.5542
1 The empirical analyses evaluated are obtained from Tables 3.1-3.8.
2 N = 155 in this analysis.
TABLE C3
ANALYSIS OF WEIGHTED LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES 
OBTAINED FROM CATEGORICAL VARIABLE ANALYSIS OF 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF CORPORATE DIVIDEND POLICY1
EXPLANATORY VARIABLE: STUDY MIDPOINT
STANDARD CHI PROBABILITY
VARIABLE ESTIMATE ERROR SQUARE2 (P=VALUE)
Intercept 0.2169 0.0330 41.26 0.0001
Late3 0.0440 0.0330 1.70 0.1923
1 The empirical analyses evaluated are obtained from Tables 3.1-3.8.
2 N = 155 in this analysis.
3 Late studies are those with sample period midpoints of 1975 and later.
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TABLE C4
ANALYSIS OF WEIGHTED LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES 
OBTAINED FROM CATEGORICAL VARIABLE ANALYSIS OF 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF CORPORATE DIVIDEND POLICY1
EXPLANATORY VARIABLE: PUBLICATION OUTLET
STANDARD CHI PROBABILITY
VARIABLE ESTIMATE ERROR SQUARE2 (P=VALUE)
Intercept 0.2400 0.0340 47.37 0.0001
Other3 0.0032 0.0340 0.01 0.9269
1 The empirical analyses evaluated are obtained from Tables 3.1-3.8.
2 N =  155 in this analysis.
3 Other publications are all studies not appearing in The Journal o f  Finance, Journal o f
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Journal o f  Financial Economics and The Review  
o f  Financial Studies.
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